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A bstract
The first two essays examine the functioning of two local governance institutions 
empowered or created by the 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution. First, 
I look at village meetings which were given real decision-making powers by the 
constitutional amendment, thus becoming real deliberative spaces. The set­
ting of village meetings allows me to study deliberative democracy, a  frequently 
discussed but infrequently empirically examined alternative to preference ag­
gregation (such as through voting). In particular, by using village meetings 
transcripts and linking them  with a household survey, I am able to investigate 
the relationship between group and individual characteristics, and voice. My 
main findings show th a t not all villagers are equally heard in the meetings. I 
find tha t the deliberations are not equitable, relative to  norms of equal influence 
relative to group size, and of equal time dedicated to each participant.
Second, I look at political reservations for women, m andated by the same 
constitutional amendment. By using a household survey th a t includes the house­
hold of the village leader, I am able to examine whether the leaders in reserved 
constituencies are token women, chosen from among the weak women of the vil­
lage only to be controlled by the traditional elites. I find th a t the women leaders 
are not weak, as they are among the younger, wealthier and more knowledge­
able women in the village. In addition to this finding about the selection of 
women, I am also comparing the policy outcomes between reserved and unre­
served constituencies. I find th a t women perform no differently from men in 
terms of provision of public goods, but also th a t women perform worse than 
men in terms of meeting with upper level officials. A finding th a t emphasizes 
the antagonism between women leaders and the traditional elites, is th a t women 
leaders’ performance is negatively affected by the concentration of landowner- 
ship in the hands of the upper castes.
In the third essay I examine the role of gubernatorial political incentives in 
the provision of assistance to the elderly in the early years of social security 
in the United States. I find th a t assistance to the elderly is higher when the 
term  limit is not binding. Furthermore, as predicted by my theoretic model, I 
find tha t the term  limit effect is present only in the states where the fraction 
elderly takes on moderate values. In addition the term  limit effect is smaller 
when political competition is less intense. These findings combined suggest tha t 
assistance to elderly is shaped by the electoral incentives of the state governor.
Finally, in the fourth essay, I examine the change in the likelihood of voting 
due to a weather shock. In particular, I find tha t the decrease in the likeli­
hood of voting due to rain during the election day is higher for less educated, 
relative to more educated individuals. One hypothesis th a t I put forward is 
th a t individuals who experience a lower drop in the likelihood of voting due 
to rain act strategically because they realize th a t their vote is likely to  weigh 
more given th a t overall voting presence is reduced. An im portant assumption 
th a t I make is tha t, conditional on the comprehensive set of observable indi­
vidual characteristics, the increase in the cost of voting due to rain is equal 
across individuals. Using measures of rain for specific time intervals during the 
election day I make comparisons between individuals for whom this im portant 
assumption may hold.
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Introduction
Tim Besley in his 2004 Keynes Lecture [Besley 2004] defines the recent re­
search at the intersection of economics and political science as "The New Politi­
cal Economy." A defining feature of The New Political Economy is an emphasis 
on taking theoretical hypotheses, about the functioning of institutions or about 
individual incentives, to data. This empirical emphasis forms the substance of 
the following collection of essays. Each essay asks a political economy question 
and answers it by examining the appropriate dataset.
The first two essays examine the functioning of two local governance institu­
tions empowered or created by the 73rd amendment to  the Indian constitution. 
First, I look at village meetings which were given real decision-making powers by 
the constitutional amendment, thus becoming real deliberative spaces. The set­
ting of village meetings allows me to study deliberative democracy, a  frequently 
discussed but infrequently empirically examined alternative to preference ag­
gregation (such as through voting). In particular, by using village meetings 
transcripts and linking them  with a household survey, I am able to investigate 
the relationship between group and individual characteristics, and voice. My 
main findings show th a t not all villagers are equally heard in the meetings. I 
find tha t the deliberations are not equitable, relative to  norms of equal influence 
relative to group size, and of equal time dedicated to each participant.
Second, I look a t political reservations for women, m andated by the same 
constitutional amendment. In the second essay I follow the pioneering work of 
Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo [2004] who first investigated the
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outcomes of these reservations by exploiting the econometric boon of random as­
signment of reserved constituencies. By using a household survey th a t includes 
the household of the village leader, I am able to examine whether the leaders in 
reserved constituencies are token women, chosen from among the weak women of 
the village only to be controlled by the traditional elites. I find th a t the women 
leaders are not weak, as they are among the younger, wealthier and more knowl­
edgeable women in the village. In addition to this finding about the selection 
of women, I am also able to look a t the traditionally examined outcome of the 
reservation process - the comparison of policy outcomes between reserved and 
unreserved constituencies. I find th a t women perform no differently from men 
in terms of provision of public goods, but also th a t women perform worse than  
men in terms of meeting with upper level officials. An additional finding th a t 
emphasizes the antagonism between women leaders and the traditional elites, is 
th a t women leaders’ performance is negatively affected by the concentration of 
landownership in the hands of the upper castes.
In the third essay I examine the role of gubernatorial political incentives in 
the provision of assistance to  the elderly in the early years of social security in the 
United States. Here, I follow in the footsteps of Tim Besley and Anne Case[1995] 
who have first examined empirically the effect of gubernatorial term  limits on 
policy outcomes. This essay shows tha t, a t least during its inception, old age 
assistance was shaped by institutions, in particular political incentives generated 
by term  limits, rather than  by the preferences of the voters. In addition, this 
essay complements the literature on the political motives behind the New Deal 
relief programs. However, in contrast with the existing literature, this essay 
provides a clearer identification of the political incentives by using sta te  level 
policy measures and w ithin-state variation in term  limits. To be specific, I 
find th a t assistance to the elderly is higher when the term  limit is not binding. 
Furthermore, as predicted by my theoretic model, I find th a t the term  limit 
effect is present only in the states where the fraction elderly takes on moderate 
values. In addition the term  limit effect is smaller when political competition
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is less intense. These findings combined suggest th a t assistance to elderly is 
shaped by the electoral incentives of the state governor.
Finally, in the fourth essay, I examine the change in the likelihood of voting 
due to a weather shock. In particular, I find th a t the decrease in the likeli­
hood of voting due to rain during the election day is higher for less educated, 
relative to more educated individuals. One hypothesis th a t I pu t forward is 
th a t individuals who experience a lower drop in the likelihood of voting due 
to rain act strategically because they realize th a t their vote is likely to weigh 
more given th a t overall voting presence is reduced. An im portant assumption 
th a t I make is tha t, conditional on the comprehensive set of observable indi­
vidual characteristics, the increase in the cost of voting due to rain is equal 
across individuals. Using measures of rain for specific time intervals during the 
election day I make comparisons between individuals for whom this im portant 
assumption may hold.
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Chapter 1
Is D eliberation Equitable? 
Evidence from Transcripts 
of Village M eetings in 
South India1
1.1 Introduction
A decision-making process is considered democratic if it results in an out­
come that reflects the ’will of the people’. Democracy’s central challenge is to 
discern this will, particularly among people with different preferred outcomes. 
The theory of democracy proposes, according to Jon Elster[1986], two solutions 
to this challenge. The first solution, the subject of social choice theory, aggre­
gates preferences across individuals. In this view of the world individuals do not 
interact with each other, they simply express their preferences, as they would 
do in a market transaction. The second solution to the democratic challenge 
is deliberation. Instead of aggregating preferences across individuals, the ideal 
deliberative process consists of discussions during which some individuals can be 
persuaded by others to change their preferences and a t the end of which "unan­
imous preferences" (Elster, 1986, p. 112) emerge. In this paper we use data  
extracted from transcripts of village meetings, coupled with household surveys,
1 T his chapter is based on joint work with Vijayendra Rao
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to empirically explore the mechanism of deliberation. In particular, we look 
at the extent to which individual preferences for public goods are matched by 
discussion of public goods in the meetings.
It is im portant to keep in mind th a t our study does not have a counterfactual 
institution. We do not claim the village meetings are inequitable with respect 
to other forms of direct or deliberative democracy. As these village meetings 
are constitutionally mandated a real counterfactual does not exist. The scope 
of our study is limited to the deliberative space of these village meetings and 
we can only claim th a t we find inequities in this space, relative to a norms of 
equal group level influence relative to group size and equal time dedicated to 
every participant.
There is a large literature on processes th a t aggregate individual preferences 
- particularly on voting behaviors, but the literature on deliberative processes is 
relatively sparse: Osborne, Rosenthal, and Turner[2000] study participation in 
meetings from a theoretical perspective. Their model assumes tha t individuals 
have favorite policies represented by a point in a multidimensional space, with 
valuations depending only on the Euclidean distance between the implemented 
policy and their favored policy. This model predicts th a t only individuals with 
extreme positions participate in meetings. They assume th a t the outcome of the 
meeting is a function of the favorite policies of the participants and conclude 
th a t the outcome is likely to be random. Turner and Weninger[2005] do an 
empirical test of this theoretical model using data  on the participation of firms 
in public regulatory meetings. They find th a t firms with preference for extreme 
rather than  moderate policies are much more likely to  attend. Besley, Pande, 
and Rao[2005a], using the same household level da ta  from our paper, study 
the determ inants of participation in village meetings. They find th a t women, 
illiterates, and the wealthy (in term  of asset ownership) are less likely to a ttend  
the meetings but disadvantaged castes and the landless are more likely to attend. 
They also find th a t when village meetings are held the targeting of benefits to
10
the poor (Below Poverty Line cards) is more effective.2
Some scholars (Dryzek and List[2003], List [2008]) argue th a t social choice 
and deliberative democracy should not be viewed as antagonists because delib­
eration may in fact free social choice from the impossibility results by making 
individual preference more single peaked and hence amenable to aggregation by 
voting. List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean[2006] find evidence for the effect of 
deliberation on preferences. They use data  from deliberative polls, and measure 
individuals preference before and after the deliberation. Their results show th a t 
deliberation does indeed move preferences closer to single peakedness.
Deliberative processes have acquired particular im portance in recent years, 
particularly in the developing world, because of the increasing emphasis placed 
on community-based decision making by policy makers[Mansuri and Rao 2004]. 
P art of the reason for this emphasis is a belief th a t involving people to participate 
in decisions th a t affect their own lives will make development more "demand- 
driven," and improve the quality of governance by increasing the proximity of 
decision-making processes to citizens and thus enhance transparency and ac­
countability. This has led countries around the world to give increasing powers 
to local governments[Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006]. Several scholars have ex­
pressed concern th a t in unequal societies this would subject village decisions to 
the risk of elite-capture ([Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000], [Bardhan 2002]), bu t 
there is not much evidence about how these processes actually work3.
Much of what we know about the empirics of deliberative processes are 
from deliberative polls which are a set of methods developed by the political 
scientist James Fishkin and his colleagues where groups of randomly chosen in­
dividuals are gathered in groups to conduct discussions on particular subjects
2Also see Chaudhuri and Heller[2003] for evidence on the highly positive im pact of a 
campaign that empowered gram sabhas  in the state of Kerala.
3 There is some evidence analyzing the match between the preferences of individuals and the  
outcom es of com mm unity-based decisions, a process known in that literature as "preference- 
targetting" (Mansuri and Rao 2004). Chattopadhaya and Duflo[(2004b)] exam ine the role of 
political reservations for women on the match between w om en’s preferences and the decisions 
of gram panchayats, Rao and Ibanez[2005] and Labonne and Chase[2007] study the match be­
tween preferences of households and the outcomes of com m ity-based decision making showing  
some elite dominance.
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(h ttp ://cdd .stan fo rd .edu /). The method has generated a wealth of informa­
tion on deliberation, but it has the limitation th a t the deliberative processes 
studied are not a part of a regular and routine system of government bu t the 
result of an academic intervention within an constrained setting. Studies of 
deliberative systems of government are very rare and largely qualitative. Jane 
Mainsbridge’s[1983] seminal ethnography of town meetings in Vermont provides 
rich insights into how deliberation works as a system of government and comes 
closest to an analysis of the kind we conduct in this paper. Her work outlines 
the complexity of the deliberative process but largely supports the idea th a t 
common interests facilitate deliberation, particularly in settings where citizens 
prefer to avoid adversarial discussions4. On the other hand, Jam es Madison 
in the Federalist Papers (Federalist No. 10 [1787]) famously cautioned th a t "a 
pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of cit­
izens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can adm it of no 
cure for the mischiefs of faction." Similarly, Albert Hirschman[1976] has argued 
th a t deliberation may be manipulated by an "articulate minority". There is, 
however, a lack of credible evidence testing whether deliberative processes can 
result in domination by a faction (Fishkin and Lushkin (p. 294)).
In this paper we examine the mechanism of deliberation in Indian village 
governments. Our data  consisting of transcripts of open village meetings, gram  
sabhas, empowered by the Indian constitution to  make im portant decisions for 
the village, linked with household-level preferences, enable us to examine the 
relationship between individual preferences and the preferences th a t emerge 
during deliberations. Our research question is whether the deliberations in 
the village meetings are equitable along two dimensions. First, we consider 
equitability from the perspective of different villager groups, such as the groups 
defined by landownership. In this perspective village meetings are equitable if 
groups of equal size have equal influence on the topics of discussion. Second, 
we consider equitability from the perspective of individuals who have different
4 Also see the Fung and Wright[2003] edited volume that has several case-studies of delib­
erative decision making.
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priorities. In this perspective village meetings are equitable if the priorities of 
all individuals are allotted representation and time in the meeting. We find 
th a t the group of large landowners has an unduly large influence on the topics 
of discussion relative to its size. At the same time we are able to uncover the 
role of interactions between different groups in the process of deliberation. Our 
evidence suggests th a t the landless and large landowners free ride on each o ther’s 
support, while the support of the large and small landowners is complementary 
to each other.
We also find th a t the preferences of the landed individuals are more likely to 
be mentioned in the meeting and are also taking up more tim e in the meetings. 
Equally im portant, the voices of disadvantaged castes, while not dominating 
the meeting, are also heard. The transcript data allows us to distinguish be­
tween officials’ and villagers’ talk, as well as between men’s and women’s talk. 
Using these partitions, we are able to more accurately pinpoint the source of 
these effects. We find th a t the land dominance effect does not stem  from the 
officials favoring the landed in their talk but rather from the landed being more 
vocal among villagers. In addition, we find tha t the preferences of the disad­
vantaged castes are more likely to be mentioned in the officials’ talk  but not in 
the villagers’ talk. W ithin villagers’ talk we also notice th a t the preferences of 
Muslims are taking up less time, relative to the those of Hindus. This finding 
suggests th a t the Muslim minority, which does not benefit from the affirma­
tive action measures offered to disadvantaged castes, is marginalized in these 
meetings. Another notable finding is tha t within women’s talk  the preferences 
of women take up more time. This finding is particularly im portant in light 
of the measures taken by the Indian government to promote the political par­
ticipation of women. In the transcripts we were also able to identify instances 
where decisions regarding the provision or maintenance of public goods were 
taken. Using these instances, we find th a t decisions, and in particular positive 
decisions, are more likely to be reached for the public goods preferred by the 
landed class. We want to emphasize th a t the evidence of inequities is restricted
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to the deliberative space of the village meetings. We do not have data  about 
the policy outcomes th a t may follow these meetings, so we cannot say whether 
the inequities in deliberation translate into inequities in outcomes.
Having found tha t the preferences of the landed class are more likely to 
be mentioned and take up more time in the meeting, we also want to investi­
gate whether any village level characteristics accentuate or mitigate this effect. 
Literacy has been shown to have a positive effect on the outcomes of local gover­
nance. For example, Besley, Pande and Rao[2005b] find th a t increased literacy 
reduces village leaders’ opportunism. Our findings also show th a t literacy has a 
positive effect in th a t it mitigates the power of the landed in village meetings. 
Political reservations for women and disadvantaged castes have been also docu­
mented to play an im portant role in local governance. The evidence on the role 
of women’s reservations is mixed. Chattopadhyay and Duflo[2004b] find tha t 
women leaders benefit their villages while providing the public goods preferred 
by women. Ban and Rao[2008a], on the other hand, find th a t women leaders do 
not influence the provision of public goods and tha t their performance is ham­
pered by the presence of a large upper caste landowner faction. Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo[2004a], and Besley, Pande and Rao[2004b] find th a t reservations for 
disadvantaged castes yield benefits to the members of these castes in the village. 
In this paper, we find th a t reservations for women and disadvantaged castes ex­
acerbate the power of the landed in village meetings. Finally, we examine the 
role of upper level supervision in these meetings. We find th a t the presence of a 
powerful upper level bureaucrat, the Block Development Officer, m itigates the 
power of the landed in village meetings.
1.2 T he C ontext: V illage G overnm ent in South  
India
Article 243 of the Indian constitution empowers village councils ( Gram Pan- 
chayats - henceforth GPs) elected every five years with the powers to prepare
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and implement plans for "economic development and social justice," it also 
m andates th a t a gram sabha, a deliberative body consisting of all individuals 
registered to vote within the Gram PanchayaVs jurisdiction, will exercise such 
powers and functions as given it to it by the state legislature. In the South 
Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, where 
our data  are from, the state legislatures have given the gram sabhas consider­
able powers. They are expected to  prepare village plans, discuss budgets, select 
beneficiaries for government program, impose new taxes and modify old ones, 
and discuss "such other m atters as may be prescribed." In effect these states 
have made gram sabhas the linchpin of village government and m andate tha t 
they should be held between two to four times a year, depending on the state. 
This power is somewhat tem pered by the fact tha t G P budgets in most In­
dian states, with the exception of Kerala, have been low, and gram sabhas are 
not held as regularly as required by state law (Besley, Pande, and Rao[2005a]). 
However, the rights granted to them  by law to make decisions on public good 
allocation and beneficiary selection, which are central to village life, ensure tha t 
gram sabhas are a powerful, constitutionally m andated, deliberative space.
The average gram sabha lasts 86 minutes. They typically begin with a 
presentation by a village official - either the president or the village secretary, 
after which the discussion is opened to the public. Occasionally an agenda 
is circulated in advance which directs the discussion towards certain subjects 
but, more usually, it is an open discussion where villagers bring up particular 
demands or grievances which are then responded to by a member of the council, 
or the village secretary - a local bureaucrat who assists the council. This call- 
response model is sometimes diverted by an extensive speech either by a council 
member or a villager on topics th a t can range from requests to comply with 
tax  payments, to  critiques of affirmative action, to a hagiography of the village 
council’s tenure outlining its various accomplishments. The la tter is more likely 
to occur when the gram sabha is held during an election year.
Local officials such as public works engineers are required to attend  the
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gram sabha to answer technical questions and respond to concerns. Sometimes 
higher-level officials also attend. The most significant of these is the Block 
Development Officer (BDO) who is the administrative officer in charge of the 
Block (sub-district level adm inistrative entity) where the G P is located. The 
BDO is a powerful person and his (it is almost always a  him) presence can 
significantly alter the discourse of deliberation because he has the power to 
make things happen: allocate budgets and people to  pressing needs, and to 
impose sanctions in case of improprieties. Article 243 also m andates political 
reservations for presidencies of councils and for council members seats. The 
proportion of seats reserved for underprivileged castes ("scheduled castes" and 
"backward castes") is allocated according to their proportion in the population, 
and a third of the seats are reserved for women5.
1.3 D ata  and M ethodology
In order to study gram sabha deliberations we bring together two different 
sources of information. In November 2001 we conducted a survey at the village 
and household level to study various aspects of GPs in South India employing 
a sampling methodology described in detail in the next section. One randomly 
chosen adult from every household in the sample was asked questions about the 
household’s socioeconomic status, household structure, views and use of public 
services in the village, and access to targeted benefits from the government. The 
respondents were also asked to provide open-ended responses rank-ordering their 
preference for problems in the village th a t needed attention. The problems were 
elicited from the respondent and postcoded into broader categories. From this 
ordering we constructed an individual preference measure: defined as his or her 
first-ranked problem in the village.
Then from January to September 2003 we tape-recorded the proceedings of
5 Previous research has dem onstrated that reservations can alter the na­
ture of decisons made by panchayats (Besley et al. [2004b], Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo[Chattopadhyay and Duflo(2004a)] [(2004b)])
16
38 gram sabhas in a sub-sample of the villages surveyed in the 2001 survey. This 
was supplemented by another round of 93 gram sabha recordings from October 
2004 to February 2006 - where the 38 villages from 2003 were revisited along 
with an additional 55 villages, also selected from the original 2001 sample. Ta­
ble 1.1 presents the meeting breakdown by round and state. Each transcript 
was divided into paragraphs, according to the natural pauses in speech. In the 
transcripts, all speakers were identified by position (official or villager) and gen­
der6. A change in speaker automatically translates into a new paragraph, bu t 
a speaker can have more than one consecutive paragraph. For each paragraph 
the topics mentioned were recorded via two methods: First, topics were manu­
ally coded, by reading every transcript and noting the topics mentioned in each 
paragraph. Second, to ensure the replicability of our findings, we coded the 
topics by keyword searches7. The two methods yield very similar results, and in 
the paper we will base our results on the keyword-searched topics. In addition, 
we also identify whether a decision was taken in any paragraph, whether it was 
a decision for or against, and the topic of the decision. This identification of 
decisions was done manually. In the appendix we provide a couple of examples 
of decisions. Hence, we can partition the transcripts based on the hierarchical 
position of the speaker (official or villager), the gender8 of the speaker, and on 
whether the paragraph contains a decision (for or against). In Table 1.2 we 
present summaries for the occurrence and the fraction of lines dedicated to each 
of these partitions.
We define two measures for each topic: the occurrence of the topic, as a 
dummy variable, and the intensity of the topic. The intensity of the topic is 
defined as the ratio between the number of lines in the paragraphs in which 
the topic was mentioned and the total number of lines in the transcript. Fur­
thermore, we apply the definitions of these measures to  every partition. Hence, 
we have an occurrence and intensity measure for officials’ talk, villagers’ talk,
6 Speaker caste is also identified in some transcripts.
7The list of keywords is available upon request
8The gender of the speaker was not identified in 10% of the discussions, including one full 
transcript
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women’s talk, men’s talk, any decision, decision for, and decision against9. In 
Table 1.3 we present the summaries of topic measures overall and for each par­
tition.
As explained in more detail below, we construct measures of group level 
support for each topic and analyze how support among different groups impacts 
the likelihood of a topic being mentioned. Furthermore, we match household 
level preferences with the topics revealed in the gram sabha in the household’s 
village. These matched topics are then studied both as indicators, and in their 
level of intensity, to understand the types of households who are more likely to 
have their preferences discussed in the gram sabha.
1.3.1 Sam pling
The sample was selected from seven districts in the four South Indian states, 
two in Andhra Pradesh (AP) -  Medak and Chithoor, three in K arnataka (KA) 
-  Bidar, Kolar and Dakshin Kanada, two in Kerala (KE) -  Kasargod and 
Palakkad, and two in Tamil Nadu (TN) -  D harm apuri and Coimbatore. Dis­
tricts within states and blocks (sub-district level entities) within districts were 
purposively chosen to control for common histories and cultural similarities. 
The district and block sampling is less relevant for this paper and is described 
in more detail in Besley et. al. ([2004a]).
The blocks are divided into several GPs -  each of which consist of between 
1 and 6 villages depending on the state. From every sampled block in AP, 
KA and TN we randomly selected 3 of our 6 sampled GPs and conducted 
household interviews in all the sampled villages falling within these GPs. In 
Kerala we randomly selected 2 GPs in one block and one GP in the other 
block. W ithin sampled GPs we conducted household interviews in all sampled
9 For exam ple, the occurence measure for water in officials’ talk equals 1 if water is a topic 
in a paragraph spoken by an official and 0 otherwise. The intensity measure for water in 
officials’ talk equals the ratio between the number of lines in paragraphs spoken by an official 
on the topic of water divided by the total number of lines in the transcript. It is im portant 
to note that the denominator for the intensity measures is always the total number of lines in 
the transcript
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wards10. This results in a household sample th a t draws from 101 GPs with 
259 villages. Twenty households were sampled at random from every selected 
village11, of which four always belonged to Scheduled Caste or Tribes (henceforth 
SC /ST  -  who benefit from affirmative action programs m andated by the Indian 
constitution). In addition to these randomly sampled households the president 
of the GP, and the ward members were also subjected to a household interview. 
This yielded a total number of 5445 households.
Due to budgetary limitations we om itted recording gram sabhas in Andhra 
Pradesh in round 1. In the other three states we randomly selected 4 blocks 
from Karnataka, 5 blocks from Kerala, and 6 blocks from Tamil Nadu, resulting 
in a to tal gram sabha sample of 38 villages. In round 2 we expanded the sample 
to include the state of Andhra Pradesh where we visited 18 villages in 6 blocks. 
In the other three states, in addition to the villages where we recorded gram 
sabhas in 2003 we sampled 10 more blocks resulting in an to tal sample of 131 
gram sabhas in 97 villages. Out of these 131 visited gram sabhas, in 4 instances 
the village leaders did not allow the proceedings to be taped.
To explore the relationship between individual preferences and the topics 
discussed during the gram sabha we link the household data  to the meeting 
transcript from the same village. In the villages where both rounds of meetings 
were recorded, each household is counted twice. Hence, our analysis is based 
on the subset of 2488 households located in villages where gram sabhas were 
recorded.
1.3.2 M ethodology
In our analysis we begin with the assumption th a t there are no constraints 
th a t prevent all topics to be mentioned in any single transcript. To support
this assumption we present the distribution of the number of topics mentioned
10 In Kerala, wards are of approximately the same size as villages in the other three states
11 The survey team  leader in every village walked the entire village to map it and identify 
total number of households. This was used to determ ine what fraction of households in the 
village were to be surveyed. The start point of the survey was randomly chosen, and after 
that every X th household was surveyed such that the entire village was covered (going around 
the village in a clockwise fashion with X ^N um ber of H ouseholds/20).
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in Table 1.6. The probability distribution function increases, reaching a maxi­
mum at 6 topics, then decrease, with the maximum observed number of topics 
being 8. The theoretical maximum number of topics is 9. W hile not providing 
any definite answers, this distribution does not suggest any evident cutoff or 
constraint in the number of discussed topics. This assumption implies th a t the 
mentioning of a topic in a gram sabha does not affect the likelihood of men­
tioning another topic. This reflects the deliberative aspect of the gram sabha, 
in th a t any participant is free to express his or her views. Furthermore, there 
is no time limit to the gram sabha, hence talk about a topic is unlikely to re­
duce the time available for other topics.12. In particular, one may be concerned 
th a t one individual’s talk precludes another individual from talking at the same 
time. Given the disconnect tha t exists between our household level da ta  and 
the transcript da ta  - our household respondents are unlikely to be the actual 
speakers in the gram sabha -, this is not a problem for our study.
We first construct group level measures of support for all topics ever men­
tioned in a meeting. The groups are those defined in Table 1.5. For each group 
we count the number of respondents tha t mentioned a particular topic as a pri­
ority. We then match this measure of support with an indicator variable for 
whether th a t particular topic was mentioned in the meeting. Alternately, to 
relax the assumption of linear effect of support group size, we create three sup­
port categories within each group - 0 supporters, 1 supporters, and 2 or more 
supporters. To estim ate the effect of group level support on the likelihood of 
being mentioned we then estim ate the following equation. In this equation the 
unit of observation is the topic within a transcript.
Pr{?it =  1} = c*i + 0t + PS^ t +  eu (1-1)
W here a* are topic fixed effects, 9t are transcript fixed effects, and S^t is the 
vector of support levels for each subgroup of group k. To correct for correlation
12 The duration of the Gram Sabhas in our sample has a mean of 86 m inutes and indeed a 
large standard deviation of 49 m inutes. The shortest one takes 15 m inutes and the longest 
325 minutes.
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within a transcript, we cluster standard errors a t transcrip t level. We run this 
regression separately for each group.
In order to explore the interactions between support among different sub­
groups, we add interaction term s to the above equation. We thus estim ate the 
following equation.
Pr{Tit =  1} =  tti +  0, +  0S* +  J 2  y ,S itSlt +  eit (1.2)
Q^j
We run this regression separately for each subgroup j  of group k.
Second, we measure the extent to which a villager’s preferences are matched 
by the topics. To this end, we construct two individual level variables, a m atch 
dummy (M D ) and a match intensity (MI ) .  Let Tg — {(ifcg)} the set of topics13 
mentioned at the meeting in village g , with each topic t k g being occupying a 
fraction f k g of the discussion. Let an individual i  living in village of g  have topic 
t i  as her first priority. Then the match dummy is defined as:
M D ig
1 if ^  6 Tg
0 otherwise 
and the match intensity is defined as:
MIig
fig  if t i  e  Tg
0 otherwise
Table 1.9 presents the summaries of the match indicator and match intensity. 
To estim ate the effect of household and individual characteristics on prefer­
ence match we use these two measures as dependent variables in ordinary least 
squares estimations:
M D i g  — a g +  7 t l ( t i  — t )  +  P X i g  +  Cjg (1 -3 )
t £ U
13 N ote that all Tg are subsets of the universe of topics U — {w ater, roads, electricity, 
housing, health, education, em ploym ent, agricultural, liquor)
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M l ig  — Oig + ^   ^7 t l { t i  ~  t) + (3Xig + Cjg (l-^)
teu
Where a s are village level fixed effects, -yt are preference fixed effects, and 
X ig is the m atrix of individual and household level variables described in Table 
1.4. It is im portant to note the two types of fixed effects th a t we use. First, by 
employing village level fixed effects we control for all village level characteristics 
th a t may affect both the individual characteristics and the preference match. 
Second, by employing preference fixed effects, we control for any unobserved 
characteristics specific to individuals who hold a given preference. To correct 
for correlation within a village, standard errors were clustered at the village 
level.
1.4 R esults
In Table 1.2 we present the summaries of the different transcript partitions. 
Looking at the intensity column we find th a t officials’ talk takes up 66 percent 
of the discussions, while villagers’ talk  takes up the remaining 34 percent. Men 
appear to dominate, taking up 81 percent of the discussions. We also find th a t 
at least a decision is reached in 56 percent of the meetings, a t least a for decision 
in 51 percent of the meetings, and a t least an against decision in 17 percent of 
the meetings. The time dedicated to  decisions is very brief as it only takes a 
couple of lines to say the decision. Given this briefness, in the following results 
we will focus only on the occurrence of decisions and not the time dedicated to 
them.
In Table 1.3 we present the summaries of gram sabha topic14 measures over­
all, by speaker’s position in the hierarchy, by speaker’s gender, and by whether 
the paragraph contains a decision. From this table we take away th a t there are 
no systematic differences between the topics discussed by villagers and officials, 
or men and women. The rank-ordering of both the occurrence and intensity
14There are topics discussed in the gram sabha that are not expressed as priorities by the 
households. The priority topics of the households, taken together, take up 53 percent of the 
m eetings.
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measures are nearly identical across the speaker type partitions. We also note 
th a t the ordering is nearly identical for the topics where decisions for and against 
were reached, the only striking difference being the decisions about roads.
Table 1.4 presents the summary statistics for the individual level variables, 
including preferences. We first look at whether individuals with different char­
acteristics have significantly different preferences. Table 1.5 presents these find­
ings. We observe th a t the amount of land owned leads to a large and significant 
difference in preferences. Large landowners are more likely to have a preference 
for roads and education, and less likely to have a preference for housing, in 
contrast with the landless villagers. Preferences also vary significantly across 
caste groups, but not across gender and age groups. The forward castes are 
more likely to have a preference for roads, as compared to Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes(SCST). The backward castes (BC/OBC) are more likely 
to have a preference for water, as compared to the two other groups. Muslims 
are more likely to have a preference for water and less likely to have a prefer­
ence for roads than non-Muslims. Furthermore, politicians15 are more likely to 
have a preference for water and less likely to have a preference for roads than 
non-politicians.
Having reviewed the group level differences in preferences we proceed to an­
alyze whether any of these differences translate into the transcript topic space. 
Table 1.7 presents the results of estimating 1.1 with linear measures of group 
support, for the groups previously defined. We observe th a t the only group for 
which support within its subgroups has a significantly different effect on the 
likelihood of the topic being mentioned is the group defined by landownership. 
Having an additional supporter for a topic in the large landowner subgroup 
increases the likelihood of the topic being mentioned by 2.5 percent. This in­
crease is significantly different than zero and, more importantly, significantly 
higher than the increase in likelihood associated with increasing support in the 
landless or small landowner group. None of the other subgroups have a similar
15 Defined as current or former Gram Panchayat  presidents or ward members
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influence.16 To relax the assumption of linear effects of group support, we also 
estim ate 1.1 using indicator variables for different levels of support. We only 
do this for the subgroups defined by landownership The first column of Table
1.8 presents these results. We observe th a t having two or more supporters for 
a topic in the large landowners’ subgroup increases the likelihood of the topic 
being mentioned by 8.4 percent. This increase is significantly different from zero 
and significantly higher than th a t associated with having two or more support­
ers in the small landowners’ group. However, this increase is not significantly 
higher than the increase associated with having two or more supporters in the 
landless group. Taken together, the results from Table 1.7 column (1) and Table
1.8 column (1) suggest that, relative to the support among landless and small 
landowners’ groups, the support among large landowners has a larger influence 
on deciding which topics are discussed.
We are able to address two possible reasons for this larger influence. First, 
because we do not observe the actual attendance of these groups in the meet­
ings, one obvious reason could be th a t large landowners a ttend  the meetings in 
larger proportion. However, as Besley, Pande, and Rao ([2005a]) using the same 
dataset found, attendance (in a meeting occurring prior to  the household survey) 
is significantly higher among landless than  among landed individuals.17 Hence 
it is unlikely th a t our finding is driven by unobserved differences in attendance.
Second, we look at the interactions between support in different subgroups. 
To shed light on the interactions between these subgroups we estim ate equation
1.2 separately for the landless, small landowners and large landowners. The 
results are presented in Table 1.8, columns (2), (3), and (4), respectively. In 
column (2), the increase in likelihood associated with going from zero to at 
least two large landowner supporters, in the absence of any landless supporters
16Increasing support among the literate also produces a significant increase in the likelihood, 
but the differential effect relative to iliterates is not significantly different from zero.
17The findings of Besley, Pande, and Rao were based on the entire household sam ple. Since 
in our study we only observe the households in the villages where the Gram Sabha was recorded 
(roughly half the sample), we re-did their com putations in our sam ple. In the landless group 
attendance was 27 percent, in the small landowners’ - 18 percent, and in the large landowners’ 
- 1 1  percent.
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is positive and significant. Similarly, in column (4), the increase in likelihood as­
sociated with going from zero to a t least two landless supporters, in the absence 
of any large landowner supporters is positive and significant. In addition, the 
interactions between having more than two supporters in the landless and large 
landowner subgroups are negative both in column (2) and (4), although signifi­
cant only in column (4). Taken together, these three results suggest th a t support 
among the landless and the large landowners act as supplements in influencing 
the likelihood of mentioning a topic. W hen support among the first group is ab­
sent, the second group appears to make efforts to bring the topic into discussion, 
as evidenced by the significant difference in likelihood associated with increased 
support in the second group. However, when support among the first group is 
high, the second group appears to  stop making efforts, as evidenced by the sig­
nificantly lower difference in likelihood associated with increased support in the 
second group. A second finding th a t emerges from the interaction results is the 
complementarity between support in the small and large landowners’ groups. 
This is evidenced by the positive and significant increases in likelihood associ­
ated with simultaneous support in these two groups, seen in columns (3) and 
(4). Rather than free riding on each other’s support as in the case of landless 
and large landowners, small and large landowners reinforce each other’s support.
W hat do these results, about the relationship between group level support 
and topics, say about the equitability of deliberation in village meetings? First, 
they suggest tha t, relative to a counterfactual in which equally sized groups have 
equal influence on the likelihood of a topic being discussed, village meetings are 
not equitable. The group of large landowners has an unduly large influence, 
relative to its size. Second, this unduly large influence may not necessarily 
be due to an imbalance of "deliberative power" favoring the large landowners, 
bu t rather to a rational choice of the landless to "piggyback" on the support 
of the large landowners. At the same time, these group level results should be 
interpreted with caution, as the group sizes are derived from a household sample 
(of 20 households per village) and may not be representative of the group sizes
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in the entire village population.
Having found tha t large landowners, as a group, significantly influence the 
topics discussed in the meetings, we move on to analyzing the household level 
determ inants of topics. Table 1.9 presents the summary of preference matching. 
We observe th a t the average individual has a 90 percent chance of having her 
preference mentioned during the meetings. Furthermore, the average individ­
ual’s priority takes up 21 percent of the discussion. Looking at the breakdown 
by type of speaker we observe officials are more likely than  villagers to men­
tion the average individual’s preference. We can interpret this as officials being 
more substantive and egalitarian in their speech, while villagers’ speech may 
possibly leave more room for competition between villagers for expressing their 
preferred topic. A similar comparison can be made between matching within 
m en’s and women’s talk. The men, taking up the overwhelming m ajority of the 
discussions, are much more likely to mention the average individual’s preference. 
As for decisions, the average individual has a 28 percent chance of having his 
preference decided on during the meeting. Furthermore, s /he  has a 24 percent 
chance of receiving a decision for and a 9 percent chance of receiving a decision 
against18.
We now proceed with exploring the effect of individual characteristics on the 
likelihood of preference matching and match-intensity. Table 1.10 presents the 
results of the ordinary least squares estimation of (1.3) and (1.4). In column 
(1) the dependent variable is the match indicator. In column (2) the depen­
dent variable is the match-intensity. The results show th a t in the unrestricted 
speech, having more land and being in a disadvantaged caste makes it more 
likely for one’s preference to be mentioned. In addition, being a Muslim reduces 
the time dedicated to discussing one’s preference. Specifically, owning 10 more 
acres of land increases the owners match likelihood by 1 percent, and being part 
of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled tribe increases one’s m atch likelihood by 
3 percent. Hence, the difference in match likelihood between an SC /ST  and a
18The for and against match likelihood add up to more than 28 percent, because it is possible 
for a topic to receive both a positive and a negative decision in the sam e m eeting
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Forward Caste19 is the same as the difference between a landless individual and 
a very large landowner owning 30 acres of land. These two effects imply th a t 
owning more land gives one a stronger voice in village meetings, as suggested by 
the group level findings, but also tha t being afforded the benefits of affirmative 
action in the case of SC/STs helps in being heard. Being a Muslim reduces 
the time dedicated to one’s preference by about 2 percent. This discrimination 
effect against Muslims is particularly im portant in the light of the SC /ST  ef­
fect. It implies th a t a minority such as Muslims, th a t is not protected through 
affirmative action will have a hard time expressing their views in a deliberative 
space.
We want to emphasize the disconnect between the household survey and the 
transcripts. There is a gap of a t least two years between the collection of the 
household data  and the first round of transcripts. The household respondents 
from whom we collect the preference data  are very unlikely to be the actual 
participants and speakers in the meetings. Hence the results have to be inter­
preted with this disconnect in mind and the meaning of "heard" should be the 
figurative one. In a more practical sense, this disconnect increases the likelihood 
th a t our observations are independent. If we had interviewed the actual partici­
pants in the gram sabha then an individual’s talk would have an externality, by 
preventing or encouraging other villagers to speak and the observations would 
no longer be independent. The disconnect in our data  is actually helping in this 
respect.
W hat do these individual level results say about the equitability of delib­
eration in village meetings? They suggest th a t, relative to a counterfactual 
of equal time allocated to each participant, village meetings are not equitable. 
Large landowners are more likely to have their priority mentioned and their 
priority takes up a larger portion of the meeting.
Once we decompose the discussion by the position of the speaker in the 
village hierarchy, in Table 1.11, we see tha t the land effect arises from the domi­
19 Forward Caste is the om itted category
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nation of landowners issues in the discourse of the villagers and not from a pref­
erential treatm ent by village officials. Furthermore, in the villagers’ speeches, 
the large landowners are not only more likely to have their priority mentioned, 
but th a t it takes up a larger fraction of the discussion. Specifically, owning 
10 more acres of land increases the owners preference match likelihood by 2 
percent and the match intensity by 0.6 percent. Decomposing the caste effect, 
we observe th a t the advantage of SCSTs is driven by an increased preference 
m atch likelihood within officials’ talk, which is not paralleled in the villagers’ 
talk. A possible interpretation of this effect, is th a t attention to  the needs of 
the SCSTs is m andated via targeted programs and officials are trying to ensure 
th a t these programs are implemented. Being an SCST is associated with a  3 
percent increase in match likelihood within officials speech, but this increased 
likelihood is not accompanied by an increased intensity. This may be seen as a 
sign th a t the attention to the SCST priorities is met only in form and does not 
affect their predominance in the deliberations.
In Table 1.12 we decompose the discussion by the gender of the speaker. The 
first notable result is th a t within women’s talk, the preferences of women take 
up more time (column (2)). This effect is particularly im portant in the light 
of the measures, such as political reservations, taken by the Indian government 
to promote the political participation of women. In a related paper, using the 
same transcript data, we have found th a t in villages where the position of Gram 
Panchayat president is reserved for women, women to tend to talk more during 
the village meetings [Ban and Rao 2008b]. This finding implies th a t affording 
voice to the women has real benefits for the women’s community. A similar re­
sult was found by Chattopadhyay and Duflo[2004b]: in constituencies reserved 
for women the public goods investments reflect the preferences of women. The 
second notable (non)result is th a t within women’s talk, the effect of landowner- 
ship disappears. This may be interpreted as women’s talk  being insulated from 
the traditional power of the landed class. The effect of landownership is present 
within men’s talk, but only in the indicator equation. Another interesting result
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is the age effect within men’s talk. Older individuals are less likely to have their 
preferences mentioned when men are speaking.
In Table 1.13 we examine the effect of individual characteristics on the like­
lihood of a  decision being reached with regards to one’s preferred topic. We find 
th a t again, owning more land increases the likelihood of having one’s preference 
decided upon. W hen we distinguish between for and against decision, we find 
th a t the land effect is driven by the for decisions. Specifically, owning 10 more 
acres of land increases the likelihood by 2.5 percent (2.7 percent among for de­
cisions). This finding further emphasizes the power of the landed class in the 
deliberative space. It implies th a t not only are voices of the landed stronger 
in the overall discussions, but are also stronger in the crucial, decision making 
stages of the discussions.
In the remaining part of the paper, we investigate whether our village level 
characteristics of interest, literacy, political reservations, and supervision, m at­
ter for the deliberative process. In particular, we look at whether these charac­
teristics m itigate or exacerbate the effect of individual characteristics observed 
in our main results. To estim ate this effect, we include in our regression an 
interaction 20 term  between the characteristic of interest and landownership. 
We focus on interactions with landownership as this is individual characteristic 
th a t is consistently associated with increased likelihood and intensity of match. 
We present the results in Table 1.14. First (columns (1) and (2)), we find that, 
compared with average literacy villages, in high literacy21 villages, the land 
domination effect is significantly reduced. In fact, in high literacy villages, large 
landowners are at a  disadvantage in terms of both likelihood of preference match 
and match intensity. One interpretation of this is tha t high literacy "lubricates" 
deliberative interactions by allowing officials to raise issues th a t m atter to a wide 
group of people and thus make discussions more inclusive. This finding is in line
20The regressions include village fixed effects, so the level of the institutional measure is 
absorbed in these fixed effects
21 Literacy has been classified by quartiles. Low literacy villages have literacy below 33 
percent (1st quartile); average literacy - between 33 and 57 percent (2nd and 3rd quartile); 
high literacy - above 57 percent(4th quartile)
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with numerous other findings th a t highlight the beneficial role of literacy on the 
functioning of local governance. For example, Besley, Pande and Rao[2005b], 
using the same village level data, find th a t increased literacy reduces village 
leaders’ opportunism.
Next, we look at the effect of political reservations disadvantaged castes 
(columns (3) and (4)). The effect of these political reservation has been recently 
well documented. Chattopadhyay and Duflo[2004b] find th a t women achieve 
better outcomes than the unreserved (by and large male) presidents and th a t 
women invest in public goods th a t are preferred by women. In a separate paper 
([2004a]) they find tha t SCST presidents invest in public goods preferred by 
SCSTs, a result tha t is also found by Besley, Pande, Rahman, and Rao[2004a]. 
We find th a t women’s, SC /ST, and other backward castes (OBC) reservations 
exacerbate the land dominance effect, in terms of the likelihood of match, and 
th a t SC /ST reservations also exacerbate the land dominance effect in terms of 
the intensity of match. In fact, we see th a t the land dominance effect is absent 
outside the reserved constituencies. We interpret these results as a sign tha t 
political reservation for castes weakens village leadership which, in turn, reduces 
the restraints on the large landowners. We have also tested the hypothesis tha t 
in women reserved or caste reserved constituencies, the women and the members 
of the lower castes are more likely to have their priorities mentioned. We have 
found no evidence of this22.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) we look at the influence of the presence of the 
BDO in the meetings. We find th a t when this official attends the gram sabha, 
the land dominance effect is reduced. Specifically, while large landowners are 
still more likely to have their priorities mentioned, in the presence of the BDO 
the time spent discussing these priorities is significantly reduced. This under­
lies the disciplining role th a t higher level officials can play in the deliberative 
process. Furthermore, this result has a simple policy implication by showing a 
straightforward action th a t may be taken to reduce elite dominance23.
22 These results are available upon request
23It is possible that the presence of the BDO  is endogenous, but the endogeneity is more
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper attem pts to peer inside the black box of deliberative democracy. 
We use a unique dataset of transcripts of gram sabhas (village meetings) in South 
India to  learn about the process of deliberation. These meetings are a part of the 
system of village government, held a t regular intervals, and are empowered by 
the Indian constitution to make im portant decisions for the village. We find tha t 
powerful groups, such as large landowners as a group and as individuals do exert 
an unduly large influence on the deliberative process. At group level we are able 
to  highlight im portant interactions between large landowners, small landowners, 
and landless. We find th a t the landless and the large landowners appear to free 
ride on each others’ support and th a t small and large landowners complement 
each others’ support. It may be th a t the lack of complementarity between the 
landless and any other group is a reason for their lack of influence. At individual 
level, the preferences of the large landowners are more likely to be mentioned 
and to dominate the deliberations by taking up more time. This effect occurs in 
the villagers’ discourse, and does not reflect preferential treatm ent from officials 
who attend  the meeting. Our results also show th a t the needs of disadvantaged 
casts are also reflected in the deliberative process, but this occurs because these 
needs are mentioned by officials. We also find th a t institutions m atter in the 
deliberative process; high literacy tempers the extent to which gram sabhas are 
dominated by landlords. Landlord domination is also reduced when the Block 
Development Officer - an im portant local official - attends the meetings. On 
the other hand, in village where the presidency is reserved for lower castes, 
the discourse tends to be even more dominated by landowners suggesting th a t 
political reservations may produce weak leaders.
While our results suggest tha t there are inequities in the deliberation process, 
it is im portant to keep in mind th a t we cannot say whether these inequities ex­
tend to actual outcomes. As we will revisit the households and villages with 
a second round survey, we will be able to test whether the inequities in delib­
likely due to village characteristics which are absorbed in the fixed effects
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eration translate into inequities in outcomes. For example, we can construct 
a measure of inequity a t gram sabha level and then examine how this measure 
correlates with post gram sabha outcomes both at household and at village level. 
Nevertheless, at this time we have evidence th a t the topics of discussion in the 
gram sabha are related to subsequent public goods outcomes. We conducted a 
village level facility survey which recorded the quality of roads in the village, 
in November 2001 and again in 2005. Using the transcript da ta  from the first 
round, to limit the potential for reverse causality, we find th a t villages where 
discussion about roads take a larger share of the gram sabha also experience a 
greater improvement in the quality of roads between 2001 and 2005.24
Thus, in this paper we examine the innards of the deliberative process by 
conducting an examination of the discourse of deliberation within gram sabhas 
in rural India. These meetings are among the most widespread deliberative 
spaces in regular and routine use within a system of government in human 
history. By matching proceedings within transcripts of gram sabhas with the 
preferences of villagers we are able to see whose voices are heard, whose priorities 
are mentioned, and how institutions affect deliberative dominance by elites.
24The quality of roads is measured on a scale from 1 to  6, 1 being a mud road and 6 being 
an asphalt road. The improvement in roads is measured as the fraction of roads, by length, 
that has moved upward in quality between 2001 and 2005. In estim ating the relationship 
between discussion about roads and improvement we control for initial road quality, a wide 
range of village level variables, and block fixed effects. We also perform a falsification test, by 
estim ating the relationship between discussions about water and road improvement, and we 
find no relationship. These findings are available upon request.
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Table 1.1: Breakdown by round and state
State Round 
1 2
Total
Andhra Pradesh 0 18 18
K arnataka 6 31 37
Kerala 15 15 30
Tamil Nadu 16 26 42
Total 37 90 127
Table 1.2: Summary of gram sabha partitions
Occurence
Partition indicator Intensity
0.66 
(0 .22) 
0.34 
(0 .22) 
0.81 
(0 .22) 
0.09 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0 .02)
Note: 1) Standard deviations of intensity measures 
in parenthesis
2) For 10 percent of the discussions, the speaker’s gender 
cannot be identified
1. Hierarchy Village official 1
Villager 0.96
2. Gender Man 0.99
Woman 0.69
3. Decision Any decision 0.56
Decision for 0.51
Decision against 0.17
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Table 1.3: Summary of gram sabha topics
Topic
Overall 
Indicator Intensity
Hierachy 
Official Villager 
Indicator Intensity Indicator Intensity
Gender 
Man Woman 
Indicator Intensity Indicator Intensity
Decision 
Any For Against 
Indicator Indicator Indicator
W ater 1 0.28 0.94 0.19 0.86 0.09 0.98 0.24 0.43 0.02 0.37 0.33 0.07
(0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) (0.04)
Roads 0.94 0.21 0.87 0.13 0.80 0.08 0.93 0.18 0.40 0.02 0.34 0.29 0.13
(0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.15) (0.04)
Education 0.83 0.13 0.70 0.09 0.63 0.03 0.80 0.10 0.35 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.02
(0.14) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) (0.03)
Health 0.72 0.09 0.62 0.07 0.46 0.02 0.67 0.07 0.24 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01
(0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10) (0.02)
Electricity 0.74 0.08 0.61 0.06 0.49 0.02 0.69 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02)
Housing 0.69 0.08 0.60 0.06 0.50 0.02 0.65 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.12) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02)
Employment 0.19 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Agricutural 0.14 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.00)
Liquor 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Standard deviations, of intensity measures in parenthesis
Table 1.4: Household level summary
Mean
Variable (SD)
Land (acres) 2.26
(5.12)
Age 37.17
(12.59)
Literate 0.74
Woman 0.49
SC/ST 0.19
BC/OBC 0.45
Muslim 0.07
Politician 0.11
P r io r i ty
Water 0.38
Roads 0.38
Electricity 0.07
Housing 0.07
Health 0.05
Employment 0.02
Education 0.01
Agricultural 0.01
Liquor 0.00
N 2488
Note: Standard deviations, of 
continuous measures, in parenthesis
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Table 1.5: Priority detail
Total Land Age Gender Caste Religion Politician
P r io r i ty 0 (0, 4] (4, 64] [16, 30] (30, 50] (50, 89] M F SC /ST OBC Forward Hindu Muslim No Yes
W ater 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.51 0.38 0.45
Roads 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.45 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.39 0.28 0.39 0.30
Electricity 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07
Housing 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.05
Health 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Employment 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Education 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Agricultural 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Liquor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 2488 1132 1001 355 897 1223 368 1258 1230 470 1114 904 2308 180 2221 267
X2 0.000 0.279 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.015
Note: l)Cell values represent the fraction of households in the category that has mentioned the priority listed in the leftmost column
2)p-values of a Chi-squared test of the hypothesis that priorities are identically distributed across the categories, at the bottom
3)SC/ST : Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, OBC: Other Backward Caste
Table 1.6: The distribution of the number of mentioned topics
Number o f 
mentioned topics
Frequency Percent
1 2 1.57
2 7 5.51
3 11 8.66
4 16 12.6
5 23 18.11
6 37 29.13
7 25 19.69
8 6 4.72
Total 127 100
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Table 1.7: Mentioned topics and group level support
Topic is mentioned 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# landless 0.0028
(0.0047)
# literate 0.0069*
(0.0035)
# SC/ST 0.0131
(0.0093)
# muslims -0.0048
(0.0161)
# female 0.0097
(0.0077)
# politic 0.0117
(0.0174)
# land (0,4] acres -0.0070
(0.0052)
# iliterate -0.0056
(0.0072)
# BC -0.0015
(0.0055)
# nonmuslims 0.0036
(0.0030)
# male -0.0039
(0.0081)
# non-politic 0.0022
(0.0032)
# land (4, 64] acres 0.0250***
(0.0083)
# Forward 0.0071
(0.0061)
Constant 0.1406***
(0.0276)
Constant 0.1406***
(0.0278)
Constant 0.1411***
(0.0275)
Constant 0.1410***
(0.0276)
Constant 0.1418***
(0.0278)
Constant 0.1408***
(0.0277)
land 5+ - landless 
land 5+ - land 1 -4
0.0223**
(0.0100)
0.0320***
(0.0109)
literate-iliterate 0.0125
(0.0089)
SC/ST-BC
SC/ST-forward
0.0146
(0.0116)
0.0061
0.0122
musl im-nonmusl ims -0.0084
(0.0169)
female-male 0.0136
(0.0148)
politic-nonpolitic 0.0095
(0.0188)
N
Adj R-sq
1143
0.6276
1143
0.6265
1143
0.6264
1143
0.6262
1143
0.6264
1143
0.6262
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a topic was mentioned in a transcript. The explanatory variables are the number o f respondents in the different categories that mentioned the 
topic as their priority. All regression contain priority and transcript fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at transcript level. * significant at p < 0.1, ** significant at p < 0.05, *** 
significant at p < 0.01
Table 1.8: Mentioned topics and land support categories
Topic is mentioned 
0 ) (2) (3) (4)
Landless support 1 0.0238 0.0076 0.0439 -0.0030
(0.0381) (0.0551) (0.0531) (0.0456)
Landless support 2+ 0.0438 0.0479 0.0519 0.0789**
(0.0314) (0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0349)
Land (0,4] support 1 -0.0051 0.0145 - 0.0011 -0.0356
(0.0325) (0.0492) (0.0501) (0.0376)
Land (0,4] support 2+ -0.0220 -0.0423 -0.0683 -0.0770*
(0.0338) (0.0493) (0.0479) (0.0400)
Land (4,.) support 1 -0.0318 -0.0711 -0.1542** -0.1588**
(0.0434) (0.0688) (0.0737) (0.0724)
Land (4,.) support 2+ 0.0841 ** 0.1343*** -0.0172 0.0376
(0.0332) (0.0511) (0.0566) (0.0669)
Landless support 1 & Land (0,4] support 1 -0.0619 -0.0749
(0.0928) (0.0907)
Landless support 1 & Land (0,4] support 2+ -0.0260 -0.0175
(0.0918) (0.0822)
Landless support 2+ & Land (0,4] support 1 -0.0178 -0.0669
(0.0708) (0.0712)
Landless support 2+ & Land (0,4] support 2+ 0.0426 -0.0005
(0.0669) (0.0621)
Landless support 1 & Land (4,.) support 1 0.2250** 0.1278
(0.1048) (0.1084)
Landless support 1 & Land (4,.) support 2+ 0.0311 -0.0044
(0.0911) (0.0715)
Landless support 2+ & Land (4,.) support 1 -0.0089 -0.1971*
(0.0852) (0.1037)
Landless support 2+ & Land (4,.) support 2+ -0.0986 -0.1144*
(0.0686) (0.0630)
Land (0,4] support 1 & Land (4,.) support 1 0.1958** 0.2794**
(0.0941) (0.1172)
Land (0,4] support 1 & Land (4,.) support 2+ 0.1765** 0.1641**
(0.0737) (0.0755)
Land (0,4] support 2+ & Land (4,.) support 1 0.2240** 0.3315***
(0.0858) (0.1016)
Land (0,4] support 2+ & Land (4,.) support 2+ 0.1455* 0.1579**
(0.0741) (0.0782)
Adjusted R-squared 0.6272 0.6275 0.6287 0.6322
Number of observations 1,143 1,143 1,143 1,143
Distribution of support categories Landless support Land (0,4] support Land (4,.) support
0 775 (67.8%) 773 (67.63%) 961 (84.08%)
1 130(11.37%) 158 (13.82%) 107 (9.36%)
2+ 238 (20.82%) 212(18.55%) 75 (6.56%)
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a topic was mentioned in a transcript. The explanatory variables are indicators 
for the support categories. The omitted category is that with no supporters in any o f the subgroups. All regression contain priority and 
transcript fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at transcript level. * significant at p < 0.1, ** significant at p < 0.05, *** 
significant at p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Summary of preference match
Match
indicator
M atch
intensity
Overall 0.90 0.21
(0.17)
Village official talk 0.82 0.14
(0.15)
Villager talk 0.74 0.07
(0.08)
Man talk 0.90 0.18
(0.16)
Woman talk 0.38 0.02
(0.04)
Any decision 0.28
Decision for 0.24 -
Decision against 0.09 -
Note: l)Standard  deviations of match
intensity in parenthesis 
2)Due to very reduced decision talk, 
described in Table 3, m atch intensity  
for decisions were not com puted
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Table 1.10: Preference match regression
(1) (2)
M atch indicator M atch intensity
Land 0.00102* 0.00049
(0.00063) (0.00035)
Literate 0.00833 0.00286
(0.00946) (0.00548)
Age -0.00199 -0.00093
(0.00139) (0.00070)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Woman 0.01254 -0.00060
(0.00843) (0.00315)
SC/ST 0.03449** -0.00451
(0.01707) (0.00657)
BC 0.01756 0.00277
(0.01305) (0.00425)
Politician 0.00203 -0.00177
(0.01169) (0.00504)
Muslim -0.00659 -0.02380**
(0.02385) (0.00987)
Constant 0.90354*** 0.24474***
(0.04258) (0.03201)
Observations 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.572 0.564
1)Village, Priority and Round fixed effects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3 )*p <  0.1, **p <  0.05, ***p <  0.01
4)The dependent variable in (1) equals 1 if the individual’s 
priority is mentioned in the m eeting, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) equals the fraction of 
lines in the transcript dedicated to the individual’s 
priority, if the priority is mentioned in the m eeting, 
and 0 otherwise
6)The estim ation is done by OLS, which in (1) im plies a 
linear probability model
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Table 1.11: Preference match regression, hierarchy partition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Officials indicator Officials intensity Villagers indicator Villagers intensity
Land 0.00046 -0.00008 0.00196*** 0.00057**
(0.00111) (0.00024) (0.00074) (0.00023)
Literate 0.01789 0.00075 0.00379 0.00211
(0.01150) (0.00394) (0.01129) (0.00347)
Age -0.00118 -0.00078 -0.00092 -0.00015
(0.00144) (0.00055) (0.00217) (0.00040)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001* 0.00001 0.00000
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00000)
Woman 0.00495 -0.00106 0.00999 0.00046
(0.00877) (0.00261) (0.01013) (0.00179)
SC /ST 0.03000* -0.00062 0.00101 -0.00389
(0.01731) (0.00589) (0.01880) (0.00344)
BC 0.02155* 0.00166 -0.00819 0.00111
(0.01337) (0.00344) (0.01319) (0.00216)
Politician -0.00685 -0'00412 -0.00724 0.00235
(0.01275) (0.00422) (0.01489) (0.00278)
Muslim -0.00035 -0.01066 -0.03665** -0.01314***
(0.02561) (0.00782) (0.01692) (0.00449)
Constant 0.80288*** 0.16959*** 0.60397*** 0.07515***
(0.04611) (0.02841) (0.07440) (0.01216)
Observations 2488 2488 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.611 0.607 0.564 0.589
1)Village, Priority and Round fixed effects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3 )*p  <  0.1, **p <  0.05, ***p <  0.01
4)T he dependent variable in (1) and (3) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is m entioned in the officials’,
and, respectively, villagers’ talk, and 0 otherwise
5)T he dependent variable in (2) and (4) equals the fraction of lines in the officials’, and, respectively,
villagers’ talk dedicated to the individual’s priority, if the priority is m entioned in the officials, and 
respectively, villager’s talk and 0 otherwise
6)T he estim ation is done by OLS, which in (1) and (3) im plies a linear probability model
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Table 1.12: Preference match regression, gender partition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women indicator Women intensity Men indicator Men intensity
Land -0.00076 -0.00005 0.00133** 0.00050
(0.00085) (0.00007) (0.00066) (0.00034)
Literate 0.00568 0.00213 0.00914 0.00223
(0.01395) (0.00174) (0.01135) (0.00481)
Age -0.00020 0.00015 -0.00257* -0.00118**
(0.00187) (0.00018) (0.00150) (0.00058)
Age sq. 0.00000 - 0.00000 0.00003* 0.00002**
(0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00002) (0.00001)
Woman 0.00582 0.00171* 0.00429 -0.00309
(0.01054) (0.00098) (0.00953) (0.00292)
SC /ST -0.02567 -0.00181 0.03615** -0.00340
(0.02403) (0.00165) (0.01687) (0.00492)
BC 0.00522 0.00062 0.02203* 0.00511
(0.01315) (0.00095) (0.01299) (0.00398)
Politician -0.01693 0.00087 0.00940 -0.00277
(0.01519) (0.00135) (0.01304) (0.00520)
Muslim -0.04285* -0.00119 -0.00835 -0.02423**
(0.02710) (0.00172) (0.02358) (0.00985)
Constant 0.33054*** 0.01040* 0.96643*** 0.24443***
(0.07660) (0.00656) (0.05185) (0.03148)
Observations 2394 2394 2394 2394
Adj R-sq 0.606 0.555 0.521 0.559
1)Village, Priority and Round fixed effects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3)*p <  0.1, **p <  0.05, ***p <  0.01
4)T he dependent variable in (1) and (3) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is m entioned in
the w om en’s, and respectively, m en’s talk, and 0 otherwise
5)The dependent variable in (2) and (4) equals the fraction of lines in the w om en’s, and, respectively,
m en’s talk dedicated to the individual’s priority, if the priority is m entioned in the w om en’s, and, 
respectively, m en’s talk, and 0 otherwise
6)The estim ation is done by OLS, which in (1) and (3) im plies a linear probability model
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Table 1.13: Preference match regression, decision
(1)
Any, indicator
(2)
For, indicator
(3)
Against, indicator
Land 0.00255** 0.00270* -0.00075
(0.00127) (0.00142) (0.00063)
Literate -0.02809* -0.01841 -0.00456
(0.01487) (0.01617) (0.01016)
Age -0.00204 -0.00041 -0.00148
(0.00195) (0.00186) (0.00130)
Age sq. 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
Woman -0.00843 -0.00842 -0.00219
(0.01044) (0.01008) (0.00682)
SC /ST -0.00878 -0.01310 -0.00179
(0.02016) (0.01998) (0.01105)
BC 0.00100 0.00039 0.00206
(0.01559) (0.01522) (0.00841)
Politician 0.02519 0.02526 0.00669
(0.01707) (0.01738) (0.00864)
Muslim -0.03546 -0.03916* -0.00809
(0.02388) (0.02260) (0.01283)
Constant 0.45100*** 0.37042*** 0.12237**
(0.08253) (0.07735) (0.05850)
Observations 2488 2488 2488
Adj R-sq 0.486 0.496 0.392
1)Village, Priority and Round fixed effects included
2)Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
3 )*p  <  0.1, **p <  0.05, ***p <  0.01
4)T he dependent variable in (1) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is mentioned  
in any decision, for or a g a in st , taken in the m eeting, and 0 otherwise
5)T he dependent variable in (2) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is mentioned  
in a for decision taken in the m eeting, and 0 otherwise
6)T he dependent variable in (3) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is mentioned  
in an a g a in s t  decision taken in the meeting,and 0 otherwise
7)The estim ation is done by OLS, which implies a linear probability model
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Table 1.14: Preference match regression, interactions
(1)
M atch indicator
(2)
Match intensity
(3)
Match indicator
(4)
Match intensity
(5)
M atch indicator
(6)
M atch intensity
Land 0.00103
(0.00090)
0.00084*
(0.00044)
-0.00217
(0.00151)
-0.00040
(0.00051)
0.00106*
(0.00065)
0.00068*
(0.00035)
Land*Low lit. 0.00108
(0.00139)
-0.00015
(0.00081)
Land*High lit. -0.00733*
(0.00433)
-0.00483***
(0.00131)
Land*Woman res. 0.00491*
(0.00255)
-0.00060
(0.00123)
Land*SC/ST res. 0.00440**
(0.00194)
0.00191**
(0.00078)
Land*OBC res. 0.00609***
(0.00198)
0.00128
(0.00125)
BDO -0.05157
(0.04147)
-0.11774*
(0.07363)
Land*BDO -0.00113
(0.00295)
-0.00496***
(0.00143)
Observations 
Adj R-sq
2374
0.580
2374
0.584
2488
0.573
2488
0.564
2488
0.573
2488
0.580
1)Levels of explanatory from Table 1.10 variables included but not reported
2)Village, Priority and Round fixed effects included
3 )Standard errors, clustered at village level, in parentheses
4)* p  <  0.1, ** p <  0.05, *** p  <  0.01
5)T he dependent variable in (1), (3), and (5) equals 1 if the individual’s priority is mentioned in the m eeting, and 0 otherwise
6)T he dependent variable in (2), (4), and (6) equals the fraction of lines in the transcript dedicated to the individual’s
priority, if the priority is m entioned in the m eeting, and 0 otherwise
7)The estim ation is done by OLS, which in (1), (3), and (5) implies a linear probability model
Annex: Exam ples o f decisions
The following is an example of a for decision, regarding water, in a  meeting 
in Andhra Pradesh. The second paragraph, spoken by the Gram Panchayat 
president - Sarpanch contains the decision:
Villager, BC, Male: There is only one water tank for the entire
village. One more tank should be constructed.
Sarpanch, OC, Male: Government has sanctioned 3 lakhs for constructing
the tank but the contractors have not started the work. We have discussed 
about this with higher officials and very soon this will be constructed. 
Also we have asked the government to allot a place for the cattle but 
they have not responded.
The following is an example of a for decision, regarding roads, in a meeting 
in Tamil Nadu. The second paragraph, spoken by the gram sabha secretary 
contains the decision:
Male (Mr. Anumanthappan, Villager, SC): Near the Mariamman temple 
present here that is around the temple street light facility should 
be provided. Also light facility must be provided within the temple.
Path leading to the temple is also in a very worst condition. So I 
request the Panchayat that must also provide a good path for that.
Male (Mr. Chandrakumar, Grama Sabha Secretary, MBC): Through this 
Panchayat decision is being made that the street light facility and 
construction of roads in the places near the temple. I convey that 
to you people in this Grama Sabha meeting.
The following is an example of an against decision, regarding schools, in a
meeting in Tamil Nadu. The second paragraph, spoken by the Gram Panchayat 
president contains the decision:
Santhakumari, Villager, OBC: Didn’t paint the school building.
President: You yourself have to look after this. There is no fund
in the Panchayat.
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Chapter 2
Tokenism or Agency? The 
Im pact of W om en’s 
Reservations on V illage 
Dem ocracies in South  
India1
2.1 Introduction
The link between democracy and development is increasingly being empha­
sized by influential scholars[Sen(1999)] and development institutions [World Bank(2005)]. 
In particular, enhancing the participation of women within democracies is seen 
as central to improving governance [World Bank(2001)]. India offers, perhaps, 
the best opportunity to learn about the impact of raising the participation of 
women in democratic institutions because of a remarkable attem pt to improve 
the representation of women in local village government. The 73rd amend­
ment to the Indian constitution, passed in 1992, m andated th a t no less than 
a th ird  of the to tal number of seats in democratically elected village govern­
ments (panchayats) , and no less than  a th ird  of the office of President of the 
Gram Panchayat (village government unit, henceforth GP) should be reserved
for women. The aim of this was to ensure th a t women would have a voice in
^ h i s  chapter is based on joint work with Vijayendra Rao
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local government and, ultimately, help facilitate the formation of a more gender 
equal society. Since every Indian village is now required to participate in this 
exercise - the enormous variation and diversity among villages in India provide 
a remarkable laboratory to test models of democratic reform.
To analyze the effect of this policy, two questions need to be answered. 
First, what do the women presidents achieve relative to their male counter­
parts? Anecdotal evidence suggests th a t women,as newcomers to the politi­
cal process, would be more enthusiastic and less corrupt and therefore more 
effective than entrenched male politicians. They would, therefore, generally 
improve the quality of governance [Vyasulu and Vyasulu(1999)] Second, who 
are these women presidents? Speculation and some anecdotal evidence suggest 
th a t they are tokens of powerful interests in the village; poorly educated, el­
derly, from impoverished families, easily manipulated and picked by elites to 
run [Ramesh and Ali(2001)]. A more optimistic view is th a t effective, educated 
women choose to run for elections.
Econometric work by Chattopadhyay and Duflo [(2004b)] - henceforth CD 
- looking at panchayats in the states of West Bengal and R ajasthan examined 
these issues in some detail and found some evidence consistent with an optimistic 
hypothesis: Women leaders tend to invest more in goods where women have 
expressed a preference, and less in goods preferred by men. Specifically, women 
leaders in West Bengal tend to invest more in water and road projects, and less 
in non-formal education,while in R ajasthan they invest more in water and less in 
roads. CD are able to identify the causal impact of reservations by establishing 
th a t reservation status is rotated  among all GPs on a random basis -  which 
allows the reservation process to be treated as a randomized trial.
While CD’s results dem onstrate the effectiveness of the panchayat reserva­
tions experiment, the results are restricted to two states, R ajasthan and West 
Bengal, of a very large and diverse country. These states, both from the north, 
are among the most male-biased in the country: R ajasthan ranks 21st and West 
Bengal 18th out of 24 states in a composite index of the status of women in In­
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dia (Filmer, King, P ritchett 1998). Thus, a question remains of how applicable 
these results are to the rest of the country.
CD find th a t women presidents2 in reserved constituencies tend to be worse 
educated than  presidents (almost all men) in unreserved constituencies, a fact 
th a t they attribu te  to the possible existence of tokenism. This, however, begs 
the question of whether this gender differential in education reflects patterns 
in the general population or is a consequence of the reservations system. It 
also raises an im portant secondary question of whether the quality of presidents 
m atters more in reserved panchayats; do better educated women function more 
effectively as presidents?
The work by Duflo and Topalova [(2004)], Bardhan, Mookherjee, and Tor- 
rado [(2005)], [(2008)], and Beamen et al. [(2008)] also econometrically analyzes 
the effect of women’s reservation. Duflo and Topalova extend the C hattopad­
hyay and Duflo findings to 24 states and examine whether the performance 
of women leaders are perceived differently than men. The authors find th a t 
women’s reservation leads to more and better drinking water facilities in the 
village, although the quality effect is not significant. For other public goods 
they find no significant effect of women’s reservation. They also find th a t vil­
lagers are less likely to pay bribes in GPs reserved for women. However, the 
villagers’ satisfaction with the president’s performance is lower in GPs reserved 
for women. Furthermore, women get less "credit" for quantity and quality im­
provements than  men. These findings are extended by Beamen et al. (2008). 
The authors also find th a t women leader perform no worse and sometimes better 
than  men bu t th a t they receive consistently worse evaluations. However, the au­
thors argue th a t women reservations improve attitudes toward women leaders. 
This improvement in attitudes is measured by quantifying the responses to hy­
pothetical situations ( “vignettes”) involving women leaders. Furthermore, the 
authors find th a t Implicit Association Tests conducted to measure bias against
2 In W est Bengal, village presidents are called “pradhans” and this is the term used through­
out CD. However in the Southern Indian states which are the setting for our study, they are 
called “adhyakhsa” , “sarpanch” , or president. We will henceforth call them  president.
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women in leadership roles show a decreased bias in villages with women leaders.
Bardhan et al. (2005) examine the effect of women’s reservation on the ta r­
geting of various local programs. They find th a t women’s reservation improves 
the targeting of subsidized loans to disadvantaged groups but at the same time, 
worsens the targeting of employment grants. In their follow-up paper (Bardhan 
et al. 2008) they do not find positive inter-village effects of women reserva­
tions on drinking water and roads, bu t they do find negative effects of women 
reservations on targeting of BPL cards and employment to  poor households.
The impact of women politicians is also examined by Clots-Figueras [Clots-Figueras(2005)]. 
The author looks at women’s political behavior as sta te  legislators. She finds 
th a t women legislators elected in seats reserved for Scheduled Castes/Tribes are 
more likely to adopt women-friendly laws, relative to women elected in open 
seats.
Another im portant issue, a major theme in the “action research” literature, 
is the salience of local structures of inequality and power [Rai et a l.(2001)].
Villages dominated by powerful caste groups tend to be much more dictatorial.
Thus, when such villages are reserved for women one expects th a t the presidents 
would be more likely to be subservient to elites. This raises the question of 
whether local structures of oligarchy and inequality have more influence over 
women presidents. Bardhan, et al. find th a t the effect of women’s reservations 
on targeting is indeed lower in villages with higher land inequality.
An evaluation of the effects of reservations for women must include both 
evidence on the process by which women are selected in reserved constituencies, 
and on how their performance compares with leaders in unreserved ones. The 
three other papers on women’s reservation cited above only address the perfor­
mance comparison. Besley, Pande and Rao [Besley et al.(2005a)] focus on the 
political economy of politician selection using the same data  as ours. In ex­
amining the broader issue of political selection, they show th a t more educated 
and politically connected individuals are more likely to get elected, but this 
relationship does not hold in constituencies reserved for women.
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In this paper we connect these two literatures by conducting a more de­
tailed analysis of political selection in constituencies reserved for women, and 
examining the impact of women’s reservation on performance. We find evidence 
against two potential channels for tokenism. First, tokenism does not appear 
to be working through the selection of weak women. Second, tokenism does 
not appear to be working through the spouse’s influence. Less than 20 percent 
of women presidents are persuaded to run by their spouse. We also find th a t 
panchayats led by women are no worse or better in their performance than  those 
w ith male leaders, and women politicians do not make decisions in line with the 
needs of women. Importantly, however, political experience enhances the per­
formance of women leaders more than  it does for men. Also, women in villages 
which are less dominated by upper castes, and in states th a t have relatively ma­
ture panchayat systems, perform better, and, respectively, no worse than  men. 
This suggests th a t institutional factors affect women politicians more than they 
affect men.
Our data, from a survey conducted between November and December 2002 
in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, 
is interesting for two reasons: First in contrast to West Bengal and Rajasthan, 
these states have low levels of gender disparity compared to the rest of the 
country -  with Kerala ranked on the top of all major Indian states on the status 
of women index [Filmer et al.(1998)]. Thus comparing the CD paper with these 
results could provide some valuable insights into how women’s reservations works 
w ithin relatively more gender-equal societies.
Second the four states present an interesting comparison within themselves in 
their approach to decentralization3: Kerala and K arnataka have been among the 
leaders in promoting village democracy in India. K arnataka has had women’s 
reservations in place since 1959, and in 1983 it passed landm ark legislation giv­
ing panchayats a streamlined organizational structure th a t served as a model 
for the 73rd amendment. Kerala has had a more checkered history, bu t was one
3See M atthew and Buch, [M atthew and Buch(2000)] for a detailed account of the history 
of panchayats at the state level.
of the first states to adopt and implement the 73rd amendment. This has been 
followed by a commitment to give panchayats meaningfully large budgets and 
the power and authority to make decisions. A ndhra Pradesh on the other hand, 
despite a long history of panchayat legislation has not had regular elections. 
Moreover, since 1997 the state government also instituted a system of “par­
ticipatory governance” th a t served to undermine the authority  of panchayats4. 
Tamil Nadu, similarly, has instituted reforms from the 73rd amendment but 
without giving village panchayats much teeth with budgets and placing most of 
the decision making at higher levels of government.
2.2 D ata
2.2.1 Sam pling Strategy
The sample was selected, using a strategy designed to control for path- 
dependencies and cultural factors while making state comparisons, from two 
districts in AP -  Medak and Chithoor, three in K arnataka -  Bidar, Kolar and 
Dakshin Kanada, two in Kerala -  Kasargod and Palakkad, and two in Tamil 
Nadu -  Dharm apuri and Coimbatore. The districts within states were selected, 
with one exception, to focus on those tha t had belonged to the same adm inistra­
tive unit during colonial rule, but had been transferred to different units when 
the states were reorganized in 1956s . Prom these states, pairs of blocks (which 
are the next level of administrative unit) one from each sta te  were selected to 
be similar on the language spoken by a majority of the population. All blocks
4 Since 2005, a newly elected government in the state is attem pting to shore up the authority  
of panchayats.
5 These are the districts of Bidar and Medak from the erstwhile state of Hyderabad, now in 
Karnataka and A P respectively, Pallakad, Coimbatore, Kasargod, Dakshin Kanada, Dharma­
puri, and Chithoor, all from erstwhile Madras state and now in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Ker­
ala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and AP respectively. Since Bidar and South Kanara district 
in Karnataka are “special” in that they represent the worst and best districts in the state  
in developm ent indicators, we also sampled Kolar district which is the one exception to the 
block matching rule in our sample. Kolar was a part of erstwhile M ysore state the precursor 
to  modern Karnataka and thus does not follow the colonial- rule m atching process described 
above. However, adding it does allow for more variation when we compare the other three 
states with Karnataka. Furthermore, Kolar has common borders with both Chithoor in AP  
and Dharmapuri in TN - which allows for a three part com parison within the same geographic 
area.
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from within the sampled districts are chosen to be the closest possible in their 
m ajority language to a block in the matching district of the neighboring state. 
Since language is a good proxy in these regions for cultural differences given 
the prevalence of caste and linguistic endogamy, language m atching allows us 
to partially control for “unobservable” sociocultural differences.
The blocks are divided into several GPs or village government units -  each 
of which consist of between 1 and 6 villages depending on the state. Prom 
each sampled block , in the states of AP, KA and TN, we random ly sampled 
6 GPs in every block. In Kerala the population per GP is roughly double th a t 
in the other three states. For this reason in Kerala we sampled 3 GPs in every 
block. This procedure gave a total of 201 GPs. Prom these we selected a village 
sample. In AP, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu we sampled all villages if the GP 
had 3 or fewer villages. If it had more than three villages, then we selected 
the president’s village and randomly selected two other villages. We excluded 
all villages with less than 200 persons from our sampling frame. All hamlets 
with population over 200 were considered as independent villages in drawing 
the sample. In Kerala we directly sampled wards instead of villages (as villages 
in Kerala tend to be very large) -  we sampled 6 wards per GP. This gave us a 
final village sample size of 527 villages6. For sampled villages, any associated 
hamlets were also included as part of the sample.
From every sampled block in AP, KA and TN we randomly selected 3 of 
our 6 sampled GPs and conducted household interviews in all sampled villages 
falling in these GPs. In Kerala we randomly selected 2 G Ps in one block and 
one GP in the other block (the selection of which block to sample how many 
GPs from was also random), and within sampled GPs we conducted household 
interviews in all sampled wards. Overall this gave us a final sample size of 
5180 households7. Twenty households were sampled at random  from every
6The state-w ise break up is AP: 69 villages, KA: 182 villages, KE: 126 wards; TN  129 
villages.
7Number of villages for household sample were: AP: 32 villages, KA: 90 villages, KE 66 
villages, TN 71 villages.
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selected village8, of which four always belonged to Scheduled Caste or Tribes 
(henceforth SC /ST -  who benefit from affirmative action programs m andated 
by the Indian constitution). In addition to these randomly sampled households 
the President of the GP was also subjected to a household interview with some 
supplem entary questions. Thus our sample of presidents coincides exactly with 
the GPs. presidents were not available for interviews in a few of our GPs -  so 
our final president sample is reduced from 201 to 192. The complete sample 
has been used for other analyses[Besley et al. (2005c)] but for the purposes of 
this study we have omitted the GPs th a t have multiple reservations for women 
and scheduled castes, keeping only GPs reserved for women and the unreserved 
GP. Thus our sample consists of 106 Gram Panchayats containing 310 villages 
in the four states and about 2100 households containing about 7100 individuals 
within them 9.
2.2.2 Questionnaires
D ata was collected at the village, president and household level. At the 
village a questionnaire was administered using Participatory Rapid Appraisal 
(PRA) techniques [Chambers(1997)] to a group of individuals (mainly men) 
selected to represent different social groups in the village, to assess their views 
on problems in the village, the work done by Panchayat, and obtain measures 
of inequality and oligarchy. PRA techniques were also employed on a group of 
selected women to get measures of women’s preferences on problems faced by 
the village. In addition, a facilities assessment was conducted by an investigator 
devoted to the task of looking at the quality of schools, clinics, roads, drinking 
water, and sanitation. We also obtained secondary da ta  from the 1991 census 
of India for the villages in our sample.
8 The survey team  leader in every village walked the entire village to map it and identify 
total number of households. This was used to determine what fraction of households in the 
village were to be surveyed. The start point of the survey was randomly chosen, and after 
that every X th household was surveyed such that the entire village was covered (going around 
the village in a clockwise fashion with X =N um ber of H ouseholds/20).
9 Analyzing the com plete data set w ith controls for GPs with m ultiple reservations produces 
results that are very else to those reported in this paper. We have om itted G Ps that have 
m ultiple reservations primarily to make the exposition less com plicated.
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In addition to this village level data, one randomly chosen adult from every 
household in the sample was asked questions on the household’s socioeconomic 
status, household structure, views and use of public services in the village, 
private government benefits. They were also asked to rank-order problems in the 
village. Since the sample is divided between male and female respondents this 
provides yet another source of information on gender differences on preferences 
about village problems. All presidents in the sampled GPs had to answer the 
household questionnaire, but were also asked a series of questions to assess their 
knowledge about the political process -  such as the names of prominent elected 
officials and reservation rules.
2.2.3 Reservation process
All GPs within a block are selected for women’s reservation by rotation, 
with a th ird  of all GPs m andated to be reserved for women presidents a t any 
given time. The method of rotation varies across states and is determined by 
the s ta te ’s election laws. Typically a list of GPs is prepared for each block 
-  ordered by the proportion of women in the population, and the first GP 
in the list selected for reservation in the first election, along with the fourth, 
the seventh and so on, skipping three in sequence. In the next election the 
second GP in the list is selected, and additional GPs picked again by skipping 
three sequentially. This method, while not perfectly random, ensures th a t GPs 
are selected for women’s reservation via an exogenous process. Two of the 
states -  AP and Tamil Nadu have direct elections for the president -  akin to 
a presidential system, while two -  akin to a prime ministerial system - have 
indirect elections. Every village is divided into wards, each of which elects a 
member to the Panchayats, and each ward is also reserved using a rotation 
system. Thus 1/3 of all GP members are always women. In reserved G P ’s with 
indirect elections the president is elected from among the women ward members. 
Table 2.1 presents a breakdown of the president’s gender by reservation status 
and state.
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To test the exogeneity of the reservations system we regress a dummy for 
women’s reservations, one a t a time, on fourteen measures of public service 
quality and general levels of development, as well as demographics, from the 1991 
census. Since census data  are available to the election commissions to determine 
the composition of constituencies, if villages were selected for reservations on the 
basis of any endogenous criteria we would expect to see a correlation between 
reservations status and at least some of the census outcomes. State dummies 
are also included in all these regressions to allow for the possibility th a t states 
may have implemented the 73rd amendment reforms at a different pace, and 
used different rotation and election systems. Table 2.2 presents results from 
these regressions10. Of the fourteen variables we tested, twelve have coefficients 
th a t are not significantly different from zero. Only two variables -  medical 
facilities and fraction irrigated land in the GP -  are significant for reasons th a t 
are unclear. This suggests th a t reservations were unlikely to have been allocated 
to GPs on the basis of observable characteristics and supports the assertion tha t 
they were exogenously allocated.
The 73rd amendment also m andated reserved seats for scheduled castes and 
tribes (SC/ST) and for other backward castes(OBC) on the basis of their pro­
portion in the village population. In the four states we axe studying, SC/ST 
and OBC reservation overlap with women’s reservations. Thus approximately 
a third of GPs with SC/ST or OBC reservations would -  randomly -  also be 
reserved for women. This is likely to confound the impact of the two types of 
reservations so we focus on contrasting GPs exclusively reserved for women with 
unreserved GPs. The impact of SC /ST reservations on Panchayats has been 
examined elsewhere [Besley et al.(2004)], [Chattopadhyay and Duflo(2004a)].
10 As we are interested in the unconditional effect of each variable on the likelihood of being 
reserved, we ran separate probits rather than a single probit with all variables on the right- 
hand-side. Also, a chi-squared test could not reject the null hypothesis that the variables were 
jointly equal to  zero in a multivariate probit.
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2.2.4 U nits o f observation
The units of observation change through the course of the paper to allow 
us to analyze a more complete set of issues th a t relate to women’s reservations. 
Since this could be a little confusing we provide a concise description of these 
changes; In the exogeneity tests, we estim ate differences between GP level vari­
ables hence the unit of observation is the GP. Throughout the section dealing 
with the activities of women presidents the unit of observation is the village. 
An exception is the analysis of president’s meeting with higher level officials, 
where the unit of observation is the G P (as there is one president for each GP). 
Throughout the section dealing with the characteristics of women presidents the 
unit of observation is the individual.
2.3 R esu lts
2.3.1 Im pact o f Reservations on W om en’s Participation
One im portant impact of women’s reservation is on women’s political and 
community participation. Besley, Pande and Rao [Besley et al. (2005b)] show 
th a t community participation, measured by attendance in public village meet­
ings, improves targeting towards disadvantaged sections of the village. CD find 
th a t in Panchayats, reserved for women, the fraction of women among village 
meeting (gram sabha) participants increased significantly, in West Bengal vil­
lages, while in R ajasthan it decreased - but not significantly. The results in 
Table 2.3 indicate th a t there is neither a significant effect of women’s reserva­
tion on women’s participation in the gram sabha, nor in the presence of women’s 
organizations11. We conclude th a t the presence of women leaders does not have 
noticeable effects on women’s participation. One reason for this divergence from 
CD is th a t in our sample women’s participation in the gram sabha is already at
11 N ote that about a third of villages in the sam ple did not answer the question on the 
proportion of women who attend gram sabha m eetings. O f the 99 villages that did not 
respond to the question 24% are reserved for women which is less than the proportion of 
reserved villages (30%) in the full sam ple. It is possible that this could bias the results, but 
the direction of the bias is unclear.
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a much higher level relative to West Bengal (33 percent vs. 7 percent) so there 
is less room for growth.
2.3.2 Im pact o f R eservations on Panchayat A ctiv ities
D ata on the activities of panchayats come from the PRA. In the PRA, re­
spondents were asked to assess the number of activities of the panchayats after 
the last election on a variety of public good investments. In order to have com­
parable measures across the public goods categories we standardize the actual 
counts by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation12. Table 
2.4 a ttem pts to replicate CD’s results by examining the unconditional difference 
in panchayat activities, for a variety of goods and services, between reserved and 
unreserved GPs. We first report mean activity levels in the two categories, and 
then the coefficient of a dummy variable for women’s reservations from a regres­
sion th a t controls for block fixed effects with standard errors clustered at the GP 
level. Prom the seven activities we examine, we see a significant difference only 
for activities in education. Relative to unreserved panchayats, panchayats re­
served for women had significantly more education-related activities. However, 
on the vast majority of activities, reserved presidents do no differently than un­
reserved presidents. Indeed, we see th a t the differences between reserved and 
unreserved panchayats in these six categories are not jointly significant.
Since the PRA was conducted w ith mostly male participants there is a poten­
tial male bias in the performance measures derived from the PRA. To address 
this bias we use a set of performance measures derived from the facility sur­
vey. In the survey we asked whether there were any improvements in different 
categories of public goods since the last GP election. We use these improve­
ment indicators as performance measures13. We report mean levels in the two 
categories and then the coefficient for women’s reservation from a linear prob­
ability regression (as these are binary measures) th a t controls for block fixed
12The summaries of the actual counts are presented in Annex 1.
13 The summaries of these indicators are presented in Annex 2
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effects. These results also show th a t reserved presidents do no differently than 
unreserved ones.
It should be noted tha t, in three of these states, panchayats do not have con­
trol over large amounts of discretionary funds. The exception is the state of Ker­
ala where panchayat budgets are the largest in the country [World Bank(2004)]. 
The lack of budgetary discretion in the three other states could impede the abil­
ity of GPs, both reserved and unreserved, to have much of an impact. But any 
short-term  impacts would be more observable in the PRA which is picking up 
GP performance in the management of public goods, while the facilities data  
measure actual changes in the supply of public goods and are therefore less 
sensitive to short-term  change.
In order to free ourselves from the assumption of budget availability we find 
a measure of activity tha t does not need financial resources. A m ajor function 
of GPs is to lobby higher levels of government for public goods, resources and 
services. Therefore, we examine the extent to which GP presidents have meet­
ings with officials from higher-levels of government14. The results show th a t 
women presidents are significantly less likely to meet with higher-level officials 
than  unreserved presidents. We are unable to distinguish between whether this 
stems from poorer networks and communication skills among women presidents, 
or from an increased reluctance among higher officials to meet with women pres­
idents.
Thus, we conclude th a t women presidents are very similar in their perfor­
mance as providers of public goods to their male counterparts. The only sub­
stantial difference is in their reduced likelihood of meeting with higher level 
officials.
R eservations and W om en’s P references
CD show th a t the impact of women’s reservations on the activities of pan­
chayats is affected by the preferences of women. We test whether men and
14 The summary is available in Annex 3
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women differ significantly in their preferences for public good investments in 
the village. Note our data  on priorities of men and women is based on a ret­
rospective question on problems faced two years ago, while CD ’s is based on 
preferences revealed by the issues women petition the GP about. Therefore the 
preference da ta  in the two surveys are not exactly comparable. But even with 
our m ethod we do notice significant differences between men and women both 
in PRA and household surveys - suggesting th a t the information is picking up 
gender differences. Table 2.5 reports the results comparing preferences from the 
men’s and women’s PRA. We see th a t the large differences are in water and 
sanitation, which women are more likely to see as a problem, and roads, which 
men are more likely to see as a problem. These differences are tested with a 
regression controlling for village fixed effects, and we see th a t the differences on 
water, sanitation and roads persist after village effects are controlled. However, 
on four of the seven priorities there is no gender difference observed.
PRAs are better suited to looking at public goods because they are the 
result of a public interaction where issues th a t require a collective consensus are 
more likely to arise. To examine issues th a t may m atter more at the level of 
households, we contrast the PRA data  with d a ta  on the ranking of problems 
from two years ago at the individual level in Table 2.6. Here we see th a t men 
have a greater preference for health and infrastructure, while women are more 
likely to consider water and electricity as a priority. Controlling for village 
fixed effects, however, no differences remain suggesting th a t they are driven by 
differences in village characteristics. Thus, while we see differences in preferences 
across men in women from two different sources of data, these differences are not 
consistent across our data  sources. Recalling th a t women presidents are more 
active in education, we conclude there is no evidence to  suggest th a t women 
presidents are acting in a manner th a t is more sensitive to the preferences of 
women15.
15We also conducted an analysis, similar to CD, w ith  activity-specific regressions where 
wom en’s reservations were interacted with wom en’s preferences to see if these preferences were 
driving the activities of women-reserved pradhans. These results, available from the authors 
on request, also do not dem onstrate any relationship between preferences and panchayat
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2.3.3 Selection of wom en presidents
Having examined the performance of women presidents we move on to study 
the characteristics of women presidents. Particularly, we want to know whether 
women are tokens. Tokenism may work through different channels. Using our 
d a ta  we can empirically rule out two channels of tokenism. F irst, tokenism may 
work through spouses or political elites persuading women to  contest the elec­
tions. Hence, we look at who persuaded presidents to  contest elections. Table 
2.7 provides simple cross-tabulations. We see th a t the responses for the two 
categories are similar -  both groups were more or less equally likely to have 
been asked to contest by political elites - Members of the Legislative Assembly 
(MLAs), previous presidents, and im portant members of the community. The 
largest difference comes from reserved women being more likely to have been 
persuaded by their spouses to run than unreserved presidents. However, even 
with this large difference, less than  20 percent of women presidents were per­
suaded to run by their spouses, but the persuasion results should be interpreted 
with caution as the cell sizes are small.
Second, tokenism may work through the selection of weak women as pres­
idents, so th a t they can be easily influenced by the male elites. To examine 
this channel we look at president characteristics in reserved and unreserved 
seats. Table 2.8 provides the summary statistics. It should be noted th a t age, 
education, and knowledge score are individual level variables, while all other 
variables are at the household level. Reserved presidents are younger, worse ed­
ucated (by two years of schooling), have smaller land holdings, lower knowledge 
scores16, and have less political experience than unreserved presidents. Note 
th a t the standard  deviations on education and the knowledge score are larger 
for reserved women than for unreserved presidents -  suggesting th a t women
activites.
16 Knowledge scores come from a series of political knowledge questions where respondents 
were asked to identify the names of prominent leaders such as the prime m inister and chief 
m inister, and to explain im portant rules such as the percentage of villages in a GP reserved for 
women. Only the respondent to the survey has a knowledge score, hence the smaller number 
of observations for this variable.
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who stand for election in reserved seats are a very diverse group. However, it is 
possible th a t these differences merely reflect gender differentials in the general 
population, since 85% of presidents in unreserved GPs are men -  and women 
are distinctly worse educated than men on average. We can check this by com­
paring women who become presidents with women, in the general population, 
who are eligible to stand for election (they have to be over 21 and literate). This 
comparison, column (4) with column (2), shows th a t women presidents are from 
the top end of the distribution of women on landholding, wealth and knowledge, 
and above average on education and age. Interestingly, women presidents have 
fewer small children (age 0-5) in their household than  the average eligible woman 
suggesting th a t women with demanding family pressures are less likely to stand 
for office17. These summaries also shed light on whether women presidents are 
from the same elite families as men presidents. The results show th a t women 
presidents are less likely to have former presidents or ward members in their 
households than men presidents, but are about equally likely to  have politicians 
in general in their households.
Given the extent of dispersion in these distributions it is possible th a t there 
is a  lot of spatial variation in attributes and th a t these trends may not persist 
once spatial controls are included. To account for this we run the following OLS 
regression on individual level data:
Pbi — Qtb D W bl +  nCbi +  'yV'bi +  s bi (^-1)
W here Pn  is the set of individual i ’s characteristics in block b, a b are block 
fixed effects, W bi indicates whether the individual is elected president in a seat 
reserved for women, and Cbi is an indicator for an SC /ST  household. Vbi is a  vec­
tor of inequality and oligarchy in individual z’s village, and ebi is the error term. 
We run two specifications. In the first specification, we restrict the sample to 
eligible women. In this specification D  measures how different reserved (women) 
presidents are from other eligible women, thus providing a difference free of
17We thank Bina Agarwal for this suggestion.
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gender effects. In this specification we set 7 = 0 . In the second specification, 
we restrict the sample to the set of presidents. D  now measures how differ­
ent reserved (women) presidents are from unreserved presidents in the observed 
attributes.
Table 2.9 reports the results for the coefficient D  for a variety of attributes, 
for the three specifications mentioned above. Looking a t the 2nd column which 
compares reserved and unreserved presidents, we see th a t reserved presidents are 
significantly worse off than  unreserved presidents in their education, knowledge 
and political experience, and also tend to be younger. However, looking at 
the 1st column we see th a t they are better off than  comparable women in the 
population in term s of land ownership, wealth and knowledge score. In terms of 
age, women president are older, and in education they are not different from the 
average eligible woman. They also have fewer small children in the household 
than  the average eligible woman These results do not support the claim th a t 
claim th a t women presidents are weaker than the average woman.
To provide a benchmark for comparison, we also examine the difference 
in characteristics between individuals elected in unreserved constituencies (the 
vast m ajority - 85 percent - of whom are men) and eligible men. Comparing 
columns (1) and (3), we observe th a t unreserved presidents differ from eligible 
men in similar ways th a t women presidents do from eligible women. The only 
distinction is th a t unreserved presidents are substantially more educated than 
the average man.
Finally we examine whether the gap between women leaders and other 
women is different from the gap between unreserved leaders and other men. 
Here we see th a t the gap in the extent to which women leaders are more knowl­
edgeable than  other women is greater than  the gap between unreserved leaders 
and other men, bu t th a t the reverse is true for the gap in land ownership.
We thus conclude th a t there is empirical evidence against two channels 
through which tokenism may act. We do not rule out however, th a t tokenism 
may also act through other, unobservable channels. Another conclusion is th a t
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the high levels of heterogeneity in the general population of women may be 
reflected in the high levels of heterogeneity among women leaders which may 
m atter in their effectiveness as presidents.
R eservation s and president characteristics
In testing the impact of women’s reservation on panchayat activities, the 
heterogeneity in the quality of presidents has to be kept in mind. Does the 
quality of the president m atter? Does it m atter more in reserved GPs? Cog­
nizant of the exogeneity of women’s reservations, we can test these hypothesis 
in the OLS following framework:
Pfcii — ”f" fiPbv “I” 'yVbv b b  $(.Pbv * b £bv
Y(,v is a measure of overall panchayat activism in village v, block b. We use 
two different measures. The first one is derived from the PRA and is constructed 
as the mean of the standardized counts of activities across all public goods cat­
egories. The second one is an indicator for meeting with higher level officials18. 
at, are block fixed effects. Pbv is the m atrix of president characteristics19, and 
Vbv is the set of village characteristics20. WbV is an indicator for whether the 
GP to  which the village v belongs is reserved for women. The coefficient 77 is an 
estim ate of the impact of women’s reservations conditioning on everything else. 
4> provides an estimate of the differential impact of president characteristics in 
villages with GPs reserved for women, relative to  unreserved ones. pbv is one 
column vector of Pbv21 ■ We examine how the president’s age, education, wealth,
18 The PRA results have more variation than the results from the facilities. Results using 
facilities data as outcomes tend to have similar signs as the PRA results but are alm ost always 
insignificant. Hence, for the sake of brevity, we do not report the facilities survey results in 
these interaction tables.
19 age categories: young (21-30), prim e(30-50), old(50-f-); education (years); number of terms 
previously served as either president or ward member; dumm y for wealthy (=  1 if owns TV  
or radio, watch, and fan); landholding(acres)
20proportion land controlled by upper castes; land Gini categories: low (1st quartile), 
medium (interquartile range), high(4th quartile), literacy rate, fraction landless, pradhan’s 
village
2115% of pradhans in unreserved GPs are women so we can also control for pradhans sex in 
these regressions. Adding this slightly weakens the effect of reservation but does not change 
the effects of interactions. We do not report them .
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land holding and political experience affect his or her performance in reserved 
relative to unreserved panchayats.
Table 2.10 reports the results for these five specifications using the measure 
of performance from PRA. The most im portant result is th a t political experience 
m atters in panchayats reserved for women. In fact, women presidents without 
previous political experience perform worse relative to their male counterparts. 
But, keeping in mind th a t experience is measured as number of terms served, as 
women gain experience they catch up to men and potentially surpass them. This 
is an optimistic result th a t provides an empirical basis for encouraging women to 
take leadership positions. W hen interpreting this result, it should also be noted 
th a t women face considerable hurdles in being elected president in unreserved 
constituencies. However the number of terms served includes terms served as 
ward member which perhaps are within reach of women even in the absence of 
reservations.
Table 2.11 illustrates how president characteristics impact the likelihood of 
meeting with higher level officials. Age, landholding and political experience 
have a significantly different impact on women and men presidents. Young 
and middle age women presidents are more likely to meet with higher level 
officials than young and middle age men presidents. At low levels of land holding 
male presidents are more likely to meet higher officials, but as land holdings 
increase female presidents become more likely to meet higher officials. Political 
experience again plays an im portant role, particularly for women presidents; as 
women gain experience they start catching up with men in the likelihood of 
meeting higher officials.
R eservations and v illage ch aracteristics
Another im portant question th a t has to be addressed is the extent to which 
inequality and concentration of power in one caste in the village affect the ef­
fectiveness of women presidents? Can elite domination affect panchayat gover­
nance, particularly in reserved GPs? We use an OLS framework identical to the
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previous one except tha t now we interact reservation w ith village characteristics.
Ybv — ""b fiPbv 'yVbv “I” V^^bv "h fifabv * f^bv) “I” £bv (^'^)
The notations are the same as before; Vbv is a subset of Vbv ■ We examine the 
differential effect of upper-caste domination and land inequality in reserved and 
unreserved GPs. Table 2.12 presents the results for the measure derived from 
PRA. The first village characteristic of interest is the proportion of land held 
by upper castes - which indicates the extent to which upper castes are "domi­
nant" in village life [Srinivas(1959)]. We observe tha t, in reserved GPs, a higher 
proportion of land held by upper castes leads to  lower overall GP activism. Fur­
thermore, in villages where upper castes hold only small fractions of land women 
presidents are more effective than men22. Since the caste distribution of villages 
with women-reserved and unreserved presidents are not significantly different, 
these results should not be interpreted as high castes blocking the efforts of 
low castes, but of patriarchy being more pronounced, in villages dominated by 
upper castes which stifles women’s ability to lead. There is no significant differ­
ential effect of land inequality, which suggests th a t large fractions of land in the 
hands of a small group is only harmful if th a t group happens to be the upper 
caste. These results are, however, not observed in Table 2.13 which report on 
the determ inants of meeting higher officials.
R eservation s and S tates
The advantage of using block pair fixed effects (as described in the sampling 
strategy) is th a t it allows us to estimate sta te  effects and thus it perm its us 
to examine how reservations work across states, controlling for historic and
22B y our calculations (available on request), at the average level of upper caste land fraction 
(0.25) there is no significant difference between women and men presidents. However, as 
the proportion of land held by upper castes increases, wom en presidents tend to become 
significantly less effective than men presidents. A referee suggests an alternative explanation  
for these results; that in villages with high fractions of upper caste land, the upper castes may 
dom inate PR A  group surveys, so the effectiveness of women Presidents in these villages could  
sim ply be underreported in the PRA. We feel this is unlikely. P R A  participants were carefully 
selected to represent all the numerically im portant groups in the village and moderators were 
instructed to prevent domination of the discussion by any one one group.
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linguistic similarities. We use the same framework and introduce interaction 
with sta te  dummies.
Y p v  =  O C p  "I" S S p y  -\~ f 3 P p v  “h ' y V p y  T j W p y  “h ( p i ^ S p y  ♦ W p x ; ) S p y  (2.4)
Y p v  is the measure of overall GP activism in village v, pair p. ap represents 
the pair fixed effects. S p v  are state dummies23. The rest of the variables are the 
same as the block fixed-effects specification. In Table 2.14 we explore the extent 
to which the effects of women’s reservation on the measure of activity derived 
from PRA, differs across states. Only in Andhra Pradesh do we see a significant 
difference between the performance in reserved and unreserved constituencies, 
w ith reserved constituencies underperforming. This result may be due to a 
politically immature reservation and electoral system in A ndhra Pradesh. In 
the three other states the differences are not significant. However, this result 
should be interpreted with caution as there are only 3 woman Presidents in the 
A ndhra Pradesh sub-sample.
Table 2.15 presents the results for the measures derived from meeting higher 
officials. The results show th a t the overall lower likelihood of meeting higher 
officials in reserved constituencies is driven by the state of Kerala. In Andhra 
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, women presidents are more likely to meet higher 
officials, while in K arnataka there is no significant difference.
2.4 C onclusion
The results of this analysis do not show a simple women’s reservations effect. 
We do however conclude th a t women presidents never perform worse than  men. 
A notable exception is in their interaction with higher level officials were they 
do not do as well as men. Unlike Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) there is no 
evidence to show that reserved women presidents act in ways th a t are more
23 We keep Kerala as the om itted category
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congruent with the preferences of women. The contrast with Chattopadhyay 
and Duflo may reflect the fact tha t their evidence is from R ajasthan and West 
Bengal, an area of India with much higher gender differentials than  South India 
where our survey was conducted.
Concerning the characteristics of women presidents, we find evidence against 
two channels of tokenism. Women are as likely to be persuaded to contest by 
political elites as unreserved presidents; less than 20 percent are persuaded to 
contest by their husbands. Women presidents are not weak. They are from 
the upper end of the distribution of women and tend to be more knowledgeable 
about political activities, more politically experienced, and wealthier than the 
average woman.
Another im portant message is tha t heterogeneity m atters. In particular, 
women presidents in reserved GPs are unambiguously more effective when they 
are more experienced. Furthermore, we see tha t women in reserved GPs perform 
worse when most of the land in the village is owned by upper castes. This 
suggests th a t caste structures may be correlated with structures of patriarchy 
making the job of women particularly difficult when they are confronted with 
entrenched hierarchies. There is also some evidence to suggest th a t women 
presidents in reserved GPs in AP perform the worst, while those in Kerala and 
K arnataka tend to perform better. This in conjunction with the positive effect 
of the presidents political experience together suggest a hopeful future. As 
women acquire more experience via the reservations system, and as the system 
continuous to mature, women will become more effective leaders. Thus, our 
results are far more supportive of the “optim ists” than  the “pessimists” but 
suggest tha t women presidents may benefit from facilitation and training in less 
supportive institutional environments.
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Table 2.1: Fraction Women among Presidents in Reserved and Unreserved GPs
GP reserved for women Unreserved GP
A ndhra Pradesh
number GPs (number villages) 3(6) 14(15)
Proportion of Female Presidents 100% 14.3%
K arnataka
number GPs (number villages) 7(20) 23(62)
Proportion of Female Presidents 100% 34.8%
Kerala
number GPs (number villages) 6(36) 8(48)
Proportion of Female Presidents 100% 0%
Tamil Nadu
number GPs (number villages) 11(31) 34(92)
Proportion of Female Presidents 100% 2.9%
Overall
number GPs (number villages) 27(93) 79(217)
Proportion of Female Presidents 100% 15.2%
Note: Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, OBCs, SC/ST women, or OBC women.
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Table 2.2: Exogeneity of Reservation
Variable 
(1991 census)
Marginal effect 
on probability 
of being reserved
Number of 
Observations
Population 0.003 103
(0.246)
Proportion Women 6.765 102
(1.574)
Fraction villages with educational facilities in GP -0.222 100
-(1.440)
Fraction villages with medical facilities in GP -0.318 100
-(2.117)**
Fraction villages with drinking water in GP -0.157 100
-(0.928)
Fraction villages with postal facility in GP -0.067 100
-(0.563)
Fraction villages with communication facility in GP -0.043 100
-(0.332)
Fraction villages with power supply in GP -0.204 100
-(1.149)
Fraction irrigated land in GP -0.490 101
-(1.742)*
Average distance from town in GP 0.000 101
(0 .011)
G P female literacy -0.310 102
-(0.747)
G P male literacy -0.238 103
-(0.653)
G P female employment 0.378 102
(0.998)
G P male employment -0.198 103
-(0.217)
Note: 1) The marginal effects are computed from individual probit regressions with state fixed effects,
2) The total number of GPs is 106, not all variables are available for all GPs hence 
the lower number of used observations
3) z-values in parentheses ** significant at 5 percent, * significant at 10 percent
4) In a probit with all the RHS variables included a chi-squared test cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that all the coefficients are jointly =  0
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Table 2.3: Effect of Women’s Reservation on Women’s Participation
Mean, 
Reserved GP
Mean, 
Unreserved GP
Difference Nr.obs
Fraction women among 0.3619 0.3350 0.0270 211
Gram sabha participants (0.0145) (0.0107) (0.0180)
Fraction villages with 0.0680 0.0326 0.0354 300
women’s NGOs (0 .0221) (0 .0111) (0.0269)
Fraction villages with 0.2134 0.1999 0.0135 304
women’s CBOs (0.0396) (0.0268) (0.0470)
Note: 1) Standard errors, controlling for block fixed effects, clustered at GP level in parenthesis.
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, OBCs, SC/ST women, or OBC women.
3) The difference between the number of observations and total number of villages (310) is 
due to the questions not being answered in all villages
4) CBO - Community Based Organization
5) Only NGOs and CBOs formed after last GP president election are counted
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Table 2.4: President activity in reserved and unreserved villages, using outcomes 
from PRA, facilities, and president survey__________________________________
Reserved for 
Women Unreserved Difference N
Outcomes from  PRA
W ater -0.047 0.020 -0.067 310
(0.075) (0.057) (0.098)
Health 0.056 -0.024 0.080 310
(0.087) (0.058) (0.096)
Education 0.129 -0.055 0.184 310
(0.071) (0.054) (0.089)**
Sanitation 0.012 -0.005 0.017 310
(0.091) (0.060) (0.115)
Roads -0.020 0.009 -0.029 310
(0.060) (0.049) (0.077)
Transport -0.028 0.012 -0.039 310
(0.076) (0.069) (0.103)
Electricity -0.076 0.032 -0.108 310
(0.097) (0.062) (0.119)
Joint significance test p-value 0.392
Outcomes from  Facilities
Drinking water 0.239 0.253 -0.014 310
(0.044)
Schools 0.346 0.382 -0.036 310
(0.066)
Anganwadi 0.265 0.269 -0.004 310
(0.034)
Roads 0.492 0.526 -0.034 310
(0.040)
Joint significance test p-value 0.876
Outcomes from president Survey 
Met higher Panchayat 0.378 0.580 -0.202
(0.078)**
106
Notes: 1) The estimation of the difference includes block fixed-effects 
2) ** significant at 5 percent
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Table 2.5: M en’s and women’s priorities, 2 years ago, as expressed in the answers 
to the PRA questionnaire
Category
Fraction villages 
with women 
expressing 
preference for 
the category
Nr obs 
with women’s 
preferences
Fraction villages 
with men 
expressing 
preference for 
the category
Nr obs 
with men’s 
preferences
Difference: 
women - men
W ater 0.466 307 0.392 310 0.075
(0.033)**
Health 0.055 307 0.055 310 0.003
(0.016)
Education 0.036 307 0.035 310 0.000
(0.013)
Sanitation 0.101 307 0.048 310 0.052
(0.019)***
Roads 0.094 307 0.177 310 -0 081 
(0.024)***
Transport 0.042 307 0.029 310 0.013
(0 .010)
Electricity 0.026 307 0.035 310 -0.010
(0.013)
Note: 1) Preferences of women derived from women’s PRA, preferences of men - from general PRA; 
3 villages did not have a women’s PRA
2) Difference is estimated with a linear probability model with the preference indicator as dependent 
variable and the female indicator as regressor
3) Village fixed effects included in estimation of difference
4) Standard errors of difference are clustered by village, in parenthesis
5) ** significant at 5 percent, *** significant at 1 percent
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Table 2.6: M en’s and women’s priorities, 2 years ago, as expressed in the answers 
to the Household questionnaire___________________________________________
Category
Fraction women 
expressing 
preference for 
the category
Fraction men 
expressing 
preference for 
the category
Difference: 
women - men
Nr.
Obs.
W ater 0.357 0.351 -0.010
(0 .020)
2113
Health 0.042 0.049 -0.005
(0.009)
2113
Education 0.019 0.022 0.003
(0.007)
2113
Infrastructure 0.309 0.316 -0.003
(0 .021)
2113
Transport 0.042 0.046 0.003
(0.008)
2113
Electricity 0.058 0.044 0.013
(0.009)
2113
Housing 0.010 0.012 -0.001
(0.005)
2113
Note: 1) Difference is estimated with a linear probability model with the 
preference indicator as dependent variable and the female indicator as regressor
2)Village fixed effects included in estimation of difference
3) Standard errors clustered by village, in parenthesis
4) The sample consists of literate individuals at least 21 years old
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Table 2.7: Persuasion
Person who persuaded 
to contest election 
Self initiated
Political
Spouse
Relative and neighbors 
Caste and other groups 
Other
Reservation status 
women unreserved
2 16
(7.41) (20.25)
5 14
(18.52) (17.72)
5 1
(18.52) (1.27)
4 13
(14.81) (16.46)
6 25
(22.22) (31.65)
5 10
(18.52) (12.66)
Note:l)Percentages out of total reservation 
category size in parentheses
2) Political category includes: MP/MLA/party official, 
previous president, important leader in community, 
other ward members
3)Other includes: NGO and other unspecified categories
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Table 2.8: Summary of individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
president
eligible eligible eligible reserved for unreserved
Characteristic population women men women president
Age 38.096 36.760 39.091 39.148 43.468
(14.161) (13.800) (14.346) (10.862) (11.502)
Education 6.474 5.746 7.016 6.074 8.456
(4.312) (4.319) (4.227) (4.287) (3.426)
HH landholding 2.814 2.765 2.850 7.909 9.244
(5.157) (5.189) (5.133) (9.597) (9.654)
HH wealthy 0.420 0.440 0.404 0.778 0.722
Knowledge score 3.602 2.424 4.439 3.185 4.608
(2.218) (1.974) (1.990) (1.642) (0.912)
HH members age 0-5 0.674 0.688 0.664 0.370 0.595
(0.975) (0.993) (0.961) (0.839) (0.899)
HH members age 6-10 0.513 0.543 0.491 0.481 0.620
(0.814) (0.826) (0.804) (0.849) (0.773)
HH members age 11+ 5.229 5.170 5.273 4.778 5.570
(2.464) (2.474) (2.455) (1.717) (2.735)
Former president, or 7.41% 12.66%
ward member, in HH 1 10
Any former political 29.63% 25.32%
position in HH 8 20
Political experience
0 55.6% 46.8%
15 37
1 44.4% 38.0%
12 30
2+ 0 .0% 15.2%
0 12
Nr Obs. 7179 3064 4115 27 79
Note: 1) Wealthy =  1 if owning TV or radio, watch, and fan
2) Knowledge score only available for respondent, not entire household roster
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Table 2.9: President Characteristics Comparisons
(1) (2) (3)
President in Reserved Seat Unreserved Seat
Compared with 
eligible women
Compared with 
unreserved 
presidents
Compared with (3) - (1) 
eligible men
Age 2.085 -4.734 5.475
(2 .212) (2.237)** (1.342)***
Education 1.245 -2.620 1.768
(0.842) (0.766)*** (0.402)***
Land owned 2.566 0.110 6.348 **
(1.264)** (1.499) (1.150)***
W ealthy (dummy) 0.369 0.054 0.317
(0.087)*** (0 .110) (0.050)
Knowledge score 1.004 -1.413 0.383
(0.300)*** (0.292) (0 122)*** ***
HH members age 0-5 -0.427 -0.118 -0.119
(0.142)*** (0.196) (0.108)
HH members age 6-10 -0.133 -0.047 0.055
(0.163) (0.188) (0.087)
HH members age 11+ -0.368 -0.520 0.403
Political experience
(0.313) (0.397)
-0.461
(0.188)**
(0.295)
N 3064 106 4115
Note: 1) Literate individuals, aged 21 and above are the eligible population
2) The coefficient reported is that of the dummy for being elected in a seat 
reserved for women/unreserved
3) Block fixed effects included in all comparisons
4) The GPs reserved for SC/ST, SC/ST women, OBC and OBC women are excluded
5) Controls for SC/ST included in regressions (1), (2), and (3)
6) Controls for SC/ST, religion, household head literacy, household head occupation, 
household size, village literacy rate, inequality, oligarchy in (2)
7) Standard errors, clustered at GP level in parentheses
8) * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent
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Table 2.10: Effect of women’s reservation: Interactions with individual charac­
teristics; Overall GP activity measured from PRA
Overall GP activity
Age Education Wealthy Land Political exp.
Reservation for Women 0.188 0.090 0.207* 0.099 -0.358*
(0.119) (0.137) (0.115) (0.078) (0.181)
President Young -0.068
(0.173)
President Prime 0.061
(0.127)
Women Res * Young 0.230
(0.178)
Women Res * Prime -0.263*
(0.154)
President Education 0 .022*
(0 .012)
Women res * Edu -0.003
(0.016)
President wealthy -0.186***
(0.066)
Women res * wealthy -0.178
(0.123)
President land 0.006
(0.005)
Women res * land -0.005
(0.007)
President Political Exp -0.030
(0.043)
Women res. * Exp 0.268**
(0 .111)
Adj. R-sq 0.501 0.493 0.495 0.493 0.500
N 297 297 297 297 297
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p=0.1, ** significant at p=0.05
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (297) and the number of villages in the sample (310) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available
4) Block fixed effects included in regression
5) Overall GP activity is an average of standardized measures from PRA
6)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications; the coefficients 
on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
7)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, literacy rate, 
indicator for GP headquarter
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Table 2.11: Effect of women’s reservation: Interactions with individual charac­
teristics; Meeting higher Panchayat
Met higher panchayat
Age Education Wealthy Land Political exp.
Reservation for Women -0.639*** -0.082 -0.050 -0.320*** -1.028***
(0.207) (0.254) (0.246) (0 .121) (0.287)
President Young -0.282
(0.220)
President Prime 0.130
(0.137)
Women Res * Young 0.912**
(0.388)
Women Res * Prime 0.393*
(0.235)
President Education 0.016
(0 .022)
Women res * Edu -0.019
(0.033)
President wealthy 0.178*
(0.103)
Women res * wealthy -0.217
(0.268)
President land -0.006
(0.006)
Women res * land 0.017*
(0.009)
President Political Exp -0.060
(0.067)
Women res. * Exp 0.533***
(0.183)
Adj. R-sq 0.625 0.604 0.606 0.614 0.639
N 102 ,102 102 102 102
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p—0.1, ** significant at p=0.05, *** significant at p =  0.01
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (102) and the number of presidents in the sample (106) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available
4) Block fixed effects included in regression
5)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications; the coefficients 
on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
6)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, literacy rate,
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Table 2.12: Effect of women’s reservation: Interactions with village character­
istics; Overal GP activity measured from PRA
Overall G P activity
Proportion Upper 
caste land Land Gini
Reservation for Women 0.157** 0.011
(0.074) (0.073)
Upper Caste Land Prop. 0.156
(0.103)
Women res. * Upper Prop. -0.367**
(0.177)
Gini Low -0.120
(0.079)
Gini High 0.013
(0.087)
Women res * Gini Low 0.152
(0.147)
Women res * Gini High 0.052
(0.133)
Adj. R-sq 0.498 0.493
N 297 297
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p—0.1, ** significant at p=0.05
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (297) and the number of villages in the sample (310) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available
4) Block fixed effects included in regression
5)Overall GP activity is an average of standardized measures from PRA
6)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications; the coefficients 
on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
7)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, literacy rate, 
indicator for GP headquarter
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Table 2.13: Effect of women’s reservation: Interactions with village character-
istics; Meeting higher Panchayat___________________________________________
Met higher panchayat
Proportion Upper
caste land Land Gini
Reservation for Women -0.161 -0.114
(0.134) (0 .122)
Upper Caste Land Prop. 0.278
(0 .201)
Women res. * Upper Prop. -0.176
(0.367)
Gini Low 0.071
(0 .110)
Gini High 0.039
(0.186)
Women res * Gini Low -0.120
(0.207)
Women res * Gini High -0.579***
(0.199)
Adj. R-sq 0.603 0.612
N 102 102
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p=0.1, ** significant at p=0.05
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (102) and the number of presidents in the sample (106) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available
4) Block fixed effects included in regression
5)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications; the coefficients 
on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
6)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, literacy rate,
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Table 2.14: Effect of women’s reservation: State Interactions; Overall GP ac-
tivity from PRA_____________________________
Overall GP activity
Reservation for Women 0.175
(0.127)
Andhra Pradesh 1.377***
(0.355)
K arnataka 0.608***
(0.194)
Tamil Nadu 0.248
(0.180)
Women res. * AP -1.074***
(0.328)
Women res. * KA 0.108
(0 .211)
Women res. * TN -0.215
(0.160)
Adj. R-sq 0.347
N 285
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p=0.1, ** significant at p=0.05, *** significant at p =0.01
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (285) and the number of villages in the sample (310) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available,
and from one block which is not included in any block pair, hence dropping out of the estimation
4) Block pair fixed effects included in regression
5)Overall GP activity is an average of standardized measures from PRA
6)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications; 
the coefficients on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
7)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, 
literacy rate, indicator for GP headquarter
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Table 2.15: Effect of women’s reservation: State Interactions; Meeting higher
Panchayat
Met higher panchayat
Reservation for Women -0.490**
(0.235)
Andhra Pradesh -1.086***
(0.298)
K arnataka -0.312
(0.227)
Tamil Nadu -0.320
(0.231)
Women res. * AP 0.539*
(0.305)
Women res. * KA 0.577*
(0.321)
Women res. * TN 0.052
(0.272)
Adj. R-sq 0.556
N 100
Notes: l)standard errors clustered at GP level in parenthesis,
* significant at p=0.1, ** significant at p=0.05, *** significant at p =0.01
2) Sample excludes GPs reserved for SC/STs, SC/ST women, OBC, OBC women
3) The difference between N (100) and the number of presidents in the sample (106) 
comes from villages for which the population is not available,
and from one block which is not included in any block pair, hence dropping out of the estimation
4) Block pair fixed effects included in regression
5)The levels of all variables in 9 and 10 are included in all specifications 
the coefficients on the levels are reported only for the interacted variables
6)In addition, variables included but not reported: fraction landless, literacy rate
Annex 1: Summary of activity counts by reservation status
Nr. water 
Activities woman open
health 
woman open
education 
woman open
sanitation 
woman open
0 68 136 67 157 60 145 74 157
% 73.12 62.67 72.04 72.35 64.52 66.82 79.57 72.35
1 23 72 20 47 29 63 17 54
% 24.73 33.18 21.51 21.66 31.18 29.03 18.28 24.88
2 2 9 6 13 4 8 2 5
% 2.15 4.15 6.45 5.99 4.30 3.69 2.15 2.30
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.46
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
mean
N
0.29
93
0.41
217
0.34
93
0.34
217
0.40
93
0.38
217
0.23
93
0.31
217
Annex l(cont): Summary of activity counts by reservation status
Nr. roads transport electricity
Activities woman open woman open woman open
0 46 110 89 199 45 103
% 49.46 50.69 95.70 91.71 48.39 47.47
1 39 87 4 17 35 79
% 41.94 40.09 4.30 7.83 37.63 36.41
2 8 16 0 1 12 27
% 8.60 7.37 0.00 0.46 12.90 12.44
3 0 4 0 0 1 2
% 0.00 1.84 0.00 0.00 1.08 0.92
4 0 0 0 0 0 6
% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.76
mean 0.59 0.60 0.04 0.09 0.67 0.75
N 93 217 93 217 93 217
Annex 2: Summary of Outcomes from facilities da ta  by reservation sta tus
drinking water schools anganwadi roads
woman open woman open woman open woman open
Improve 
since last 
GP election
No 69 164 57 138 66 161 43 107
% 74.19 75.58 61.29 63.59 70.97 74.19 46.24 49.31
Yes 24 53 36 79 27 56 50 110
% 25.81 24.42 38.71 36.41 29.03 25.81 53.76 50.69
N 93 217 93 217 93 217 93 217
Annex 3 
Summary of Meeting 
higher panchayat
woman open
No 16 34
% 59.26 43.04
Yes 11 45
% 40.74 56.96
Total 27 79
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Chapter 3
Taking Care o f the Elderly: 
The Effect o f Electoral 
Incentives on the Old Age 
A ssistance Program,
1931 - 19551
Introduction
Between 1950 and 1996, Social Security coverage expanded from 16 percent 
to over 90 percent of the elderly population, and benefits increased by over 270 
percent ([Campbell 2003], 15-16).2 As a result, in 1997, nearly 50 percent of 
the federal budget (about 10 percent of GDP) was used to pay for or subsidize 
services mainly aimed at the elderly ([Mulligan and Sala-I-M artin 1999a]). De­
mographics alone cannot fully explain the structure or the growth in government 
welfare programs for the elderly; political factors are most likely part of the ex­
planation as well ([Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin 1999b] and [Muligan and Sala-I-M artin 1999c]). 
Media coverage of the elderly often depicts them  as an increasingly powerful and 
highly successful political bloc, and seniors are, indeed, more politically active
JThis chapter is based on joint work with Andreea Balan Cohen
2Between 1965 and 1997, the consumer price index rose by 397 percent, average wages by 
476 percent, and Social Security benefits by 502 percent (Campbell 2003, 16)
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relative to non-seniors.3
A fundamental question of political economy is whether, in a representa­
tive democracy, policy is shaped by the preferences of the voters or by the 
institutions (rules) governing the decision-making process. While institutions 
in general and term  limits in particular have been shown to shape a variety 
of policies, from fiscal policy ([Besley and Case 1995]) to environmental policy 
([List and Sturm  2006]), old age pensions have been considered to be influenced 
mainly by voters’ preferences (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini [2000], 
section 6.2.3 for a review). In our paper we argue tha t, during its inception, 
the old age assistance program in the United States was shaped by institutions 
rather than preferences. Specifically, we show tha t, between 1931 and 1955, 
the political incentives generated by the institution of gubernatorial term  limits 
affected the amount of assistance provided for the elderly.
Recent work ([Campbell 2003]) has shown th a t the expansion of the Social 
Security program and the rise in elderly political participation from the late 
1950s onwards are indeed related, but with the growth in the Social Security 
program providing the starting point. In its early years, the Social Security 
program expanded “through the urgings of the Social Security A dm inistration” ; 
as the program grew, it increased seniors’ political participation—by enhancing 
their free time and incomes— , which, in turn, helped ensure further program 
growth ([Campbell 2003]).
Although the growth in the old age insurance (OASI) component of the 
Social Security program between 1935-1950s was indeed isolated from politi­
cal pressures, the expansion of its welfare component—the Old Age Assistance 
(OAA) Program—was not. As we discuss in this paper, since the OAA program 
was administered at the state level, it was substantially more open to political
3For instance, between 1952 and 1996, senior voting in presidential elections increased by 
15 percent (from 73 to 84 percent), whereas voting among the 18-35 and 35-64 age groups 
decreased by 16 percent (from 68 to 57 percent) and stayed constant (at about 77 percent) 
respectively (authors’ calculations based on data in Cam pbell 2003, 28). In midterm elections, 
contemporary turnout differences among the elderly and other age groups are even more 
striking: seniors are now more than twice as likely to  vote compared to those under 35 
(Campbell 2003, 29). In addition, elderly are more likely to make campaign contributions, 
volunteer, and contact senators and congressmen through letter-writing (Campbell, 2003).
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influences, and elderly politics did play a very large role in its expansion.
This paper thus complements Campbell (2003) and makes several contri­
butions to the literature on the impact of politics on welfare programs for the 
elderly. F irst, we show that, as predicted by our theoretic model, the variation 
in OAA benefits between 1935-1955 was due in part to governors’ vote seeking 
behavior. In order to identify the effect of political processes on OAA, we use 
the exogenous variation in political incentives provided by gubernatorial term  
limits to show that only governors who were able to run for reelection manipu­
lated OAA payments, and th a t the elderly recipients were indeed the targeted 
group.
Second, our model predicts and the results confirm th a t governors used OAA 
for political purposes only in the states where OAA supporters represent a 
moderately sized population. At very low and very high numbers of supporters 
the costs of increasing OAA exceed the electoral benefits. Third, we show th a t 
governors facing higher electoral competition increased OAA benefits more than 
those in uncontested states.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents a review of the related 
literature. Section 2 presents a brief history of the OAA program, and explains 
why this program, unlike OASI, was open to political influence. In section 3 we 
show how existing models of the influence of political incentives on economic 
policy can be modified to motivate the empirical findings. Section 4 describes 
the da ta  and the empirical framework, and section 5 presents the results. In 
section 6 we investigate whether the political incentives for m anipulating OAA 
may be due to the changing patterns of elderly political participation between 
1931 and 1955. While we cannot provide definitive, empirically backed, evidence 
to this claim, we do review existing literature and secondary data. Section 7 
concludes.
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3.1 R elated  Literature
Our results are related to, but not readily reconciled with, three main 
strands of literature. To begin with, since we examine early welfare spend­
ing programs from a political angle, our results are related to the writings 
on the politicizing of New Deal relief programs ([Wright 1974], [Wallis 1987], 
[Anderson and Tollison 1991], [Couch and Shughart 1998], [Fishback 1999], [Fleck 2008]). 
This literature is concerned with the impact of state political power (at the na­
tional level) on the ability of states to  a ttrac t federal New Deal resources. In 
this paper, however, we take a different approach, and focus on state level policy 
issues instead. By using the variation in term  limits and focusing on specific 
welfare spending programs (OAA, AB, and ADC), we are able to isolate more 
clearly the political incentives faced by decision makers.
By focusing on the politics of a previously unexplored elderly Social Security 
program (OAA), as well as on an early time period 1931-1955, our results are also 
complementary to the "gerontocracy" literature which documents the political 
clout of the elderly as a lobby group in the post 1950s time period (Mulligan 
and Sala-I-Martin 1999a,b,c; Campbell 2003). As discussed in the introduction 
and section 6 , we extend this literature by showing th a t, contrary to previous 
assumptions, the elderly were a powerful political force even prior to the Social 
Security amendments of 1950, albeit a t the state, rather than  the national level.
Finally, our paper is most closely related to the recent political economy 
literature which use term  limits to estim ate the effect of political incentives on 
economic policies ([Besley and Case 1995], [List and Sturm  2006]). We follow 
a similar approach to these papers, but we focus on an earlier time period, 
different policy variables, and use a new dataset on term  limits and gubernatorial 
characteristics. Additionally, we contribute to this literature by addressing the 
choice of OAA policy tools by state governors, and showing th a t benefits were 
preferred to recipients due to their lower adm inistrative costs and higher political 
benefits. Finally, as it will be discussed in greater detail below and in the next
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section, we offer new insights on the role of policies to a ttrac t additional votes 
in the context of rival (rather than non-rival) benefits from state spending.
In their seminal paper, Besley and Case (1995) focus on sta te  fiscal policies, 
and show th a t governors eligible for reelection have lower governmental expen­
ditures and taxes due to the disciplining mechanism of elections. Furthermore, 
they also provide some evidence th a t term-limited governors are more likely to 
reverse redistributive policies (like minimum wages increases) than  incumbents 
who are not constrained. List and Sturm  (2006) use term  limits to show that 
political incentives drive the decisions on secondary policy issues in ways th a t 
are not consistent with median voter or lobby models. They show th a t environ­
mental spending differs between term s when the limit is biting and term s when 
the governor is eligible for reelection, and th a t this variation is larger when the 
states are “greener” , i.e. when the proportion of pro-environmental voters in a 
sta te  increases. The intuition for their second result is th a t governors who are 
catering to the pro-environmental interests in the greener states when they can 
run for reelection will reduce environmental spending once they become lame 
ducks.
In the setting of our paper, OAA spending is unlikely to be considered a 
secondary policy issue, since recipiency rates were as high as 50 percent of all 
elderly population in some states. Nevertheless, we also find significant variation 
in OAA spending between term-limited and not term-limited governors. How­
ever, in contrast to List and Sturm  (2006), we find th a t this variation in OAA 
policy depends non-linearly on the share of the target population, namely the 
elderly. The main difference between our results and those from List and Sturm  
(2006) stems from the fact th a t environmental spending is, to a certain degree 
non-rival, whereas OAA spending is essentially rival. Hence, a fixed amount 
of environmental spending will bring the votes of all green voters in a state, 
regardless of their group size. By contrast, an increase in the number of people 
eligible for OAA results in lower spending per recipient. In the next section we 
show how to incorporate this insight into a career concern model in the vein
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of Besley and Case (1995) and List and Sturm  (2006), and th a t our empirical 
findings from section 5 are consistent with the predictions from this model.
3.2 O A A  Background: E volution  and P olitic iz­
ing, 1935-1955
3.2.1 T he Structure and Evolution of th e OAA Program , 
1935-1955
The passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 marked the beginning of 
old-age pension programs in the United S tates .4 It included provisions for two 
main programs targeted at the elderly, Old age Assistance (OAA) and Old 
Age Insurance (OASI). OASI later developed into the current Social Security 
Program, and was federally administered; OAA, on the other hand, was need- 
based and intended to be temporary, until the OASI Program  would be fully 
rolled out.
We have described the characteristics and evolution of the OAA program 
between 1935 and 1955 in more detail elsewhere ([Balan Cohen 2006]). For the 
purpose of this paper, it is im portant to note four main features of the OAA pro­
gram. F irst, the OAA program was very large in size, both absolutely (even by 
modern standards), and relative to OASI.5 Second, although the federal govern­
ment provided matching funds according to a pre-specified common formula, the 
ultim ate responsibility in administering the program and in determining OAA 
benefits and recipients rested with the states themselves. A person generally 
qualified if she was 65 years and older, and if her level of resources was below a
4A lthough on paper 27 states had old age programs before 1935, in practice recipiency 
rates were close to zero alm ost everywhere, and benefits levels were very low[Costa 1988].
5 D espite its present-day size and importance, until 1950 OASI was the smaller of the two 
programs; in 1947, for instance, 97 percent of the com bined OAA and OASI paym ents went 
to OAA. In 1950, at the peak of the OAA program, 22 percent of the total elderly population  
(2.8 million people) were receiving benefits, and in some states, recipiency rates were as high 
as 50 percent. The size of the benefits was also high, w ith OAA benefits representing, on 
average, 11 percent of the average personal after-tax incom e, and about 20 percent of elderly 
per capita incom e during this time period
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certain cutoff level th a t varied by state. Finally, the evolution of OAA program 
between 1935 and 1955 was characterized by enormous variation in benefits and 
recipients across states and tim e .6
3.2.2 OAA and State Politics
The OASI program was relatively isolated from political pressures during 
its early years. ([Lieberman 1998]) offers several explanations for this. First, 
since OASI was administered a t the federal level, it was less susceptible to 
political pressures at lower levels. Second, since work under OASI was entirely 
procedural until 1941, it relied heavily on standard routines and carefully defined 
operations. Furthermore, even after benefits began to be paid in 1941, the 
operation of OASI was governed by the details of the Social Security Act, and 
required few rulemaking and adjudication procedures, thus curtailing the access 
of potential interest group to the policymaking process. Finally, the OASI 
program was administered by the Social Security Board, which, a t least during 
its early years, was a politically independent agency.
All of these factors stood in stark contrast to those involved in the adminis­
tration and implementation of the OAA program. First, since the OAA program 
was administered at the state rather than  federal level, it was much more sus­
ceptible to the influence of local interest groups. Federal supervision of state 
plans limited this to some extent, but the leverage of the federal government 
over individual states was not very high .7 Second, the rules for determining 
eligibility in the OAA program were not established by the Social Security Act 
or the federal government, but rather by the sta tes’ legislatures, creating ample 
opportunities for political lobbying.8 Finally, due to its purported tem porary
6In 1937, for instance, benefits varied from $61 in M ississippi to  $380 in California, and 
OAA recipiency rates from 4 percent in Maine to 50 percent in Oklahoma. There was also a 
large variation in benefits and recipiency rates w ithin states; for exam ple, between 1940 and 
1950, recipiency rates tripled in Alabama and decreased by more than one-half in Delaware.
7Since the federal government was not directly involved in adm inistering state plans, it 
could punish noncompliant states only by cutting off m atching federal funds, and thus under­
mining the program itself. A lthough the federal government was thus — understandably—  
reluctant to  cut off funds to noncompliant states, it did do so on several “outrageous” 
occasions— for instance in Oklahoma in 1937.
8See for instance Lindford (1949) for a detailed account of the many legislative battles over
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nature—until OASI would be fully rolled out—the OAA program was more sub­
ject to uncertainty regarding its size, which further increased the susceptibility 
of the program to political influences.9
The OAA program, however, was only one of a to ta l of three welfare pro­
grams set up under the Social Security Act of 1935. The other two—Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) and Aid to  the Blind (AB)— were targeted to dif­
ferent needy categories in the population, but had very similar adm inistration 
and implementation characteristics compared to OAA.
Although ADC and AB were also potentially subject to political manipu­
lation, however, the size of these programs between 1935-1955 was very small 
compared to th a t of OAA (see Figure 1). In addition, states were far more 
quicker in setting up OAA compared to ADC and AB programs—whereas all 
states had federally-approved OAA programs by 1939, this was not the case for 
ADC & AB programs until 1954. This is a t least suggestive of a much higher 
priority granted to OAA programs in the budget allocation process at the state 
level.10
Political factors can account for much of this difference across programs. 
Given a set of programs targeted to different recipient categories, welfare pro­
grams for the more politically successful group will be larger, because this in­
creases the governors’ political payoffs from targeting a particular group.
3.2.3 OAA Policy Tools: Benefits vs. R ecipients
State adm inistrators of the OAA program had a choice of two margins along 
which to adjust state OAA spending in response to a given federal matching 
subsidy: an intensive margin (adjusting benefits per recipient), and an extensive 
one (changing the number of recipients through eligibility requirements). Due
OAA in M assachuestts.
9 For OASI, the obvious connection between current contributions and future benefits en­
sured a more stable long-run perspective on program size (Lieberman 1998)
10An extreme example of this is provided by Colorado’s case, whose constitution in 1940 
(alterable only by a referendum of voters) stated that 85 percent of all sta te  revenues from 
excise, consum ption, retail and sales, liquor and inheritance taxes was to be allocated to  OAA 
([Clague and Gordon 1940], 14).
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to administrative and political considerations, changing benefits was adminis­
tra to rs’ preferred policy tool.
To begin with, changing benefits for existing recipients was administratively 
less expensive than  changing the number of recipients. Since OAA eligibility 
was determined on an individual basis, by visiting social workers, increasing the 
number of OAA recipients involved adm inistrative costs associated with hiring, 
training and supervising social workers, as well as with expanding the structure 
of the OAA program to remoter areas. By contrast, changing the size of OAA 
benefits simply involved amending the existing OAA legislation and using the 
existent administrative structure. Furthermore, the “detection” costs associated 
with changing benefits were also lower, because federal supervision of state OAA 
plans involved a closer scrutiny of eligibility rules, bu t imposed no limitations 
on the size of the benefits.11
In addition to being administratively cheaper, changing benefits was also 
more likely to be politically beneficial, because the political power of current 
recipients was much greater than  tha t of those who would have been added into 
the program. For example, the marginal elderly recipients in the South were 
poorer, more likely to live in rural areas, and more likely to be black compared 
to the average OAA recipient ([Hawkins 1956], [Quadagno 1988a]). Moreover, 
even in the richer non-southern states, the marginal OAA recipient was more 
likely to be poor and geographically isolated due to the higher adm inistrative 
costs associated with expanding the program further away from high-density 
population areas.
By contrast, the elderly affected by expansions in the OAA program along 
the intensive (benefit) margin were more likely to live in richer, more industrial 
areas. Since the richer northern and western states had adm inistrative and 
legislative infrastructure for OAA in place even before 1936, they were able to 
take advantage of federal subsidies faster. As a result, they had few elderly
11 In Oklahoma in 1938 for instance, the federal government stopped OAA paym ents to 
the state upon discovering that ineligible persons were receiving benefits (New York Tim es, 
November 24, 1938)
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on waiting rolls, and were thus more likely to respond to federal subsidies by 
increasing benefits rather than recipients. Even in the poorer southern states, 
changes in benefits were more likely to accrue to the initial recipients of OAA, 
who were more likely to be white and slightly better off([Quadagno 1988b]).
As we will discuss in more detail in section 6.3, poorer and geographically 
isolated elderly were less politically active. This was especially true for elderly 
blacks in the South, who were essentially barred from participating in political 
activities due to discrimination in the voting process.12 As a result, the political 
benefits from manipulating OAA were higher along the benefit rather than  the 
recipient margin.
3.3 Theoretical considerations
At the core of our theoretical interpretation lies the difference in incentives 
between a term-limited and a governor eligible for re-election. Assuming tha t 
a governor draws some private benefits from holding office and th a t his actions 
influence the likelihood of re-election, it is reasonable to expect term-limited and 
re-eligible governors to act differently. Our theoretical interpretation follows the 
reputation building framework used by List and Sturm  (2006). The governor’s 
actions reveal a type ("pro/anti-elderly") to voters who care solely about the 
type. Furthermore, non-incumbents cannot take actions to reveal their type. If 
revealing a type increases chances of re-election but is costly, then governors will 
only take revealing actions when they are standing for re-election. The setup 
of our model follows closely th a t of List and Sturm. W hat distinguishes our 
model, however, is tha t the cost of revealing type increases with the size of the 
target voter group (i.e. elderly).
The candidates (incumbents and non-incumbents) are heterogenous along 
two dimensions. First, they have an ideology, L or R, which is known to voters.
12 In 1940, for instance, the proportion of southern blacks registered to vote was only 5 
percent [Campbell and Feagin 1975]; as late as the 1950s, th is fraction was only 28 percent 
(Quadagno 1988a, 254).
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Second, they have a type, pro- or anti-elderly, which is their private information. 
The likelihood th a t a random candidate is pro-elderly is known, n The governor 
sets the overall level of public spending and also decides if the elderly receive 
assistance or not. For reasons detailed in section 2.3, we will assume th a t the 
governor cannot decide what fraction of the elderly to target. To keep the model 
simple, we are further assuming tha t assistance to elderly does not affect the 
overall level of public spending .13 Furthermore, governors act strategically only 
about assistance to elderly. Governors can stand for re-election once.
Voters are divided into three groups, L, R, E, and NE w ith sizes /yL, 7 #, j E , 
and 7 NE (we normalize total population to 1). L and R voters only care about 
governor’s ideology. E(pro redistribution towards elderly) and NE (against re­
distribution towards elderly) voters only care about governor’s type. We refer to 
states where ryE > 'yNE as "pro-elderly" states and to states where 7 ^  < 7 NE 
"anti-elderly" states.
Governors are elected by majority rule. The elections are always between 
one L and one R candidate. The outcome of the election is uncertain, due 
to a random  shock tha t transfers e votes from the R to the L candidate e is 
distributed with density h{e) and cdf H(e). h(.) is symmetric around zero, 
smooth and single peaked. Hence, if the L candidate receives k votes, her 
probability of winning is:
P(k +  e > \ )  =  P(e > \  -  k) = 1 -  H { \  -  k)
Governors get a payoff A from just being in office. They get an additional 
payoff based on their decision to redistribute towards the elderly or not. This 
additional payoff changes depending on the governors type and on the size of the 
pro-elderly and anti-elderly population. If a governor does not act in accordance 
with her type she receives a negative, fixed payoff —F. If a governor redistributes 
toward the elderly she receives an additional payoff —c*('yE — 7 jvs)> where c*
13 OAA spending was associated with crowding out of other welfare spending programs, and 
thus the net im pact on overall public spending was indeed negligible.
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(costs of redistribution) can take a low or high value, cl or c # , with probability 
p and 1 — p, respectively.14 If a governor redistributes toward the elderly in 
the first term , the benefits to the elderly remain increased in the second term  
without needing to pay the redistribution costs again. To reduce notation we 
will denote ")E — 'Yn e  as A ^.T he governors also have a time discount factor f3.
The timing of the model is as follows:
1) nature reveals c* to the elected governor
2) the governor chooses public spending (non-strategically) and whether to 
redistribute towards or away from elderly.
3) these choices are observed by the voters
4) if the governor can stand for re-election, then the election is between the 
incumbent and a random candidate. After election, we are back to step 1); 
otherwise, two random candidates face off and we also return  to step 1).
We are now interested in finding the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the following collection of strategies to be an equilibrium in a pro-elderly 
state(A .e >  0): pro-elderly governors always give assistance to the elderly; non 
pro-elderly governors who can stand for reelection give assistance to  elderly only 
if costs are low; the elderly vote for the incumbent if and only if she has given 
assistance while in office.
If costs are low, a non pro-elderly L governor will give assistance when eligible 
for reelection if the gains from attracting elderly voters are higher than  the costs 
of giving assistance:
A —  clA e — F + P(AE +  +  8 >  2 ^ ^  >  A +  P{ i l  — A e + s >
W here A — clA e  — F  is the first term  payoff if redistributing, P ( A e  + j E + 
e > A) is the probability of winning a second term  if redistributing, (3\ is the
14 The assum ption is that the assistance towards the elderly is supported by taxing the 
non-elderly, so the larger the difference between the two groups, the higher the distribution  
costs.
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discounted second term  payoff, and the left hand side of the inequality are the 
equivalents without redistribution. This inequality reduces to:
F  + clA e  < +  A e  ~  -  H (1 l  ~  ~  ^ )) =  PXT(Ae )
We denote H ( 7 L +  A ^ — | )  — H ( — A e  — as r ( A s ) ,  where T is an 
increasing function, bounded from above by 1. W ith this notation we have:
F  + clA e  < PXT(A e )
To ensure th a t high costs prohibit anti-elderly governors from ever giving as­
sistance, we need to have the above inequality reversed when replacing cl with 
ch■ P u tting  the two inequalities together we have the following condition for 
the equilibrium behavior of anti-elderly governors in a pro-elderly state:
F  -I- clA e  < ^A r(A ^ ) < F  + chA e
To ensure th a t high costs do not ever deter pro-elderly governors from giving 
assistance, we need th a t the present discounted benefits of redistributing when 
costs are high must exceed the present discounted benefits of not redistributing.
A — c h A e  +  P ( A e  +  7 l  + £ >  2) ^ ^  >  A ~  F  +  P { l l  ~  A e  +  £ >
This reduces to
— F  +  c h A e  < PXT(Ae)
Hence, the final conditions for a pro-elderly state are:
m ax(F  +  clA e , —F  +  chA e ) < (3XT(Ae ) < F  + chA e  (3.1)
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By the symmetry of h the condition for R governors is the same. 
Analogously, we obtain the conditions in an anti-elderly state (A # < 0):
— F  + ch& e  < ^ A r(A s) < min(—F  +  clA e , F  + chA e ) (3.2)
We also need a condition for the optim ality of voter behavior. Intuitively, 
the individual voter must be better off voting for the incumbent if and only if 
she has acted in the favor of the voter’s type. Given the equilibrium strategy of 
the governors, the elderly are better off voting for the incumbent if they received 
assistance, if:
7T +  (1  — 7x)p <
7T +  ( 1  — 7T)p
Similarly, the anti-elderly are better off voting for the incumbent if the elderly 
did not receive assistance, if:
1 -  7T
1 — 7T +  Tip <
1 — 7T +  7rp
These conditions ensure th a t the incumbent who has acted pro-elderly (anti- 
elderly) is more likely to act pro-elderly (anti-elderly) in her second term 15 than  
a random challenger, and is satisfied for small values of p.
. V I  — 7T — ( 1  — 7 r) /«  o \p < m in(------------------------ , —--------) (3.3)
7r  I  — 7T
Intuitively, a small p means th a t the likelihood of the costs being low is small 
enough to be informative, whereas a large p would mean tha t, for example, even 
non pro-elderly governors provide assistance so frequently th a t elderly voters 
cannot distinguish them  from pro-elderly governors. Hence, if condition 3.3 
is satisfied, the non-ideologic voters vote for incumbent if she acts according 
to their type in the first term , because, according to their updated beliefs, 
such an incumbent is more likely to act according to their type than  a random
15 The likelihood that an incumbent who has provided assistance will provide assistance in 
the second term is in fact the Bayes updated likelihood that s /h e  is pro-elderly.
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candidate .16
P ro p o s it io n  1 I f  either condition 3.1 (in a pro-elderly state) or condition 3.2 
(in an anti-elderly state), and 3.3 are satisfied, then the spending behavior of 
governors will be different when they are eligible for  reelection and when they 
are not.
This proposition is straightforward, and confirms the intuition th a t governors 
are less likely to enact costly programs, even if these programs help them  get 
re-elected.
P ro p o s it io n  2 The size of the elderly population has an ambiguous effect on 
the likelihood of the equilibrium in this model.17
On the one hand a larger elderly population makes it more costly to provide 
assistance to elderly and on the other hand it increases the electoral benefits of 
providing assistance. W ithout making further assumptions about the distribu­
tion of the election shock we cannot say which effect dominates. Nevertheless, a 
schematic representation of conditions 3.1 and 3.2 in Figure 3.1 sheds some light 
on this relationship. For this particular functional form of h and these partic­
ular param eter values we can say th a t term  limit effects (i.e. governors acting 
against their type to match the type of the state when eligible for re-election) 
only exist for intermediate sizes of the targeted population. Specifically, in a 
pro-elderly state, an anti-elderly governor will cater to the interests of the el­
derly by raising the OAA only for intermediate sizes of the elderly population, 
i.e. for A e  £ [A ^i, A ^ ]-
Finally, due to the symmetry about 0, smoothness and single-peakedness 
of h, T ( A e ) for a given positive (negative) A ^  is maximized(minimized) when
16This condition is identical to  that derived in List and Sturm (2006), and a full derivation  
can be found in their paper.
17In this equilibrium, in a pro-elderly state pro-elderly governors always give assistance to  
the elderly; anti-elderly governors who can stand for reelection give assistance to elderly only 
if costs are low; the elderly vote for the incumbent if and only if she has given assistance 
w hile in office. W hile, in anti-elderly state anti-elderly governors never give assistance to the 
elderly; pro-elderly governors who can stand for reelection don’t give assistance to the elderly 
only if the costs are low; the anti-elderly vote for the incumbent if and only if she has not 
given assistance while if office.
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7 l  =  1 r  In other words, conditions 3.1 and 3.2 is more likely to hold when 
political competition is higher. We thus have:
P ro p o s it io n  3 The difference in elderly welfare spending between governors 
eligible and not eligible for reelection should be higher when political competition 
is higher.
3.4 D ata  and Em pirical Framework
Due to its administrative and implementation structure, the OAA program 
was highly susceptible to political influences. Moreover, the elderly eligible for 
OAA were a pretty  successful political group, and more likely to lobby for benefit 
rather than recipiency rate increases. Did elected government officials in charge 
of administering the OAA program respond to these political incentives?
3.4.1 D ata D escription
In order to explore the relationship between political considerations and the 
size of the OAA program -and thus test the predictions of the model in section 
3 empirically- we have constructed a new dataset on state OAA benefit levels 
and number of OAA recipients linked to political da ta  on electoral rules and 
gubernatorial outcomes, and a rich set of state-level covariates. Since after 1955 
OASI was much larger in size compared with OAA, and since our identification 
strategy relies on differences in old age income both across states and time, we 
restrict our attention to the 1931-1955 time period.
W elfare  P ro g ra m s  a n d  S ta te  C o n tro ls  d a ta .  The OAA data  set con­
tains yearly information on average state benefit levels and number of OAA 
recipients. In addition, we also collected da ta  on Aid to the Blind (AB) and 
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), in order to perform falsification tests and 
show th a t elderly were indeed the politically targeted group. We link this data­
base to a rich dataset on sta te  level factors th a t influenced the evolution of OAA
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and political outcomes during this time period. These include net personal in­
come, demographic characteristics, measures of state revenue and expenditures, 
measures of education, as well as measures of employment. Summary statistics 
are presented in Table 3.1 and further details on this da ta  are provided in Balan 
Cohen (2006).
P o litic a l D a ta . The political dataset contains information on the pres­
ence and length of gubernatorial term  limits, the number of term s served by 
state governors and whether they actually ran for reelection when eligible, as 
well as data  on victory margins in gubernatorial elections and party  affiliation. 
Summary statistics are presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.3.
3.4.2 Empirical Framework
To test the first proposition, we estim ate the following equation:
\n(O AA)st = a+/3*N oLim itst+Q*Xst+ s ta ies+yeart+states*time+€st (3.4)
where s, t, index states and years, OAA is a measure of the size of the OAA 
program, N o L im i t  is an indicator for whether the governor is eligible to run 
for reelection (i.e. the gubernatorial term  is not binding), and A  is a vector of 
state-level covariates. We include state and year fixed effects, as well as state 
specific time trends in all specifications. To allow for arbitrary correlations of 
the error term  within each state, we cluster the standard errors by state.
The identification of the coefficient of interest j3 relies on the variation in 
political incentives faced by governors who are term-limited and those eligible 
for reelection. For the governors eligible for reelection, the marginal benefit of a 
dollar spent on OAA includes both a private benefit component (since it raises 
the chance of being re-elected), as well as a public benefit component. For the 
term-limited ( “lame duck” ) governors, however, the marginal benefit does not
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include the private benefit component from reelection. Hence, the coefficient /? 
will capture the conditional difference in measures of OAA spending between 
gubernatorial terms with binding, and respectively not binding, term  limits.
To estimate /3 consistently by OLS, the variation in political incentives pro­
vided by term  limits has to be exogenous to OAA policy. Most of the literature 
on term  limits treats them as exogenous to sta te  fiscal policies (Besley and Case 
1995, List and Sturm  2006). The reason for this is th a t gubernatorial term  
limits are the oldest and most common U.S. lim itation on office holding (they 
go back to the 18th century), and they require significant majorities to be over­
tu rned .18 There are some economic and demographic differences between states 
with and without term  limits (like income per capita and population size), but 
we address this issue by controlling for a rich set of state level covariates, as well 
as for state fixed effects. There are, however, two states in our sample which 
adopted term  limits between 1931 and 1955: West Virginia in 1945 and Idaho 
in 1947. Since for these observations policy making (including OAA) are simul­
taneously determined with term  limits, conditioning on term  limits might be 
problematic. We have therefore performed estimations both with and without 
these observations. Since results are essentially unchanged, in this paper we 
only present the results using the full sample.
To test the second proposition we first define a proxy for A # - the number 
of voters who have intense preferences in favor of OAA policy. List and Sturm  
(2006) use the fraction of the membership in pro-environmental organizations as 
a proxy for the "green/brown" divide, defining a "green" state as one in which 
membership is above a certain threshold. Similarly, we use the fraction of the 
elderly population (aged 65 and above) as a proxy for A e - As this fraction 
is highly correlated across time within a state, we use the elderly population 
fraction in 1940.19. To allow for the non-linear relationship between A ^  and
18 As early as 1787 the Delaware constitution established a two-term limit for the governor, 
and nearly four fifths of the states now place some sort of restriction on the number of terms 
for which an individual may hold the governorship.
19 We have done the analysis for several other reference years and the results are virtually  
unchanged.
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the term-limit effect, we use indicator variables for the top and bottom  quartile 
of the 1940 elderly population fraction .20 Hence, we estim ate the following 
equation:
ln(OAA)st =  ft * NoLim its t  + Si * N o L im i tst * Q l(E ldl940) +
+S2 * NoLimitgt  * Q4(Eld\949)  +
+6 * X st + states +  yeart +  states * t im e  +  est (3.5)
If OAA had an impact on elderly migration, then our OAA measure and the
fraction of elderly in the population would be jointly determined, and estima­
tions based on equation (2) would suffer from endogeneity problems. But elderly 
migration was unlikely to have been a large factor during this time period; state 
residence requirements for OAA were high—ranging from 1 to 5 years—and 
elderly cross-state migration overall was essentially nil.21
To test the third proposition we use the margin of victory(m st) in the previ­
ous gubernatorial election as a (negative) proxy for the intensity of the political 
competition. Hence, we estimate the following equation:
In (OAA) st = ft * N o L im i tst + 5i * N o L im i t st * Ql(Eldl94Q)  +
+£2 * N oLim its t  * Q4(Eldl940)  +  * N o L im i tst * m st +
+<£>2 * N oLim its t  * Q l(Eldl940)  * m st -f- ip3 * N o L im i tst * Q4(Eldl940) * m st +
+u)\ * Q l(£7dl940) * m st + u>2 * Q4(Eldl940 ) * m st +  /i * m st
+0 * X st +  states +  yeart +  states * t im e + est (3-6)
20Therefore /3 captures the term -lim it effect for the states in the interquartile range of 1940 
fraction elderly and <5i, and S2 , respectively, capture the differential term -lim it effect for the  
states in the bottom , and top quartile, relative to the interquartile states.
21 For instance, less than 1 percent of men aged 66-75 had moved to  a new state during 
1950. Among those older than 75, migration was probably even lower.
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3.5 Em pirical results
3.5.1 M ain results
The main findings are presented in Table 3.4. The first column presents the 
OLS results from estim ating equation 3.4 with OAA benefits per recipient as 
the dependent variable. The vector of state level controls includes net personal 
income per IRS return, the percentage of the population th a t is black, as well 
as measures of education, employment, m anufacturing and agricultural condi­
tions. Since OAA was initially designed to cover elderly not yet receiving OASI 
benefits, we also control for OASI benefits in each sta te  and year.22 To diminish 
concerns about reverse causality between these variables and OAA, the controls 
are lagged one year. Consistent with Proposition 1, the OLS regression from 
column 1 in Table 3.4 suggests th a t the average OAA benefit per recipient is 4 
percent higher when the governor is eligible to stand for reelection.
The second column presents the OLS results from estim ating equation 3.5 
with OAA benefits per recipient as the dependent variable. In order to test 
Proposition 2 we interact the term-limit indicator with indicators for the top 
and bottom  quartile of the fraction elderly. Consistent with the graphical repre­
sentation of Proposition 2 in Figure 3.1, the term-limit effect is present only in 
the states in the interquartile range of the fraction elderly. For the states in this 
interquartile range the average OAA benefit per recipient is 7.5 percent higher 
when the governor is eligible to stand for reelection. For the states in the bo t­
tom  quartile the term-limit effect is 6.5 percent lower than  in the interquartile 
states and the overall term-limit effect in these bottom  quartile states (/3 + 51) is 
not significantly different from zero. For the states in the top  quartile of the el­
derly fraction the term-limit effect is 10.5 percent lower than  in the interquartile 
states and f t + 52 is not significantly different from zero. These findings confirm
22 Since prior to 1950 OAA had low coverage and included richer recipients compared to  
OAA, the overlap between OASI and OAA recipients was initially sm all. W hen the provisions 
of OASI were liberalized in 1950, the number of new OASI beneficiaries receiving minimum  
benefits— and hence in continued need of assistance— increased (W hite 1953). As late as 1952, 
however, the concurrent receipt of OAA and OASI among OAA recipients was not higher than  
13 percent (W hite 1953).
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the predictions of the particular param etrization of Proposition 2. Specifically, 
we can conclude tha t it is beneficial for politicians to cater to the interests of 
the elderly only if the elderly are a moderately sized group: too small and the 
electoral benefits do not justify the costs, too large and the costs outweigh the 
electoral benefits.
In the th ird  column we estim ate equation 3.6 by OLS, with OAA benefits per 
recipient as the dependent variable. For the states where the term-limit effect is 
present (the states in the interquartile range of fraction elderly), the term -lim it 
effect is highest when the margin of victory is lowest. For every 10 percent 
increase in the margin of victory the term  limit effect falls by 4 percentiles. 
Our results show th a t in states where the margin of victory was more than  25 
percent (9.7/0.4) the term-limit effect effectively disappears. We interpret this 
as confirming the predictions of Proposition 3, as higher political competition 
leads to higher term-limit effects.
3.5.2 R obustness checks
In Table 3.5 we examine whether the term-limit effect manifests itself through 
the intensive (OAA benefits per recipient) or extensive (OAA recipiency rate) 
margin. As discussed in section 2.3, increases in OAA benefits have lower ad­
ministrative costs and higher political benefits than increases in OAA recipients, 
and should thus be the preferred political tool. Table 3.5 estim ates equation 3.5 
using OAA benefits per capita in column 1 and then decomposing it into OAA 
benefits per recipient (column 2) and OAA recipiency rate (column 3). The 
results show th a t the 15.4 percent term-limit effect observed in OAA benefits 
per capita is driven by a 7.5.percent increase in OAA benefits per recipient and 
by a 7.9 percent increase in OAA recipiency rate. However, while the increase 
in OAA benefits per recipient is precisely measured and is significantly different 
from zero, the increase in recipiency rate is not significantly different from zero. 
Hence, we conclude th a t indeed, increasing benefits per capita was the preferred 
political tool.
110
In Table 3.6 we ask whether the elderly were particularly targeted by state 
governors for politically-motivated transfers. To answer this we first test for 
the existence of term  limit effects in the two other welfare measures within 
the scope of sta te  governors th a t had similar rules and regulations to OAA, 
but were not targeted at the elderly population -  Aid for Dependent Children 
(ADC) and Aid for the Blind (AB). The results in columns 2 and 3 show th a t 
these two welfare measures were not m anipulated by incumbent sta te  governors 
for electoral purposes. Second, we test for the existence of term  limit effects 
in a welfare measure targeted at the elderly bu t outside the scope of state 
governors - the federally administered Old Age Insurance (OASI). In column 
4 we notice th a t the term  limit in OASI benefits per recipient was very small 
(less than 1 percent) and negative. Having examined the term  limit effects in 
these additional three welfare measures we can conclude th a t sta te  governors 
(and not higher level offices) used transfers to elderly (and not to other groups) 
for political purposes.
Finally, in Table 3.7 we revisit our main findings using a different proxy for 
A ^. As OAA was in essence a redistribution of income, another proxy may be 
the level of poverty in the state, as rich individuals would oppose such redis­
tribution while poor individuals would favor them. Hence we use the average 
personal net income as a proxy for A #, assuming th a t a  high average personal 
net income translates to a low fraction of poor individuals.23 The results in 
column 2 are very similar to our main results. The term  limit effects are present 
only in the states in the interquartile range of average personal net income. In 
these states the term-limit effect amounts to an 11 percent increase in the OAA 
benefits per capita. In the states from both the top and bottom  quartiles the 
term-limit effects are significantly smaller than in the interquartile states and 
are overall not significantly different from zero. In column 3 we find tha t, simi­
larly to the main results, the term-limit effects are highest at the lowest margin 
of victory. However this effect is not precisely measured and is not different
23T his would im ply that incom e distribution is similar accross states. We acknowledge this  
is a rather strong assumption.
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from zero. Nevertheless this robustness check does strengthen the case for our 
claim th a t the term-limit effect exists only in states where the support for the 
redistribution is moderate.
3.6 D iscussion
Between 1931 and 1955, elderly welfare spending was in the hands of the state 
governments. The results from section 5 show th a t incumbent state governors 
unconstrained by term-limits m anipulated OAA policy to further their electoral 
goals.
3.6.1 Elderly Political Participation
An open question still remains. Did the elderly have th a t much political 
clout in this period? Our findings give only an indirect answer. Since governors 
were manipulating elderly assistance for electoral goals, the elderly as a group 
must have been able to swing an election one way or the other. We now bring 
forward further evidence about the political power of the elderly.
Most authors have noted th a t the 1940s and 1950s were the “dismal years” 
of the “gray lobby” (Campbell 2003, 84). As late as the 1950s elderly participa­
tion in politics was low. During the presidential election of 1952, elderly were 
as likely to vote as non-elderly, bu t only two-thirds as likely to make campaign 
contributions (Campbell 2003, 84).24 In addition, the number of senior mem­
bership groups with access to the policymaking process was also low. Early 
social insurance organizations like the American Association for Old Age Se­
curity and the American Association for Labor Legislation Security, which had 
actively campaigned for old age pensions in the 1920s had disappeared after the 
passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, and the powerful senior lobby groups 
of later decades (like AARP) had not yet been formed (Campbell 2003, 77). As 
a result, little political attention was devoted to  senior citizens at the national
24By contrast, in current midterm elections seniors are more than twice as likely to vote 
compared to those under 35 (Cam pbell 2003, 29).
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level during this time period. Prior to the 1960s, party  platforms contained a 
paragraph or two on Social Security, bu t no special section on elderly issues, and 
relatively few congressional hearings on age-related policy were held (Campbell 
2003).
3.6.2 N ational vs. State Level Political Participation
However, the lack of strong political participation among the elderly group at 
the national level masks substantial variation a t more local levels between 1931- 
1955. For instance, several elderly pension movements were relatively successful 
in some states, but had little influence at the national level.
In California the Townsend movement—which advocated pensions for all el­
derly of $200 a month—was a powerful political force ([Amenta et al. 1992]). 
In 1936, for instance, a Gallup poll found th a t 14 percent of California voters 
favored Townsend pensions, leading George Gallup to conclude th a t Townsend 
supporters most likely held the balance of power between the Republican and 
Democratic parties in the state ([Putnam  1970], 57). And when the Townsend 
movement weakened, the California Ham and Eggs movement—favoring pen­
sions for all unemployed elderly over 50—quickly gained momentum, receiving 
45 percent of the vote in a 1938 referendum ([Mitchell 2001] [Costa 1988], 178).
Townsend and Ham and Eggs-like plans and movements had also caused a 
lot of stir in Ohio, Colorado, and Michigan at various points during the 1940s 
([Mitchell 2001]). Similarly, in Massachusetts, the ascendancy of the Irish politi­
cal power throughout the 1930s and 1940s was associated with intense lobbying 
of both the Democratic and the Republican parties on behalf of the elderly 
([Gratton 1986]).
These groups supported pension programs tha t were very different from 
OAA state plans. Both the Townsend and the Ham and Eggs movements, for 
instance, advocated pensions for all elderly regardless of their financial situa­
tion (as opposed to just the needy ones). Most of these plans, however, were
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unsustainable, and hence often met with skepticism .25 Politicians and groups 
who adopted more m oderate approaches th a t accepted the existing state sys­
tems of Old Age Assistance, but demanded higher payments, were much more 
successful.26
3.6.3 Political Participation Am ong OAA Beneficiaries
D ata on political participation by OAA beneficiaries is unfortunately not 
available, but we can draw some inferences based on the political behavior of the 
poorest elderly—who were most likely to be eligible for OAA. Our calculations 
based on data  from the National Election Surveys (NES), show that poor elderly 
were indeed politically active, at least relative to other poor groups. The turnout 
in the elections of 1948, 1952, and 1956, for instance, was much higher among 
the elderly (65 percent) than  among the non-elderly groups (48 percent). W ithin 
the elderly group as a whole, however, the turnout among poor elderly was lower 
than  tha t among richer ones.
W hat were the factors determining OAA beneficiaries’ political participa­
tion? In recent decades, the political success of the elderly has been a ttribu ted  
to several factors. The elderly have more time and more resources to invest in 
political activities (Campbell 2003, Mulligan and Sala-I-M artin 1999a). In addi­
tion, they are a more homogeneous political group with predetermined member­
ship criteria—everybody becomes old at some point—and thus can more easily 
avoid free riding issues (Mulligan and Sala-I-M artin 1999a). They are also more 
single-minded in their political choices due to their heavy reliance on Social Se­
curity (Campbell 2003, Mulligan and Sala-I-M artin 1999a,b). Lastly, they are 
more politically neutral voters, caring more about well-being than about ideol­
ogy (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Dixit and Londregan 1996, Campbell 2003).
Similar factors influenced the OAA beneficiaries’ political participation be­
25 The Townsend plan for instance, would have cost 66 billion per year at a tim e when the  
GNP was 90 billion (Campbell 2003, 77)
26In Colorado, for instance, a Townsend-like group advocating increased OAA paym ents 
managed to achieve an am endm ent of the state constitution, and in California in 1942, Earl 
Warren appeased Townsendites, Ham and Eggers, and other pension advocates by raising 
state OAA, and thus, successfully won the California Governorship [Mitchell 2001].
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tween 1935 and 1955, but in different proportions. For instance, OAA recipients 
had low levels of the first two politically inducing resources—time and income.27 
The other three factors conducive to political success—heavy reliance on Social 
Security, single-mindedness and political neutrality—played a large role, how­
ever. To begin with, since most OAA recipients had no other earnings, and 
did not receive any other relief, OAA assistance represented a very large share 
of recipients’ total income.28 Since recipients were almost entirely dependent 
on OAA for income support, they thus had a very large political stake in the 
program. It is not surprising therefore th a t political support for means-tested 
pensions (as opposed to OASI), and for generous non-insurance based pension 
programs like the Townsend plan was largest among the poorest of the elderly.29
3.7 C onclusion
In this paper, we use the variation in political incentives of state governors 
provided by term  limits to show th a t the variation in the level of OAA benefits 
per recipient between 1931 and 1955 was due to governors’ vote seeking behavior. 
Although the other two programs set up under the Social Security Act, ADC 
and AB, were also open to political influences, we show th a t sta te  governors 
targeted elderly due to their greater political power.
As predicted by our theoretical model, the m anipulation of OAA occurred 
only in states with moderately sized elderly population and increased with the 
degree of political competition. Given th a t OAA beneficiaries were relatively 
poor during this time period, and th a t means-tested welfare programs generally
27 At the start of the program, OAA recipients were more likely to be in poor health, have low 
levels of resources, and work rather than be retired. However, the OAA program did greatly 
increase recipients’ health, well-being, and retirement rates (Balan Cohen 2006, Friedberg 
1999, Costa 1999), so it is very likely that income and tim e resources did play an im portant 
part in spurring OAA recipients’ political participation later on.
28In 1944, for instance, this share was over 80 percent. A uthors’ calculations based on data  
from Bureau of Public Assistance (1944), Table 30.
29A uthors’ calculations based on data from a 1938 Gallup poll reveals that the fractions 
of poor, and respectively middle-income elderly who were in favor of need-based pensions 
(as opposed to pensions for all elderly) were 80 and 60 percent. Similarly, support for the  
Townsend plan in 1939 was 69 percent among relief recipients, but only 49 percent among the  
elderly overall (M itchell 2001, 268).
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fail to mobilize political support, our findings th a t politicians m anipulated OAA 
benefits in order to a ttrac t votes are surprising. However, given th a t the OAA 
program greatly improved the health and well-being of recipients (Balan Cohen 
2006, Costa 1999, Friedberg 1999), providing a better understanding of how 
elderly politics affected the distribution of OAA payments can provide valuable 
insights into the current debates over the reform of Social Security and its 
potential implications on low-income elderly.
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no term-limit effect 
tenn-limit effect
Figure 3.1: The relationship between A g  and the terrn-limic effect
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable #  O bs Mean S t.d ev
OAA Data and State Controls
OAA per recipient 720 1983.36 629.75
OAA recipiency rate 720 38.80 23.44
OASI per recipient 720 1412.58 434.49
ADC per recipient 697 1328.02 499.79
AB per recipient 675 2202.28 682.84
Net Income per Return 720 13677.83 1723.69
% Black 720 9.08 11.77
% Employment in manufacturing 720 1.91 1.15
% Illiterate 720 3.35 2.31
% Housing owner occupied 720 54.51 7.95
% Unemployed 720 61.62 2.94
Average farm value 720 73662.21 56849.89
Political Variables
1= Governor not Term Limited 720 0.68
Governor's winning voting margin previous election 718 28.02 30.71
N ote: The OAA benefits and recipients data was collected from various Social Security publications, and controls data 
was collected from various sources, particularly United States Statistical Abstracts (see Balan Cohen 2006 for details). 
All monetary values (net income, OAA, OASI, ADC, AB benefits, average farm value, manufacturing values per 
capita, expenditure per capita) are expressed in 1982 dollars and are corrected for differences in the cost of living across 
states using Lindert and Williamson (1980). The data on the presence and length of term limits, the number of terms 
served, and the party affiliation is from The Book o f The States (various years), and Kallenbach and Kallenbach 
(1977).
Table 3.2: Detailed summary statistics for sizes of targeted populations
#Obs Mean St. dev Min
Percentiles 
25 50 75 Max
Percentage population aged 65 and above 48 7.01 2.01 4.28 5.50 6.81 8.03 16.13
Average net personal income 48 18,040 2,519 14,010 16,417 17,863 18,958 29,217
Percentage population aged 15 and below 48 18.35 1.25 16.21 17.44 18.29 19.13 22.00
Percentage blind 48 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.35
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Table 3.3: Gubernatorial Data: Summary Statistics
Reelection and term limit
Governor running for 
reelection
Governor not 
running for 
reelection
Limit binding 4a 120
Limit not binding 240 137
Total 244 257
Governors not running for reelection
Governor running for 
other election Other options13
Limit binding 28 92
Limit not binding 43 94
Total 71 186
a Four governors ran for reelection with the limit biting as they had not 
served a full term; they had filled in an unexpired term, 
b Other options include being politically appointed to different positions, 
retiring completely from public office, passing away 
Notes. The data on the presence and length of term limits, the number of 
terms served,and the party affiliation is from The Book of The 
States(various years), and Kallenbach and Kallenbach (1977). The data 
on governors, documenting whether they actually ran for reelection when 
eligible and whether they ran for other elections, was also collected from 
the National Governors’ Association.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Term Limits on OAA Benefits and Recipiency Rates
ln(OAA benefits per recipients)
(1) (2) (3)
NoLimit 0.038* 0.075“ 0.097“
(0.021) (0.034) (0.037)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly bottom quartile -0.065*
(0.038)
-0.240“
(0.101)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly top quartile 
NoLimit * Margin
NoLimit * Fraction elderly bottom quartile * Margin 
NoLimit * Fraction elderly top quartile * Margin 
Fraction elderly bottom quartile * Margin 
Fraction elderly top quartile * Margin 
Margin
-0.106“
(0.047)
-0.177“ *
(0.062)
-0.004*
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
% illiterate 0.134 0.127 0.094
(0.118) (0.117) (0.123)
Infaverage farm value) -0.038 -0.052 0.011
(0.213) (0.206) (0.191)
% black 0.110 0.099 0.060
(0.092) (0.095) (0.101)
% Employment in manufacturing -0.082* -0.088** -0.084**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.039)
% Owner occupied housing 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
% Unemployed -2.092 -1.967 -1.793
(1.744) (1.691) (1.603)
ln(average net personal income) 0.113 0.114 0.102
(0.119) (0.118) (0.119)
In(OASI) -0.164 -0.137 -0.035
(0.103) (0.107) (0.121)
State fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
State specific time trends yes yes yes
Number of observations 720 720 718
Adjusted R2 0.940 0.940 0.941
Notes: ‘ significant at 10%, “ significant at 5%, “ ‘ significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by 
state. The sample in all regressions cover all 48 continental states in the 1931-1955 period. All variables except 
NoLimit are lagged one year. OAA benefits are expressed in real terms (hundreds of 1982 USD), adjusted for 
differences in costs of living.
States in the bottom quartile of fraction elderly: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, N 
Carolina, S Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
States in the top quartile of fraction elderly: California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, Washington
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Table 3.5: Effect of Term Limits on OAA, Benefits vs. Recipiency Rates
ln(OAA per capita) ln(OAA per recipient) ln(recipiency rate)
NoLimit 0.154“ 0.075“ 0.079
(0.059) (0.034) (0.059)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly bottom quartile -0.223“ * -0.065* -0.158“
(0.072) (0.038) (0.069)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly top quartile -0.203*“ -0.106“ -0.097
(0.074) (0.047) (0.062)
% illiterate -0.205 0.127 -0.332*
(0.222) (0.117) (0.195)
ln(average farm value) 0.014 -0.052 0.066
(0.268) (0.206) (0.152)
% black -0.171 0.099 -0.271“
(0.176) (0.095) (0.130)
% Employment in manufacturing -0.069 -0.088“ 0.019
(0.090) (0.042) (0.063)
% Owner occupied housing 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.028) (0.015) (0.019)
% Unemployed -0.068 -1.967 1.899
(2.686) (1.691) (1.615)
Infaverage net personal income) 0.318* 0.114 0.204*
(0.162) (0.118) (0.113)
In(OASI) -0.193 -0.137 -0.056
(0.145) (0.107) (0.099)
State fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
State specific time trends yes yes yes
Number of observations 
Adjusted R2
720
0.961
720
0.940
720
0.981
Notes: ‘ significant at 10%, “ significant at 5%, “ ‘ significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. The 
sample in all regressions cover all 48 continental states in the 1931-1955 period. All variables except NoLimit are lagged one 
year. OAA benefits are expressed in real terms (hundreds of 1982 USD), adjusted for differences in costs of living. OAA per 
capita is computed by dividing total OAA in the state with the population aged 65 and above. Recipiency rate is expressed in 
recipients per population aged 65 and above.
States in the bottom quartile of fraction elderly: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, N Carolina, S 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
States in the top quartile of fraction elderly: California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, Washington
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Table 3.6: Effect of Term Limits on OAA, ADC, AB, OASI
InfOAA per recipient) InfADC per recipient) InfAB per recipient) InfOASI per recipient)
NoLimit 0.075" -0.038 0.031 -0.007*
(0.034) (0.060) (0.025) (0.004)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly bottom quartile -0.065* -0.000
(0.038) (0.012)
NoLimit * Fraction elderly top quartile -0.106" 0.014
(0.047) (0.009)
NoLimit * Fraction 15 and below bottom quartile 0.088
(0.061)
NoLimit * Fraction 15 and below top quartile 0.127
(0.087)
NoLimit * Fraction blind bottom quartile -0.010
(0.077)
NoLimit * Fraction blind top quartile -0.003
(0.030)
% illiterate 0.127 0.126 -0.134 0.055
(0.117) (0.124) (0.086) (0.033)
Infaverage farm value) -0.052 0.295 0.117 -0.025
(0.206) (0.209) (0.141) (0.037)
% black 0.099 0.215"* 0.021 -0.002
(0.095) (0.063) (0.095) (0.028)
% Employment in manufacturing -0.088" -0.048 -0.118*** 0.003
(0.042) (0.050) (0.043) (0.015)
% Owner occupied housing 0.000 0.012 0.006 -0.017*"
(0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.005)
% Unemployed -1.967 -1.233 -1.696 -0.039
(1.691) (2.089) (2.234) (0.351)
Infaverage net personal income) 0.114 0.247 0.031 0.017
(0.118) (0.180) (0.155) (0.021)
In(OASI) -0.137 -0.108 -0.271*
(0.107) (0.174) (0.144)
State fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
State specific time trends yes yes yes yes
Number of observations 720 697 675 768
Adjusted R2 0.940 0.924 0.928 0.991
Notes: ‘significant at 10%, "significant at 5%, " ’significant at 1 %. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. The sample in all regressions cover all 
48 continental states in the 1931-1955 period. All variables except NoLimit are lagged one year. OAA, ADC, AB and OASI benefits are expressed in real terms 
(hundreds of 1982 USD), adjusted for differences in costs of living.
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Table 3.7: Effect of Term Limits on OAA, alternate proxy for A e
InfOAA benefits per recipients)
(1) (2) (3)
NoLimit 0.038* 0.111“ 0.121“
(0.021) (0.047) (0.056)
NoLimit * Personal net income bottom quartile -0.128“
(0.051)
-0.172“
(0.080)
NoLimit * Personal net income top quartile 
NoLimit * Margin
NoLimit * Personal net income bottom quartile * Margin 
NoLimit * Personal net income top quartile * Margin 
Fraction elderly bottom quartile * Margin 
Fraction elderly top quartile * Margin 
Margin
-0.096*
(0.051)
-0.155“
(0.075)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
% illiterate 0.134 0.128 0.109
(0.118) (0.117) (0.120)
Infaverage farm value) -0.038 -0.049 -0.009
(0.213) (0.205) (0.183)
% black 0.110 0.100 0.091
(0.092) (0.095) (0.098)
% Employment in manufacturing -0.082* -0.084* -0.075*
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
% Owner occupied housing 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
% Unemployed -2.092 -1.870 -1.989
(1.744) (1.700) (1.656)
infaverage net personal income) 0.113 0.119 0.117
(0.119) (0.121) (0.128)
InfOASI) -0.164 -0.144 -0.109
(0.103) (0.108) (0.117)
State fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
State specific time trends yes yes yes
Number of observations 720 720 718
Adjusted R2 0.940 0.940 0.940
Notes: ‘ significant at 10%, “ significant at 5%, ‘ “ significant at 1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. 
The sample in all regressions cover all 48 continental states in the 1931-1955 period. All variables except NoLimit are 
lagged one year. OAA benefits are expressed in real terms (hundreds of 1982 USD), adjusted for differences in costs of 
living.
States in the bottom quartile of net personal income: Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, N Dakota, Oregon, S 
Dakota, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin
States in the top quartile of net personal income: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, N 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
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Chapter 4
Rainy Tuesdays: 
D istinguishing Strategic 
from N aive Voters in U .S. 
Elections
4.1 Introduction
Elections provide an opportunity to study people’s strategic behavior and 
to determine whether they act equally strategically or not. The payoff to an 
individual in an election depend particularly on the action of the others. One 
hypothesis supported by the data, is th a t voters are heterogenous with respect 
to how strategic they are. I model this heterogeneity using simple functional 
forms and derive an equation which can be estim ated with the available data. I 
certainly do not rule out other hypotheses about how individuals decide whether 
to vote or not. For example, the same results can be explained through non­
additive costs of voting.
The essence of strategic behavior is taking into account the effect of others’ 
action on one’s own payoff. A typical assumption in strategic behavior models 
is th a t all players know equally well the effect of other players’ action on their 
own payoffs. How plausible is this assumption? After all, players are sometimes 
assumed to  be heterogenous with respect to their type. Then why not allow
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them  to also differ with respect to how strategic they are? Furthermore, if indi­
viduals differ with respect to how strategic they are, then what is the source of 
this heterogeneity? Are there particular characteristics which influence strate­
gicness?
W eather on the election day has been of interest to  campaign managers but 
also to academics. For example, a common view in the United States is tha t 
rain on election day favours the Republican party  with its more committed 
supporters. Many wonder what would have happened, had it not rained across 
the state of Ohio on the election day in 2004, given th a t Ohio was won by 
the Republicans by a slight margin. On a more serious note, Shachar and 
Nalebuff[1999] include rain as a determ inant of turnout and find th a t 1 inch of 
rain decreases turnout by 3.4 percent. I use rain on election day to distinguish 
between strategic and naive voters. Rain on election day has a different effect 
on the behavior of naive and strategic individuals. Naive people notice the rain 
and see it as a deterrent to go to the polls. Strategic people notice the rain 
and see it as deterrent but also as an encouragement to go the polls, precisely 
because they know it will discourage some people to go and hence their vote will 
carry a larger weight. Hence, rain increases the likelihood of voting for strategic 
relative to naive people. An im portant underlying assumption is th a t the shock 
to the cost of voting is additive, i.e. the increase in the cost of voting is the 
same for everybody affected by the shock. In my data  I control for an extensive 
set of individual characteristics, and for the tim e of day when the rain occurred. 
Hence, the assumption is in fact th a t the increase in the cost of voting is the 
same for everybody, conditional on the observable individual characteristics, 
including the time of the when individuals consider voting. The remainder of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature on voting 
behavior and turnout, Section 3 describes the model, Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 Literature
Anthony Downs [1957] is the first to look a t elections from an economic - cost 
and benefit- point of view. He mentions th a t when individuals decide whether 
or not to vote, they base their decision on candidate or party  differential, ben­
efits of living in a democracy, expected closeness, and expected turnout. He 
conjectures tha t the higher the first three the higher the benefit and hence the 
likelihood of voting. I follow his model but allow people to differ with respect to 
how well they understand the implications of expected turnout. Downs’ views 
are also supported by Tullock[1972] and Riker and Ordeshook[1968] who show 
empirically th a t increased expected closeness leads to an increased likelihood of 
voting. A radically different explanation of voting behavior is th a t of Ferejohn 
and Fiorina (1974, 1975). They argue th a t expected closeness does not have 
an effect on the decision to vote, as individuals simply want to minimize the 
maximum regret from the decision not taken. Hence, individuals vote as if they 
were the swing voter because the maximum regret is achieved by not voting in 
the event of a tied election.
More sophisticated and purely theoretical models of strategic voting are 
developed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985), and Feddersen and Pesendor- 
fer(1996, 1997). In their initial article (1983), Palfrey and Rosenthal propose 
a game theoretic model of voting behavior. Individuals vote over two alterna­
tives with fixed positions (i.e. the absolute candidate differential is equal across 
individuals). Individuals are split into two groups, based on their preferred al­
ternative and all have the same cost of voting. The game is one of complete 
information, in th a t the costs and preferences of each individual are known. In­
formation is nevertheless naturally imperfect as everybody votes (or abstains) 
at the same time. The authors show th a t there are two types of Nash equi­
libria, as the electorate size increases: one with turnout approaching zero and 
one with turnout approaching twice the percentage of the smaller group in the 
population. In their subsequent work (1985) the authors introduce uncertainty
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over costs and preferences, thus transforming the game into one of incomplete 
information. They show th a t there are no Bayesian Nash equilibria with high 
turnout, and only the individuals with negligible costs of voting do vote.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer(1996, 1997) analyze a model in which the source 
of uncertainty is the realization of a variable - the state of the world - the affects 
the payoff of all voters. Similarly to Palfrey and Rosenthal, individuals are 
split into groups based on their constant preferred position with an additional 
group of independents whose preferred position varies w ith the state of the 
world. Each individual knows her own group and receives a signal about the 
state of the world. The precision of the signal varies, some individuals receive 
perfectly accurate signals and know the state of the world, some receive an 
imperfect signal and are uncertain about the sta te  of the world. The authors 
show th a t uninformed voters who are indifferent between the two candidates 
(i.e. have the same expected utility from voting for any of the two) strictly 
prefer to abstain. This leads to an equilibrium in which some voters abstain 
although they strictly prefer one candidate over the other. The authors prove 
th a t despite these abstentions, if the only source of uncertainty is the state of the 
world, elections still fully aggregate information in th a t the chosen alternative 
would not change were the private information to become public knowledge.
Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) explain the strategic behavior of voters - as 
reflected in turnout being a positive function of expected closeness - through 
the activity of party  leaders. Party  leaders focus their effort geographically 
according to the chance of the effort to swing the election to their side. In turn, 
the likelihood of the effort being pivotal depends on expected closeness and the 
responsiveness of individuals to the effort. Their model is supported empirically 
by a structural estimation. Coate and Conlin (2004) use a similar structural 
estimation of turnout a t Texas liquor referenda to support their model which 
assumes individuals behave as group rule-utilitarians. They also use weather on 
election day as a proxy for costs of voting but do not find a  significant effect of 
weather on turnout.
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Finally, Bartels(1996) analyzes how the behavior of informed voters differs 
from th a t of informed voters. Unlike in this paper, the difference between in­
formed and uninformed voters is with regard to how they vote not to whether 
or not they vote. The author finds th a t the difference between the actual prob­
ability of vote for the Republican candidate and the hypothetical probability of 
a fully informed voter is about ten percentage points.
4.3 M odel
I am assuming th a t there is heterogeneity among voters with respect to how 
strategic they are and I am trying to find out what determines this heterogeneity. 
The model is an adaptation of Riker and Ordeshook [1968]. Individual i is 
characterized by the following: a preference over the chosen alternative, X , 
represented by Ui(X)\ a cost of voting, made up of an individual cost q ,  and an 
exogenous shock e (the costs enter linearly in her utility); a benefit from living 
in a functioning democracy, di > 0, and a positive measure of how strategic she 
is, crj >  0 .
The individual can vote for the two available alternatives, R  and L , or ab­
stain. If she votes, she attributes a subjective probability p f  to R  winning, 
and a subjective probability to democracy being m aintained through a high 
enough turnout, and faces cost c* +  e. If she does not vote, she attributes a sub­
jective probability p ^ v  to R  winning and X ^ v  to democracy being maintained, 
and faces no cost. Then the subjective value of her vote is the difference between 
the utility of voting and the utility of not voting (I am dropping subscripts):
V  = {pv  -  p NV) \u{R) -  u{L) | +  (Xv  -  X NV)d - c - e  (4.1)
P  = p v  — pNV can be seen as the difference her vote makes in electing the 
candidate and A =  Xv  — XNV - as the difference her vote makes in maintaining 
democracy. The individual will vote if and only if V  > 0.
P  and A depend on T  - subjective expected turnout. Expected turnout is
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a function of, among other things, the exogenous shocks in the cost of voting. 
T  =  T (e ,.), with ^  < 0. The larger the shock the lower the expected turnout. 
The magnitude of the effect of T  on P  and A depends on a. P  = P( T , a ) ,  with 
<  0, =  0 for a = 0 and <  0. Similarly A =  A (T ,a), with < 0,
=  0 for cr =  0 and qYq0 < 0. These are to say th a t the individual believes 
th a t the higher the turnout the lower the difference her vote makes both in 
term s of electing the candidate and maintaining democracy. More importantly, 
the more strategic she is the stronger this relationship. For a completely naive 
individual (cr =  0), there is no relationship between expected turnout and the 
difference her vote makes. The link between the value of the vote, magnitude 
of the shock and strategicness can then be summarized by:
meaning th a t for a given exogenous shock, the value of one’s vote increases 
more, the more strategic she is.
To make this link more tractable and usable in an estim ation I will now 
simplify the model, by introducing more specific functional forms for P , A, and 
T.
T  =  To — he
P  = P0 + a f ( T ) , f  < 0
A =  A0 +  <rg(T),g' < 0
Furthermore I will assume th a t a E {0,1}, 0 representing a naive individual and 
1- a strategic individual. Hence, the difference between the value of the vote for 
the strategic and the naive voter is:
V s - V N = /(To -  he) MB) -  u(L) I + <?(To -  he)d (4.3)
which is increasing in epsilon. This allows me to design a simple test to deter­
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mine which individual characteristics determine how strategic she is. First, I 
identify an exogenous shock to the cost of voting: rain on election day. Second, 
I look at how this shock affects the differential in the probability of voting 
across categories of voters. Rain has a first order effect - a higher cost of voting 
reduces the payoff from voting and thus reduces the probability of the vote. In 
addition, rain has two second order effects th a t work through expected turnout - 
a higher cost of voting implies a lower expected turnout. First, a lower expected 
turnout leads to an increased probability of being a pivotal voter. Second, a 
lower expected turnout implies an increased responsibility to m aintain a demo­
cratic system. W hen one expects fewer voters one’s abstention has an increased 
chance to disrupt the democratic system through a near-zero overall turnout. 
These two indirect effect thus increase the probability of the vote.
The identifying assumption is tha t voters who are naive (i.e. less strategic) 
do not take into account the indirect effects1. Thus, for the same shock to the 
cost of voting the probability of the vote decreases more for naive voters than 
for strategic voters, when controlling for and interacting with differences in the 
party /candidate differential and in the benefit from democracy. An underlying 
assumption is th a t the majority of people are not aware of the second order ef­
fect, otherwise a higher cost of voting would not imply a lower expected turnout. 
Another assumption is th a t the shock to the cost of voting is additive, i.e. the 
increase in the cost of voting is the same for everybody affected by the shock. 
This is of course a rather strong assumption. It is not a stretch of imagination 
to think th a t some people have better means of protecting themselves from the 
elements than  others. However in my data  I control for an extensive set of indi­
vidual characteristics, so the assumption is in fact th a t the increase in the cost 
of voting is the same for everybody, conditional on the observable individual 
characteristics. Furthermore, using hourly measures of rain I can isolate vari­
ation in rain at particular times in the day. Since individuals th a t intend to 
vote at similar times are likely to be equally affected by rain, the differential
1 One can be too strategic, thinking of third and higher order effects, but I leave this aside.
133
effect of rain on these individuals is more likely to reflect differences in strategic 
behavior.
4.4 D ata
V oting  data
The voting data  comes from the National Election Studies2 1948-2002 cu­
mulative datafile. The NES survey is administered in the United States in all 
electoral years, (including Presidential and M idterm election years) to  a sample 
of roughly 2,000 individuals from all states. Presidential elections take place 
on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in years divisible by four. 
The survey contains a comprehensive set of personal characteristics and politi­
cal variables. The respondents include both voters and non-voters. The data  is 
a repeated cross section. I am using sample from 1972-1998, 14 election years 
(looking both at Presidential and M idterm elections) Before 1972 and after 1998 
county information is not recorded in the survey so it cannot be matched with 
weather data. The sample size is approximately 27,500 and the unit of obser­
vation is the individual. The summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1, 
Table 4.2, and Table 4.3. The absolute candidate differential is measured as 
the absolute value of the difference between the therm om eter ratings for the 
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates.
W eather data
The weather da ta  comes from the datasets available a t the National Climate 
D ata Center3. There are two datasets of interest, containing daily and hourly 
meteorological data. The daily weather dataset4 contains cumulative amount 
of rain, snow for the entire election day (24hrs) and maximum and minimum
2Available to  download from w w w .um ich.edu/~N ES
3 Available at w w w .ncdc.noaa.gov. The datasets can be downloaded free of charge if ac­
cessed from a US educational server (.edu).
4U.S. D aily Surface D ata TD 3200 /3210/3206/3205
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tem perature for the entire election day. The hourly data5 contains hour by hour 
rain amount, throughout the election day. The daily da ta  has the advantage 
th a t it is available for all counties, almost every year. The disadvantage is th a t 
it is more noisy: since it contains cumulative measures, rain during the night is 
no different from rain during the day; in addition as measurements are recorded 
during the day, the information for two consecutive days must be used to cover 
the entire election day. The hourly data  has the obvious advantage th a t is hour 
by hour, hence more accurate. The disadvantage is th a t it is available for a 
lot fewer counties and fewer years per county. The year by year averages are 
presented in Table 4.4. Hourly data  can be used to validate the daily amounts. 
For example, the unusually high daily value in 1972 is confirmed by the hourly 
amount. The unit of observation is the weather station.
The location of the individuals survey in the NES is most closely described 
by the county they reside in at the time of the interview. Therefore, in order 
to link the individual to the weather data, county level weather information is 
constructed by averaging the readings of all weather stations in the county. The 
voting data  is then merged with voting data  by state-county-year.
4.5 R esu lts
To identify whether differences in education translate into differences in 
strategicness I use a difference-in-difference-in-difference model. In addition, 
the data  structure allows several fixed effects to control for unobserved vari­
ables. The equation to identify whether, for example, education leads to  a 
higher probability of being strategic is:
Picst =  a l+ali+PX ics t+ jedu ics t+Srainc t+T jcanddics t+O eduics tX rainct+Sics t
(4.4)
5U.S. Hourly Precipitation D ata TD3240
135
where PiCSt is the probability th a t individual i votes, in county c, in sta te  s, 
in year t. The state xyear fixed effect controls for any state level variables, 
including those tha t change over time. For example, this fixed effect would 
control for whether the individual finds herself in a "swing", "blue", or "red" 
state. The county fixed effect controls for any county level variable th a t do not 
change over time. Perhaps the most im portant county level control is for the 
normal weather conditions. Certainly an extra inch of rain in a typically rainy 
county has a different impact than  one in a typically dry county.
Education is measured by a categorical variable which records the highest 
level of education completed: grade school, high school, college without degree, 
and college with degree. The results are presented in Table 4.5. In the first 
column I use the daily measure of rain. In this first column it can be observed 
th a t an inch of rain increases the likelihood of voting for an individual who 
has finished high school by 14 percent more than  for an individual with only 
a grade school education. This is consistent with the hypothesis th a t finishing 
high school induces a more strategic voting behavior relative to finishing only 
grade school. Furthermore, the total effect of rain on the likelihood of voting 
for a person who has finished high school or more -obtained by adding the 
coefficient for rain with the relevant interaction- is not significantly different 
from zero. This is to say th a t for individuals w ith more than  grade school, rain 
has no effect on their likelihood of voting, whereas for individuals with only 
grade school it has a negative effect. Similar differential effects can be observed 
for having some or a complete college education. In columns 2 through 5 I 
use hourly measures of rain. As hourly measures were taken in a much smaller 
number of counties, the sample size drops considerably. In column two I use the 
amount of rainfall for the entire voting day, 7am to 10pm.6. The signs of the 
coefficients are identical to those in column one and the sizes are quite similar. 
However, the coefficients are not precisely measured, perhaps due to the smaller 
sample size. In columns 3 through 5 I break down the hourly measure of rain
6 All hours are expressed in the local time of the county.
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into three intervals, 7am-12pm, 12pm-5pm, and 5pm-10pm, and interact the 
amount of rain during these intervals with the education measures one at a 
time. The results in column 3 show th a t the differential effect of rain in the 
7am-12pm interval is very large and precisely estimated. An inch of rain drops 
the likelihood tha t an individual with only a grade school education votes by 
85 percent, while leaving this likelihood unchanged for people with at least a 
high school education. By focusing on the effect of rain in this particular time 
interval, I can further address the concerns th a t the differential effect of rain 
is due to unobserved differences in the cost of voting. The individuals who, 
perhaps because of constraints in their schedule, are only considering voting in 
the 7am-12pm interval are the ones who will be affected by rain in this interval. 
They are also more likely to represent a homogenous group with regards to the 
increase in cost of voting due to rain.
In all the regressions it can be observed th a t the larger the absolute candi­
date differential - a measure of the difference in utilities derived from the two 
candidates - the larger the likelihood of voting. This supports the Downsian 
conjecture[1957] tha t the less perceived difference between candidate the lower 
the likelihood of voting.
The available data  allows for an even more accurate test to distinguish be­
tween the story of differences in strategicness and th a t of unobserved differences 
in the cost of voting. All th a t is needed is a circumstance under which each vote 
weighs heavier but without increasing the cost of voting. An exogenous change 
in the closeness of the election which does not change the cost of voting would 
be such a circumstance. A plausibly exogenous source of within state-variation 
in closeness is the type of House race. In the congressional districts where no 
incumbent is running for re-election and no candidate is running unopposed the 
election is more likely to be up for grabs and hence expected closeness is higher. 
The race for the House is "open" in roughly 10 percent of the cases. Since the 
type of house race changes over time for the same congressional district this 
variable is identified at the county-year level. Interacting the dummy for open
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House race with the education measures allows us to further distinguish between 
the two stories. Consider the estim ating equation:
P ic s t  =  a l + a % t + l 3 X i Cat + 'Y e d u i CSt + 5 o p e n ct + r i c a n d d i Cs t + 0 e d u i CSt X o p e r i c t + £ i Cat
(4.5)
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4.6. A change in the 
type of House race does not change the cost of voting, but only the weight of 
the vote. Hence, th a t I observe the 9s to be similar in sign and significance 
to those estim ated in the rain equation is further proof th a t the results in the 
rain equation are driven by differences in strategicness. The more educated 
individuals realize the increase in the weight of their vote and hence turnout 
in larger numbers. A note of caution should be made. The open race and 
the rain are not perfectly comparable effects, in particular because everybody 
knows whether i t ’s raining or not, but not everybody knows th a t the House 
election is made more competitive in the absence of an incumbent. Therefore 
the differential effect of the open race by education level can be decomposed 
into differences in strategicness and differences in knowledge. W ithout further 
da ta  I can not gauge the relative sizes of these two components.
4.6 C onclusion
This paper adds a simple modification to the older models of strategic voting 
by allowing individuals to differ in their understanding of the rules of the game. 
In addition, this paper presents a  simple approach to the paradox of non-voting 
and backs up its claims with empirical results. The results show th a t it is not 
implausible to think individuals differ with respect to how strategically they 
behave. Education is significant in determining this heterogeneity. The caveat 
mentioned in the introduction about the reliance on the assumption of additive 
costs of voting is not a minor one and needs to  be kept in mind. By focusing 
on subgroups of the population among which voting costs are plausibly additive
138
and by highlighting a situation where the costs of voting do not change, I have 
presented suggestive but not definitive evidence th a t differences in strategicness 
do play a role in explaining the observed outcomes.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Percentage/
Mean
Total nr. obs
Age 45.19
(SD) (17.81) 27,482
Female 55.91 27,591
Race W hite 80.47
Black 11.70
Hispanic 4.36 27,443
Education Grade School(0-8) 11.29
High School(9-12) 47.66
Some college (13+) 21.93
College(degree) 19.11 27,318
Location City 25.93
Suburban 39.10
Rural 34.97 27,591
Income percentile 0-16 16.71
17-33 16.17
34-67 34.07
68-95 27.84
96-100 5.21 25,200
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Continued
Percentage/
Mean
Total nr. obs
Occupation Prof. & manag. 25.70
Clerical & sales 19.52
Skilled & service 33.77
Laborer&Farmer 5.27
Homemaker 15.74 26,473
Employment Employed 59.78
Not Employed 8.20
Retired 14.26
Homemaker 17.76 27,552
Church Every week 26.22
Almost 11.55
Few a month 13.16
Few a year 24.68
Never 19.52
No religious 4.86 27,268
Home own 67.48 27,264
Married 58.67 27,504
Media Days Read news 3.83
(SD) (2.92) 15,515
Days TV  news 4.50
(SD) (2.67) 15,505
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Table 4.3: Summary of Political Variables
Percentage/
Mean
Total nr. obs
Vote Not registered 20.64
Reg. no vote 13.92
Reg. & vote 65.44 23,740
Interest in election Not much 26.69
Somewhat 44.99
Very 28.31 25,899
Interest in public Hardly 13.37
affairs Now and then 21.86
Some time 35.75
Most time 28.73 25,392
Contact by major party 25.58 24,250
Close pres election 57.32 14,153
Party ID Strong D 17.26
Weak D 21.26
Ind D 12.29
Ind Ind 12.30
Ind R 10.87
Weak R 14.22
Strong R 10.80 27,440
Absolute Cand diff 33.51
(SD) (26.51) 18,186
Absolute Party diff 27.16
(SD) (25.58) 19,873
Table 4.4: Rain Summary, in 1/100 inches
Daily rain Hourly rain 07-22
Year Mean SD N Mean SD N
1972 100.07 111.41 2,607 35.93 36.64 1,124
1974 30.94 33.47 1,534 15.48 16.07 568
1976 4.26 21.64 2,201 16.37 22.37 163
1978 15.76 24.39 2,183 15.75 20.65 667
1980 12.76 18.38 1,563 17.58 17.00 444
1982 35.85 53.94 1,355 27.53 29.22 409
1984 8.58 20.70 2,243 16.61 19.73 293
1986 29.51 46.16 2,080 31.18 41.57 538
1988 11.39 19.09 1,978 10.15 8.32 441
1990 17.13 21.58 1,943 10.09 11.04 591
1992 53.01 64.57 2,414 30.64 32.98 766
1994 16.32 26.80 1,688 14.37 20.71 394
1996 7.30 17.37 1,634 5.17 9.87 312
1998 10.89 23.00 1,166 6.00 9.87 279
Total 27.68 54.93 26,589 20.88 27.86 6,989
Note: daily rain is the sum of rain on election and following day
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Table 4.5: Effect of education on strategic behavior
I^qi1\/ rom
Hourly rain Hourly rain Hourly rain Hourly rain
L J t X l l y  IdJH 7am-10pm 7am-12pm 12pm-5pm 5pm-10pm
Daily rain -0.1501***
(0.0493)
Hourly rain 7am-10pm -0.2661
(0.1903)
Hourly rain 7am-12pm -0.8498*** -0.0185 -0.0174
(0.3212) (0.1616) (0.1616)
Hourly rain 12pm-5pm -0.1641 -0.0520 -0.1695
(0.2810) (0.4137) (0.2815)
Hourly rain 5pm-10pm -0.0019 0.0077 -0.0458
(0.3501) (0.3509) (0.4388)
Candidate differential 0.0574*** 0.0666* 0.0637* 0.0630* 0.0637*
(0.0186) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0376)
High School -0.0247 0.0226 -0.0027 0.0773 0.0627
(0.0214) (0.0542) (0.0467) (0.0489) (0.0472)
Some college -0.0020 0.0399 0.0355 0.1007* 0.0823*
(0.0229) (0.0567) (0.0495) (0.0515) (0.0497)
College degree 0.0095 0.0447 0.0371 0.1003* 0.0952*
(0.0241) (0.0592) (0.0520) (0.0537) (0.0520)
High School * Rain measure 0.1392*** 0.1397 0.8918*** -0.3109 -0.1100
(0.0485) (0.1536) (0.2948) (0.3132) (0.2747)
Some college * Rain measure 0.1799*** 0.2585 0.8475*** -0.0351 0.2861
(0.0493) (0.1577) (0.2941) (0.3199) (0.2973)
College degree * Rain measure 0.1678*** 0.2389 0.8772*** 0.0482 0.0571
(0.0494) (0.1600) (0.2947) (0.3404) (0.3011)
Adjusted R2 0.184 0.203 0.205 0.201 0.202
Number of observations 6,587 1,544 1,544 1,544 1,544
Notes: The dependent variable is whether an individual voted, either in a presidential or mid-term election 
The equations are estimated using a linear probability model 
The rain measure used in the interactions is one specificied in the column header 
Rain is measured in inches; daily rain is measured over the election date and the following day; 
hourly rain is measured during the election day 
Candidate differential is measured on a scale fromO to 0.97
Controls included but not reported: employment status, occupation, income, gender, race, urbanism, marital,
homeownership, exposure to media, interest in election
The equations include State*year, and county fixed effects
Robust standard errors, clustered at county*year level in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.6: Effect of Open House Race
Candidate differential 0.0603***
(0.0185)
High School -0.0101
(0.0207)
Some college 0.0211
(0.0223)
College degree 0.0351
(0.0235)
Open House race -0.0583
(0.0568)
High School * Open House race 0.0375**
(0.0163)
Some college * Open House race 0.0501**
(0.0240)
College degree * Open House race 0.0442**
(0.0204)
Adjusted R2 
Number of observations
0.184
6,807
Notes: The dependent variable is whether an individual voted in a House election
The equations are estimated using a linear probability model
The omitted education category is grade school (at most 8 years o f education)
Candidate differential is measured on a scale from 0 to 0.97
Controls included but not reported: employment status, occupation, income, gender, race, urbanism,
marital, homeownership, exposure to media, interest in election
The equations include State*year, and county fixed effects
Robust standard errors, clustered at county*year level in parenthesis
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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